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Migrate Sirupsen to sirupsen.

This commit is contained in:
Ludovic Fernandez 2018-01-22 12:16:03 +01:00 committed by Traefiker
parent c134dcd6fe
commit fb4ba7af2b
684 changed files with 92394 additions and 33943 deletions

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go generated vendored Normal file

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package autocert provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
// and any other ACME-based CA.
//
// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
package autocert
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
mathrand "math/rand"
"net"
"net/http"
"path"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
)
// createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state
// entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call.
// This is a variable instead of a const for testing.
// TODO: Consider making it configurable or an exp backoff?
var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute
// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use.
var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
func init() {
src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano())
pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
}
// AcceptTOS is a Manager.Prompt function that always returns true to
// indicate acceptance of the CA's Terms of Service during account
// registration.
func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
// HostPolicy specifies which host names the Manager is allowed to respond to.
// It returns a non-nil error if the host should be rejected.
// The returned error is accessible via tls.Conn.Handshake and its callers.
// See Manager's HostPolicy field and GetCertificate method docs for more details.
type HostPolicy func(ctx context.Context, host string) error
// HostWhitelist returns a policy where only the specified host names are allowed.
// Only exact matches are currently supported. Subdomains, regexp or wildcard
// will not match.
func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy {
whitelist := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts))
for _, h := range hosts {
whitelist[h] = true
}
return func(_ context.Context, host string) error {
if !whitelist[host] {
return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured")
}
return nil
}
}
// defaultHostPolicy is used when Manager.HostPolicy is not set.
func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error {
return nil
}
// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client.
// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-sni-01",
// "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types, as well as providing them
// to a TLS server via tls.Config.
//
// You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache,
// to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts.
// Otherwise your server is very likely to exceed the certificate
// issuer's request rate limits.
type Manager struct {
// Prompt specifies a callback function to conditionally accept a CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's TOS.
// If so, Manager calls Prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
// whether the caller agrees to the terms.
//
// To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS.
Prompt func(tosURL string) bool
// Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates.
// If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager.
//
// Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public
// parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first.
Cache Cache
// HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt
// to retrieve new certificates for. It does not affect cached certs.
//
// If non-nil, HostPolicy is called before requesting a new cert.
// If nil, all hosts are currently allowed. This is not recommended,
// as it opens a potential attack where clients connect to a server
// by IP address and pretend to be asking for an incorrect host name.
// Manager will attempt to obtain a certificate for that host, incorrectly,
// eventually reaching the CA's rate limit for certificate requests
// and making it impossible to obtain actual certificates.
//
// See GetCertificate for more details.
HostPolicy HostPolicy
// RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should
// be renewed before they expire.
//
// If zero, they're renewed 30 days before expiration.
RenewBefore time.Duration
// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
// and requesting new certificates.
// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL
// directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key.
//
// Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
Client *acme.Client
// Email optionally specifies a contact email address.
// This is used by CAs, such as Let's Encrypt, to notify about problems
// with issued certificates.
//
// If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used.
Email string
// ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys.
//
// If false, a default is used. Currently the default
// is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve.
ForceRSA bool
clientMu sync.Mutex
client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
stateMu sync.Mutex
state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name
// renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers.
// It is keyed by domain name.
renewalMu sync.Mutex
renewal map[string]*domainRenewal
// tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens.
tokensMu sync.RWMutex
// tryHTTP01 indicates whether the Manager should try "http-01" challenge type
// during the authorization flow.
tryHTTP01 bool
// httpTokens contains response body values for http-01 challenges
// and is keyed by the URL path at which a challenge response is expected
// to be provisioned.
// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
httpTokens map[string][]byte
// certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni challenges
// and is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name of ClientHello.
// Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix.
// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate
}
// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook.
// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering
// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored.
//
// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting
// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation.
// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible.
// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details.
func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
if m.Prompt == nil {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set")
}
name := hello.ServerName
if name == "" {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing server name")
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.Trim(name, "."), ".") {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name component count invalid")
}
if strings.ContainsAny(name, `/\`) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name contains invalid character")
}
// In the worst-case scenario, the timeout needs to account for caching, host policy,
// domain ownership verification and certificate issuance.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
// check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge
if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") {
m.tokensMu.RLock()
defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil {
return cert, nil
}
if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name); err == nil {
return cert, nil
}
// TODO: cache error results?
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token cert for %q", name)
}
// regular domain
name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114
cert, err := m.cert(ctx, name)
if err == nil {
return cert, nil
}
if err != ErrCacheMiss {
return nil, err
}
// first-time
if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
return cert, nil
}
// HTTPHandler configures the Manager to provision ACME "http-01" challenge responses.
// It returns an http.Handler that responds to the challenges and must be
// running on port 80. If it receives a request that is not an ACME challenge,
// it delegates the request to the optional fallback handler.
//
// If fallback is nil, the returned handler redirects all GET and HEAD requests
// to the default TLS port 443 with 302 Found status code, preserving the original
// request path and query. It responds with 400 Bad Request to all other HTTP methods.
// The fallback is not protected by the optional HostPolicy.
//
// Because the fallback handler is run with unencrypted port 80 requests,
// the fallback should not serve TLS-only requests.
//
// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use TLS SNI
// challenges for domain verification.
func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
m.tryHTTP01 = true
if fallback == nil {
fallback = http.HandlerFunc(handleHTTPRedirect)
}
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/acme-challenge/") {
fallback.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
// A reasonable context timeout for cache and host policy only,
// because we don't wait for a new certificate issuance here.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), time.Minute)
defer cancel()
if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, r.Host); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
data, err := m.httpToken(ctx, r.URL.Path)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
w.Write(data)
})
}
func handleHTTPRedirect(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != "GET" && r.Method != "HEAD" {
http.Error(w, "Use HTTPS", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
target := "https://" + stripPort(r.Host) + r.URL.RequestURI()
http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound)
}
func stripPort(hostport string) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hostport)
if err != nil {
return hostport
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, "443")
}
// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache.
// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled
// with the cached value.
func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
m.stateMu.Lock()
if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok {
m.stateMu.Unlock()
s.RLock()
defer s.RUnlock()
return s.tlscert()
}
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign")
}
if m.state == nil {
m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
}
s := &certState{
key: signer,
cert: cert.Certificate,
leaf: cert.Leaf,
}
m.state[name] = s
go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
return cert, nil
}
// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise.
// If a cached certficate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned.
func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
if m.Cache == nil {
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// private
priv, pub := pem.Decode(data)
if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
privKey, err := parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// public
var pubDER [][]byte
for len(pub) > 0 {
var b *pem.Block
b, pub = pem.Decode(pub)
if b == nil {
break
}
pubDER = append(pubDER, b.Bytes)
}
if len(pub) > 0 {
// Leftover content not consumed by pem.Decode. Corrupt. Ignore.
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
// verify and create TLS cert
leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
tlscert := &tls.Certificate{
Certificate: pubDER,
PrivateKey: privKey,
Leaf: leaf,
}
return tlscert, nil
}
func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
if m.Cache == nil {
return nil
}
// contains PEM-encoded data
var buf bytes.Buffer
// private
switch key := tlscert.PrivateKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
return err
}
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
b := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
return err
}
default:
return errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type")
}
// public
for _, b := range tlscert.Certificate {
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b}
if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes())
}
func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
b, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
if err != nil {
return err
}
pb := &pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
return pem.Encode(w, pb)
}
// createCert starts the domain ownership verification and returns a certificate
// for that domain upon success.
//
// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete.
// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process.
func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
// TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once
state, err := m.certState(domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// state may exist if another goroutine is already working on it
// in which case just wait for it to finish
if !state.locked {
state.RLock()
defer state.RUnlock()
return state.tlscert()
}
// We are the first; state is locked.
// Unblock the readers when domain ownership is verified
// and we got the cert or the process failed.
defer state.Unlock()
state.locked = false
der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain)
if err != nil {
// Remove the failed state after some time,
// making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello.
time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() {
defer testDidRemoveState(domain)
m.stateMu.Lock()
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
// Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid
// before deleting.
s, ok := m.state[domain]
if !ok {
return
}
if _, err := validCert(domain, s.cert, s.key); err == nil {
return
}
delete(m.state, domain)
})
return nil, err
}
state.cert = der
state.leaf = leaf
go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
return state.tlscert()
}
// certState returns a new or existing certState.
// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked.
// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created.
func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
m.stateMu.Lock()
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
if m.state == nil {
m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
}
// existing state
if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok {
return state, nil
}
// new locked state
var (
err error
key crypto.Signer
)
if m.ForceRSA {
key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
} else {
key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
state := &certState{
key: key,
locked: true,
}
state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller
m.state[domain] = state
return state, nil
}
// authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
// The key argument is the certificate private key.
func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, domain); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
csr, err := certRequest(key, domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return der, leaf, nil
}
// verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error {
// The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill
// in this specific order.
challengeTypes := []string{"tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"}
m.tokensMu.RLock()
if m.tryHTTP01 {
challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01")
}
m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try
for {
// Start domain authorization and get the challenge.
authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status
// is in a final state.
switch authz.Status {
case acme.StatusValid:
return nil // already authorized
case acme.StatusInvalid:
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI)
}
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
var chal *acme.Challenge
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], authz.Challenges)
nextTyp++
}
if chal == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q; tried %q", domain, challengeTypes)
}
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal)
if err != nil {
continue
}
defer cleanup()
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
continue
}
// A challenge is fulfilled and accepted: wait for the CA to validate.
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err == nil {
return nil
}
}
}
// fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal.
// The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded.
func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge) (cleanup func(), err error) {
switch chal.Type {
case "tls-sni-01":
cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.putCertToken(ctx, name, &cert)
return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(name) }, nil
case "tls-sni-02":
cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.putCertToken(ctx, name, &cert)
return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(name) }, nil
case "http-01":
resp, err := client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(chal.Token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
p := client.HTTP01ChallengePath(chal.Token)
m.putHTTPToken(ctx, p, resp)
return func() { go m.deleteHTTPToken(p) }, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type)
}
func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge {
for _, c := range chal {
if c.Type == typ {
return c
}
}
return nil
}
// putCertToken stores the cert under the named key in both m.certTokens map
// and m.Cache.
func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
if m.certTokens == nil {
m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
}
m.certTokens[name] = cert
m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
}
// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate for the specified domain name
// from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
delete(m.certTokens, name)
if m.Cache != nil {
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name)
}
}
// httpToken retrieves an existing http-01 token value from an in-memory map
// or the optional cache.
func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, error) {
m.tokensMu.RLock()
defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
if v, ok := m.httpTokens[tokenPath]; ok {
return v, nil
}
if m.Cache == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token at %q", tokenPath)
}
return m.Cache.Get(ctx, httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
}
// putHTTPToken stores an http-01 token value using tokenPath as key
// in both in-memory map and the optional Cache.
//
// It ignores any error returned from Cache.Put.
func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
if m.httpTokens == nil {
m.httpTokens = make(map[string][]byte)
}
b := []byte(val)
m.httpTokens[tokenPath] = b
if m.Cache != nil {
m.Cache.Put(ctx, httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath), b)
}
}
// deleteHTTPToken removes an http-01 token value from both in-memory map
// and the optional Cache, ignoring any error returned from the latter.
//
// If m.Cache is non-nil, it blocks until Cache.Delete returns without a timeout.
func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
delete(m.httpTokens, tokenPath)
if m.Cache != nil {
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath))
}
}
// httpTokenCacheKey returns a key at which an http-01 token value may be stored
// in the Manager's optional Cache.
func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
return "http-01-" + path.Base(tokenPath)
}
// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
//
// The loop is scheduled in two cases:
// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state)
// - a new cert was created by m.createCert
//
// The key argument is a certificate private key.
// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
m.renewalMu.Lock()
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
if m.renewal[domain] != nil {
// another goroutine is already on it
return
}
if m.renewal == nil {
m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal)
}
dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key}
m.renewal[domain] = dr
dr.start(exp)
}
// stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers.
// The timers are not restarted during the lifetime of the Manager.
func (m *Manager) stopRenew() {
m.renewalMu.Lock()
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
for name, dr := range m.renewal {
delete(m.renewal, name)
dr.stop()
}
}
func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
const keyName = "acme_account.key"
genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
}
if m.Cache == nil {
return genKey()
}
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName)
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
key, err := genKey()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := m.Cache.Put(ctx, keyName, buf.Bytes()); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return key, nil
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
priv, _ := pem.Decode(data)
if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid account key found in cache")
}
return parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
}
func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
m.clientMu.Lock()
defer m.clientMu.Unlock()
if m.client != nil {
return m.client, nil
}
client := m.Client
if client == nil {
client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL}
}
if client.Key == nil {
var err error
client.Key, err = m.accountKey(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
var contact []string
if m.Email != "" {
contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email}
}
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact}
_, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict {
// conflict indicates the key is already registered
m.client = client
err = nil
}
return m.client, err
}
func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
if m.HostPolicy != nil {
return m.HostPolicy
}
return defaultHostPolicy
}
func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
if m.RenewBefore > renewJitter {
return m.RenewBefore
}
return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
}
// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading.
type certState struct {
sync.RWMutex
locked bool // locked for read/write
key crypto.Signer // private key for cert
cert [][]byte // DER encoding
leaf *x509.Certificate // parsed cert[0]; always non-nil if cert != nil
}
// tlscert creates a tls.Certificate from s.key and s.cert.
// Callers should wrap it in s.RLock() and s.RUnlock().
func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
if s.key == nil {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing signer")
}
if len(s.cert) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing certificate")
}
return &tls.Certificate{
PrivateKey: s.key,
Certificate: s.cert,
Leaf: s.leaf,
}, nil
}
// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn
// and optional SANs.
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
DNSNames: san,
}
return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
}
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys.
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
//
// Inspired by parsePrivateKey in crypto/tls/tls.go.
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) {
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
return key, nil
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
return key, nil
default:
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
}
}
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
return key, nil
}
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key")
}
// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0],
// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates.
// It doesn't do any revocation checking.
//
// The returned value is the verified leaf cert.
func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
// parse public part(s)
var n int
for _, b := range der {
n += len(b)
}
pub := make([]byte, n)
n = 0
for _, b := range der {
n += copy(pub[n:], b)
}
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub)
if len(x509Cert) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found")
}
// verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name
leaf = x509Cert[0]
now := timeNow()
if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet")
}
if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate")
}
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key
switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
}
if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
}
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
}
if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
}
default:
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm")
}
return leaf, nil
}
func retryAfter(v string) time.Duration {
if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
return time.Duration(i) * time.Second
}
if t, err := http.ParseTime(v); err == nil {
return t.Sub(timeNow())
}
return time.Second
}
type lockedMathRand struct {
sync.Mutex
rnd *mathrand.Rand
}
func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 {
r.Lock()
n := r.rnd.Int63n(max)
r.Unlock()
return n
}
// For easier testing.
var (
timeNow = time.Now
// Called when a state is removed.
testDidRemoveState = func(domain string) {}
)

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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package autocert
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io/ioutil"
"os"
"path/filepath"
)
// ErrCacheMiss is returned when a certificate is not found in cache.
var ErrCacheMiss = errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate cache miss")
// Cache is used by Manager to store and retrieve previously obtained certificates
// as opaque data.
//
// The key argument of the methods refers to a domain name but need not be an FQDN.
// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern.
type Cache interface {
// Get returns a certificate data for the specified key.
// If there's no such key, Get returns ErrCacheMiss.
Get(ctx context.Context, key string) ([]byte, error)
// Put stores the data in the cache under the specified key.
// Underlying implementations may use any data storage format,
// as long as the reverse operation, Get, results in the original data.
Put(ctx context.Context, key string, data []byte) error
// Delete removes a certificate data from the cache under the specified key.
// If there's no such key in the cache, Delete returns nil.
Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error
}
// DirCache implements Cache using a directory on the local filesystem.
// If the directory does not exist, it will be created with 0700 permissions.
type DirCache string
// Get reads a certificate data from the specified file name.
func (d DirCache) Get(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]byte, error) {
name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
var (
data []byte
err error
done = make(chan struct{})
)
go func() {
data, err = ioutil.ReadFile(name)
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-done:
}
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
return data, err
}
// Put writes the certificate data to the specified file name.
// The file will be created with 0600 permissions.
func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error {
if err := os.MkdirAll(string(d), 0700); err != nil {
return err
}
done := make(chan struct{})
var err error
go func() {
defer close(done)
var tmp string
if tmp, err = d.writeTempFile(name, data); err != nil {
return
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
// Don't overwrite the file if the context was canceled.
default:
newName := filepath.Join(string(d), name)
err = os.Rename(tmp, newName)
}
}()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-done:
}
return err
}
// Delete removes the specified file name.
func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
name = filepath.Join(string(d), name)
var (
err error
done = make(chan struct{})
)
go func() {
err = os.Remove(name)
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-done:
}
if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return err
}
return nil
}
// writeTempFile writes b to a temporary file, closes the file and returns its path.
func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (string, error) {
// TempFile uses 0600 permissions
f, err := ioutil.TempFile(string(d), prefix)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if _, err := f.Write(b); err != nil {
f.Close()
return "", err
}
return f.Name(), f.Close()
}

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// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package autocert
import (
"crypto/tls"
"log"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"time"
)
// NewListener returns a net.Listener that listens on the standard TLS
// port (443) on all interfaces and returns *tls.Conn connections with
// LetsEncrypt certificates for the provided domain or domains.
//
// It enables one-line HTTPS servers:
//
// log.Fatal(http.Serve(autocert.NewListener("example.com"), handler))
//
// NewListener is a convenience function for a common configuration.
// More complex or custom configurations can use the autocert.Manager
// type instead.
//
// Use of this function implies acceptance of the LetsEncrypt Terms of
// Service. If domains is not empty, the provided domains are passed
// to HostWhitelist. If domains is empty, the listener will do
// LetsEncrypt challenges for any requested domain, which is not
// recommended.
//
// Certificates are cached in a "golang-autocert" directory under an
// operating system-specific cache or temp directory. This may not
// be suitable for servers spanning multiple machines.
//
// The returned listener uses a *tls.Config that enables HTTP/2, and
// should only be used with servers that support HTTP/2.
//
// The returned Listener also enables TCP keep-alives on the accepted
// connections. The returned *tls.Conn are returned before their TLS
// handshake has completed.
func NewListener(domains ...string) net.Listener {
m := &Manager{
Prompt: AcceptTOS,
}
if len(domains) > 0 {
m.HostPolicy = HostWhitelist(domains...)
}
dir := cacheDir()
if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
log.Printf("warning: autocert.NewListener not using a cache: %v", err)
} else {
m.Cache = DirCache(dir)
}
return m.Listener()
}
// Listener listens on the standard TLS port (443) on all interfaces
// and returns a net.Listener returning *tls.Conn connections.
//
// The returned listener uses a *tls.Config that enables HTTP/2, and
// should only be used with servers that support HTTP/2.
//
// The returned Listener also enables TCP keep-alives on the accepted
// connections. The returned *tls.Conn are returned before their TLS
// handshake has completed.
//
// Unlike NewListener, it is the caller's responsibility to initialize
// the Manager m's Prompt, Cache, HostPolicy, and other desired options.
func (m *Manager) Listener() net.Listener {
ln := &listener{
m: m,
conf: &tls.Config{
GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate, // bonus: panic on nil m
NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"}, // Enable HTTP/2
},
}
ln.tcpListener, ln.tcpListenErr = net.Listen("tcp", ":443")
return ln
}
type listener struct {
m *Manager
conf *tls.Config
tcpListener net.Listener
tcpListenErr error
}
func (ln *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
if ln.tcpListenErr != nil {
return nil, ln.tcpListenErr
}
conn, err := ln.tcpListener.Accept()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tcpConn := conn.(*net.TCPConn)
// Because Listener is a convenience function, help out with
// this too. This is not possible for the caller to set once
// we return a *tcp.Conn wrapping an inaccessible net.Conn.
// If callers don't want this, they can do things the manual
// way and tweak as needed. But this is what net/http does
// itself, so copy that. If net/http changes, we can change
// here too.
tcpConn.SetKeepAlive(true)
tcpConn.SetKeepAlivePeriod(3 * time.Minute)
return tls.Server(tcpConn, ln.conf), nil
}
func (ln *listener) Addr() net.Addr {
if ln.tcpListener != nil {
return ln.tcpListener.Addr()
}
// net.Listen failed. Return something non-nil in case callers
// call Addr before Accept:
return &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.IP{0, 0, 0, 0}, Port: 443}
}
func (ln *listener) Close() error {
if ln.tcpListenErr != nil {
return ln.tcpListenErr
}
return ln.tcpListener.Close()
}
func homeDir() string {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return os.Getenv("HOMEDRIVE") + os.Getenv("HOMEPATH")
}
if h := os.Getenv("HOME"); h != "" {
return h
}
return "/"
}
func cacheDir() string {
const base = "golang-autocert"
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "darwin":
return filepath.Join(homeDir(), "Library", "Caches", base)
case "windows":
for _, ev := range []string{"APPDATA", "CSIDL_APPDATA", "TEMP", "TMP"} {
if v := os.Getenv(ev); v != "" {
return filepath.Join(v, base)
}
}
// Worst case:
return filepath.Join(homeDir(), base)
}
if xdg := os.Getenv("XDG_CACHE_HOME"); xdg != "" {
return filepath.Join(xdg, base)
}
return filepath.Join(homeDir(), ".cache", base)
}

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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package autocert
import (
"context"
"crypto"
"sync"
"time"
)
// renewJitter is the maximum deviation from Manager.RenewBefore.
const renewJitter = time.Hour
// domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers
// renewing a single domain's cert.
type domainRenewal struct {
m *Manager
domain string
key crypto.Signer
timerMu sync.Mutex
timer *time.Timer
}
// start starts a cert renewal timer at the time
// defined by the certificate expiration time exp.
//
// If the timer is already started, calling start is a noop.
func (dr *domainRenewal) start(exp time.Time) {
dr.timerMu.Lock()
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
if dr.timer != nil {
return
}
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(dr.next(exp), dr.renew)
}
// stop stops the cert renewal timer.
// If the timer is already stopped, calling stop is a noop.
func (dr *domainRenewal) stop() {
dr.timerMu.Lock()
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
if dr.timer == nil {
return
}
dr.timer.Stop()
dr.timer = nil
}
// renew is called periodically by a timer.
// The first renew call is kicked off by dr.start.
func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() {
dr.timerMu.Lock()
defer dr.timerMu.Unlock()
if dr.timer == nil {
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
// TODO: rotate dr.key at some point?
next, err := dr.do(ctx)
if err != nil {
next = renewJitter / 2
next += time.Duration(pseudoRand.int63n(int64(next)))
}
dr.timer = time.AfterFunc(next, dr.renew)
testDidRenewLoop(next, err)
}
// do is similar to Manager.createCert but it doesn't lock a Manager.state item.
// Instead, it requests a new certificate independently and, upon success,
// replaces dr.m.state item with a new one and updates cache for the given domain.
//
// It may return immediately if the expiration date of the currently cached cert
// is far enough in the future.
//
// The returned value is a time interval after which the renewal should occur again.
func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
// a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment
// but we try nonetheless
if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.domain); err == nil {
next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter)
if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+renewJitter {
return next, nil
}
}
der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.domain)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
state := &certState{
key: dr.key,
cert: der,
leaf: leaf,
}
tlscert, err := state.tlscert()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
dr.m.cachePut(ctx, dr.domain, tlscert)
dr.m.stateMu.Lock()
defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock()
// m.state is guaranteed to be non-nil at this point
dr.m.state[dr.domain] = state
return dr.next(leaf.NotAfter), nil
}
func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration {
d := expiry.Sub(timeNow()) - dr.m.renewBefore()
// add a bit of randomness to renew deadline
n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(renewJitter))
d -= time.Duration(n)
if d < 0 {
return 0
}
return d
}
var testDidRenewLoop = func(next time.Duration, err error) {}

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// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
_ "crypto/sha512" // need for EC keys
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"math/big"
)
// jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce.
// The result is serialized in JSON format.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7.
func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, nonce string) ([]byte, error) {
jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
alg, sha := jwsHasher(key)
if alg == "" || !sha.Available() {
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
}
phead := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce)
phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead))
cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs)
hash := sha.New()
hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload))
sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
enc := struct {
Protected string `json:"protected"`
Payload string `json:"payload"`
Sig string `json:"signature"`
}{
Protected: phead,
Payload: payload,
Sig: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(sig),
}
return json.Marshal(&enc)
}
// jwkEncode encodes public part of an RSA or ECDSA key into a JWK.
// The result is also suitable for creating a JWK thumbprint.
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
switch pub := pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.3.1
n := pub.N
e := big.NewInt(int64(pub.E))
// Field order is important.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"e":"%s","kty":"RSA","n":"%s"}`,
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(e.Bytes()),
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(n.Bytes()),
), nil
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-6.2.1
p := pub.Curve.Params()
n := p.BitSize / 8
if p.BitSize%8 != 0 {
n++
}
x := pub.X.Bytes()
if n > len(x) {
x = append(make([]byte, n-len(x)), x...)
}
y := pub.Y.Bytes()
if n > len(y) {
y = append(make([]byte, n-len(y)), y...)
}
// Field order is important.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638#section-3.3 for details.
return fmt.Sprintf(`{"crv":"%s","kty":"EC","x":"%s","y":"%s"}`,
p.Name,
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
), nil
}
return "", ErrUnsupportedKey
}
// jwsSign signs the digest using the given key.
// It returns ErrUnsupportedKey if the key type is unknown.
// The hash is used only for RSA keys.
func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash)
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rb, sb := r.Bytes(), s.Bytes()
size := key.Params().BitSize / 8
if size%8 > 0 {
size++
}
sig := make([]byte, size*2)
copy(sig[size-len(rb):], rb)
copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb)
return sig, nil
}
return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey
}
// jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function
// to use for signing a digest with the provided key.
// It returns ("", 0) if the key is not supported.
func jwsHasher(key crypto.Signer) (string, crypto.Hash) {
switch key := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
return "RS256", crypto.SHA256
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
switch key.Params().Name {
case "P-256":
return "ES256", crypto.SHA256
case "P-384":
return "ES384", crypto.SHA384
case "P-521":
return "ES512", crypto.SHA512
}
}
return "", 0
}
// JWKThumbprint creates a JWK thumbprint out of pub
// as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7638.
func JWKThumbprint(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
jwk, err := jwkEncode(pub)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(jwk))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b[:]), nil
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
)
// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states.
const (
StatusUnknown = "unknown"
StatusPending = "pending"
StatusProcessing = "processing"
StatusValid = "valid"
StatusInvalid = "invalid"
StatusRevoked = "revoked"
)
// CRLReasonCode identifies the reason for a certificate revocation.
type CRLReasonCode int
// CRL reason codes as defined in RFC 5280.
const (
CRLReasonUnspecified CRLReasonCode = 0
CRLReasonKeyCompromise CRLReasonCode = 1
CRLReasonCACompromise CRLReasonCode = 2
CRLReasonAffiliationChanged CRLReasonCode = 3
CRLReasonSuperseded CRLReasonCode = 4
CRLReasonCessationOfOperation CRLReasonCode = 5
CRLReasonCertificateHold CRLReasonCode = 6
CRLReasonRemoveFromCRL CRLReasonCode = 8
CRLReasonPrivilegeWithdrawn CRLReasonCode = 9
CRLReasonAACompromise CRLReasonCode = 10
)
// ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered.
var ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported")
// Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem.
type Error struct {
// StatusCode is The HTTP status code generated by the origin server.
StatusCode int
// ProblemType is a URI reference that identifies the problem type,
// typically in a "urn:acme:error:xxx" form.
ProblemType string
// Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem.
Detail string
// Header is the original server error response headers.
// It may be nil.
Header http.Header
}
func (e *Error) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("%d %s: %s", e.StatusCode, e.ProblemType, e.Detail)
}
// AuthorizationError indicates that an authorization for an identifier
// did not succeed.
// It contains all errors from Challenge items of the failed Authorization.
type AuthorizationError struct {
// URI uniquely identifies the failed Authorization.
URI string
// Identifier is an AuthzID.Value of the failed Authorization.
Identifier string
// Errors is a collection of non-nil error values of Challenge items
// of the failed Authorization.
Errors []error
}
func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string {
e := make([]string, len(a.Errors))
for i, err := range a.Errors {
e[i] = err.Error()
}
return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; "))
}
// RateLimit reports whether err represents a rate limit error and
// any Retry-After duration returned by the server.
//
// See the following for more details on rate limiting:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-05#section-5.6
func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) {
e, ok := err.(*Error)
if !ok {
return 0, false
}
// Some CA implementations may return incorrect values.
// Use case-insensitive comparison.
if !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(e.ProblemType), ":ratelimited") {
return 0, false
}
if e.Header == nil {
return 0, true
}
return retryAfter(e.Header.Get("Retry-After"), 0), true
}
// Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key.
type Account struct {
// URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve
// account data from the CA.
URI string
// Contact is a slice of contact info used during registration.
Contact []string
// The terms user has agreed to.
// A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed
// to the actual Terms of Service of the CA.
AgreedTerms string
// Actual terms of a CA.
CurrentTerms string
// Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow.
Authz string
// Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations
// granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request.
Authorizations string
// Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates
// issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request.
Certificates string
}
// Directory is ACME server discovery data.
type Directory struct {
// RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new
// and modifying existing accounts.
RegURL string
// AuthzURL is used to initiate Identifier Authorization flow.
AuthzURL string
// CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL.
CertURL string
// RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow.
RevokeURL string
// Term is a URI identifying the current terms of service.
Terms string
// Website is an HTTP or HTTPS URL locating a website
// providing more information about the ACME server.
Website string
// CAA consists of lowercase hostname elements, which the ACME server
// recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation
// as defined in RFC6844.
CAA []string
}
// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge.
// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization
// with StatusInvalid.
type Challenge struct {
// Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01".
Type string
// URI is where a challenge response can be posted to.
URI string
// Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge.
Token string
// Status identifies the status of this challenge.
Status string
// Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure
// when this challenge was used.
// The type of a non-nil value is *Error.
Error error
}
// Authorization encodes an authorization response.
type Authorization struct {
// URI uniquely identifies a authorization.
URI string
// Status identifies the status of an authorization.
Status string
// Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent.
Identifier AuthzID
// Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession
// of the identifier (for pending authorizations).
// For final authorizations, the challenges that were used.
Challenges []*Challenge
// A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient
// to prove possession of the identifier.
// Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set.
// Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array.
// If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges.
Combinations [][]int
}
// AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent.
type AuthzID struct {
Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns".
Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org".
}
// wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects.
type wireAuthz struct {
Status string
Challenges []wireChallenge
Combinations [][]int
Identifier struct {
Type string
Value string
}
}
func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization {
a := &Authorization{
URI: uri,
Status: z.Status,
Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value},
Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy
Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)),
}
for i, v := range z.Challenges {
a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge()
}
return a
}
func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError {
err := &AuthorizationError{
URI: uri,
Identifier: z.Identifier.Value,
}
for _, raw := range z.Challenges {
if raw.Error != nil {
err.Errors = append(err.Errors, raw.Error.error(nil))
}
}
return err
}
// wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation.
type wireChallenge struct {
URI string `json:"uri"`
Type string
Token string
Status string
Error *wireError
}
func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge {
v := &Challenge{
URI: c.URI,
Type: c.Type,
Token: c.Token,
Status: c.Status,
}
if v.Status == "" {
v.Status = StatusPending
}
if c.Error != nil {
v.Error = c.Error.error(nil)
}
return v
}
// wireError is a subset of fields of the Problem Details object
// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7807#section-3.1.
type wireError struct {
Status int
Type string
Detail string
}
func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error {
return &Error{
StatusCode: e.Status,
ProblemType: e.Type,
Detail: e.Detail,
Header: h,
}
}
// CertOption is an optional argument type for the TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods for
// customizing a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges.
type CertOption interface {
privateCertOpt()
}
// WithKey creates an option holding a private/public key pair.
// The private part signs a certificate, and the public part represents the signee.
func WithKey(key crypto.Signer) CertOption {
return &certOptKey{key}
}
type certOptKey struct {
key crypto.Signer
}
func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {}
// WithTemplate creates an option for specifying a certificate template.
// See x509.CreateCertificate for template usage details.
//
// In TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent,
// resulting in a self-signed certificate.
// The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs.
func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption {
return (*certOptTemplate)(t)
}
type certOptTemplate x509.Certificate
func (*certOptTemplate) privateCertOpt() {}

View file

@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ import (
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish"
"io"
"strconv"
"golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish"
)
const (
@ -205,7 +206,6 @@ func bcrypt(password []byte, cost int, salt []byte) ([]byte, error) {
}
func expensiveBlowfishSetup(key []byte, cost uint32, salt []byte) (*blowfish.Cipher, error) {
csalt, err := base64Decode(salt)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ func expensiveBlowfishSetup(key []byte, cost uint32, salt []byte) (*blowfish.Cip
// Bug compatibility with C bcrypt implementations. They use the trailing
// NULL in the key string during expansion.
ckey := append(key, 0)
// We copy the key to prevent changing the underlying array.
ckey := append(key[:len(key):len(key)], 0)
c, err := blowfish.NewSaltedCipher(ckey, csalt)
if err != nil {
@ -240,11 +241,11 @@ func (p *hashed) Hash() []byte {
n = 3
}
arr[n] = '$'
n += 1
n++
copy(arr[n:], []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%02d", p.cost)))
n += 2
arr[n] = '$'
n += 1
n++
copy(arr[n:], p.salt)
n += encodedSaltSize
copy(arr[n:], p.hash)

View file

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
package blowfish // import "golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish"
// The code is a port of Bruce Schneier's C implementation.
// See http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html.
// See https://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html.
import "strconv"
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ func NewCipher(key []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
// NewSaltedCipher creates a returns a Cipher that folds a salt into its key
// schedule. For most purposes, NewCipher, instead of NewSaltedCipher, is
// sufficient and desirable. For bcrypt compatiblity, the key can be over 56
// sufficient and desirable. For bcrypt compatibility, the key can be over 56
// bytes.
func NewSaltedCipher(key, salt []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
if len(salt) == 0 {

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
// The startup permutation array and substitution boxes.
// They are the hexadecimal digits of PI; see:
// http://www.schneier.com/code/constants.txt.
// https://www.schneier.com/code/constants.txt.
package blowfish

View file

@ -9,28 +9,73 @@ package ocsp // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
_ "crypto/sha1"
_ "crypto/sha256"
_ "crypto/sha512"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/asn1"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"strconv"
"time"
)
var idPKIXOCSPBasic = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 1})
// These are internal structures that reflect the ASN.1 structure of an OCSP
// response. See RFC 2560, section 4.2.
// ResponseStatus contains the result of an OCSP request. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6960#section-2.3
type ResponseStatus int
const (
ocspSuccess = 0
ocspMalformed = 1
ocspInternalError = 2
ocspTryLater = 3
ocspSigRequired = 4
ocspUnauthorized = 5
Success ResponseStatus = 0
Malformed ResponseStatus = 1
InternalError ResponseStatus = 2
TryLater ResponseStatus = 3
// Status code four is unused in OCSP. See
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6960#section-4.2.1
SignatureRequired ResponseStatus = 5
Unauthorized ResponseStatus = 6
)
func (r ResponseStatus) String() string {
switch r {
case Success:
return "success"
case Malformed:
return "malformed"
case InternalError:
return "internal error"
case TryLater:
return "try later"
case SignatureRequired:
return "signature required"
case Unauthorized:
return "unauthorized"
default:
return "unknown OCSP status: " + strconv.Itoa(int(r))
}
}
// ResponseError is an error that may be returned by ParseResponse to indicate
// that the response itself is an error, not just that its indicating that a
// certificate is revoked, unknown, etc.
type ResponseError struct {
Status ResponseStatus
}
func (r ResponseError) Error() string {
return "ocsp: error from server: " + r.Status.String()
}
// These are internal structures that reflect the ASN.1 structure of an OCSP
// response. See RFC 2560, section 4.2.
type certID struct {
HashAlgorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
NameHash []byte
@ -38,9 +83,24 @@ type certID struct {
SerialNumber *big.Int
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560#section-4.1.1
type ocspRequest struct {
TBSRequest tbsRequest
}
type tbsRequest struct {
Version int `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,default:0,optional"`
RequestorName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"explicit,tag:1,optional"`
RequestList []request
}
type request struct {
Cert certID
}
type responseASN1 struct {
Status asn1.Enumerated
Response responseBytes `asn1:"explicit,tag:0"`
Response responseBytes `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,optional"`
}
type responseBytes struct {
@ -56,26 +116,26 @@ type basicResponse struct {
}
type responseData struct {
Raw asn1.RawContent
Version int `asn1:"optional,default:1,explicit,tag:0"`
RequestorName pkix.RDNSequence `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:1"`
KeyHash []byte `asn1:"optional,explicit,tag:2"`
ProducedAt time.Time
Responses []singleResponse
Raw asn1.RawContent
Version int `asn1:"optional,default:0,explicit,tag:0"`
RawResponderID asn1.RawValue
ProducedAt time.Time `asn1:"generalized"`
Responses []singleResponse
}
type singleResponse struct {
CertID certID
Good asn1.Flag `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,optional"`
Revoked revokedInfo `asn1:"explicit,tag:1,optional"`
Unknown asn1.Flag `asn1:"explicit,tag:2,optional"`
ThisUpdate time.Time
NextUpdate time.Time `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,optional"`
CertID certID
Good asn1.Flag `asn1:"tag:0,optional"`
Revoked revokedInfo `asn1:"tag:1,optional"`
Unknown asn1.Flag `asn1:"tag:2,optional"`
ThisUpdate time.Time `asn1:"generalized"`
NextUpdate time.Time `asn1:"generalized,explicit,tag:0,optional"`
SingleExtensions []pkix.Extension `asn1:"explicit,tag:1,optional"`
}
type revokedInfo struct {
RevocationTime time.Time
Reason int `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,optional"`
RevocationTime time.Time `asn1:"generalized"`
Reason asn1.Enumerated `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,optional"`
}
var (
@ -86,61 +146,206 @@ var (
oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 12}
oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 13}
oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10040, 4, 3}
oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 4, 3, 2}
oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, 2}
oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 1}
oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 2}
oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 3}
oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 10045, 4, 3, 4}
)
var hashOIDs = map[crypto.Hash]asn1.ObjectIdentifier{
crypto.SHA1: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26}),
crypto.SHA256: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1}),
crypto.SHA384: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2}),
crypto.SHA512: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3}),
}
// TODO(rlb): This is also from crypto/x509, so same comment as AGL's below
var signatureAlgorithmDetails = []struct {
algo x509.SignatureAlgorithm
oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier
pubKeyAlgo x509.PublicKeyAlgorithm
hash crypto.Hash
}{
{x509.MD2WithRSA, oidSignatureMD2WithRSA, x509.RSA, crypto.Hash(0) /* no value for MD2 */},
{x509.MD5WithRSA, oidSignatureMD5WithRSA, x509.RSA, crypto.MD5},
{x509.SHA1WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA, x509.RSA, crypto.SHA1},
{x509.SHA256WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA, x509.RSA, crypto.SHA256},
{x509.SHA384WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA, x509.RSA, crypto.SHA384},
{x509.SHA512WithRSA, oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA, x509.RSA, crypto.SHA512},
{x509.DSAWithSHA1, oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1, x509.DSA, crypto.SHA1},
{x509.DSAWithSHA256, oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256, x509.DSA, crypto.SHA256},
{x509.ECDSAWithSHA1, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1, x509.ECDSA, crypto.SHA1},
{x509.ECDSAWithSHA256, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256, x509.ECDSA, crypto.SHA256},
{x509.ECDSAWithSHA384, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384, x509.ECDSA, crypto.SHA384},
{x509.ECDSAWithSHA512, oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512, x509.ECDSA, crypto.SHA512},
}
// TODO(rlb): This is also from crypto/x509, so same comment as AGL's below
func signingParamsForPublicKey(pub interface{}, requestedSigAlgo x509.SignatureAlgorithm) (hashFunc crypto.Hash, sigAlgo pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier, err error) {
var pubType x509.PublicKeyAlgorithm
switch pub := pub.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
pubType = x509.RSA
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA
sigAlgo.Parameters = asn1.RawValue{
Tag: 5,
}
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
pubType = x509.ECDSA
switch pub.Curve {
case elliptic.P224(), elliptic.P256():
hashFunc = crypto.SHA256
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256
case elliptic.P384():
hashFunc = crypto.SHA384
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384
case elliptic.P521():
hashFunc = crypto.SHA512
sigAlgo.Algorithm = oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512
default:
err = errors.New("x509: unknown elliptic curve")
}
default:
err = errors.New("x509: only RSA and ECDSA keys supported")
}
if err != nil {
return
}
if requestedSigAlgo == 0 {
return
}
found := false
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
if details.algo == requestedSigAlgo {
if details.pubKeyAlgo != pubType {
err = errors.New("x509: requested SignatureAlgorithm does not match private key type")
return
}
sigAlgo.Algorithm, hashFunc = details.oid, details.hash
if hashFunc == 0 {
err = errors.New("x509: cannot sign with hash function requested")
return
}
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
err = errors.New("x509: unknown SignatureAlgorithm")
}
return
}
// TODO(agl): this is taken from crypto/x509 and so should probably be exported
// from crypto/x509 or crypto/x509/pkix.
func getSignatureAlgorithmFromOID(oid asn1.ObjectIdentifier) x509.SignatureAlgorithm {
switch {
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureMD2WithRSA):
return x509.MD2WithRSA
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureMD5WithRSA):
return x509.MD5WithRSA
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureSHA1WithRSA):
return x509.SHA1WithRSA
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureSHA256WithRSA):
return x509.SHA256WithRSA
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureSHA384WithRSA):
return x509.SHA384WithRSA
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureSHA512WithRSA):
return x509.SHA512WithRSA
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureDSAWithSHA1):
return x509.DSAWithSHA1
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureDSAWithSHA256):
return x509.DSAWithSHA256
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA1):
return x509.ECDSAWithSHA1
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA256):
return x509.ECDSAWithSHA256
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA384):
return x509.ECDSAWithSHA384
case oid.Equal(oidSignatureECDSAWithSHA512):
return x509.ECDSAWithSHA512
for _, details := range signatureAlgorithmDetails {
if oid.Equal(details.oid) {
return details.algo
}
}
return x509.UnknownSignatureAlgorithm
}
// TODO(rlb): This is not taken from crypto/x509, but it's of the same general form.
func getHashAlgorithmFromOID(target asn1.ObjectIdentifier) crypto.Hash {
for hash, oid := range hashOIDs {
if oid.Equal(target) {
return hash
}
}
return crypto.Hash(0)
}
func getOIDFromHashAlgorithm(target crypto.Hash) asn1.ObjectIdentifier {
for hash, oid := range hashOIDs {
if hash == target {
return oid
}
}
return nil
}
// This is the exposed reflection of the internal OCSP structures.
// The status values that can be expressed in OCSP. See RFC 6960.
const (
// Good means that the certificate is valid.
Good = iota
// Revoked means that the certificate has been deliberately revoked.
Revoked = iota
Revoked
// Unknown means that the OCSP responder doesn't know about the certificate.
Unknown = iota
// ServerFailed means that the OCSP responder failed to process the request.
ServerFailed = iota
Unknown
// ServerFailed is unused and was never used (see
// https://go-review.googlesource.com/#/c/18944). ParseResponse will
// return a ResponseError when an error response is parsed.
ServerFailed
)
// Response represents an OCSP response. See RFC 2560.
// The enumerated reasons for revoking a certificate. See RFC 5280.
const (
Unspecified = 0
KeyCompromise = 1
CACompromise = 2
AffiliationChanged = 3
Superseded = 4
CessationOfOperation = 5
CertificateHold = 6
RemoveFromCRL = 8
PrivilegeWithdrawn = 9
AACompromise = 10
)
// Request represents an OCSP request. See RFC 6960.
type Request struct {
HashAlgorithm crypto.Hash
IssuerNameHash []byte
IssuerKeyHash []byte
SerialNumber *big.Int
}
// Marshal marshals the OCSP request to ASN.1 DER encoded form.
func (req *Request) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
hashAlg := getOIDFromHashAlgorithm(req.HashAlgorithm)
if hashAlg == nil {
return nil, errors.New("Unknown hash algorithm")
}
return asn1.Marshal(ocspRequest{
tbsRequest{
Version: 0,
RequestList: []request{
{
Cert: certID{
pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
Algorithm: hashAlg,
Parameters: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 5 /* ASN.1 NULL */},
},
req.IssuerNameHash,
req.IssuerKeyHash,
req.SerialNumber,
},
},
},
},
})
}
// Response represents an OCSP response containing a single SingleResponse. See
// RFC 6960.
type Response struct {
// Status is one of {Good, Revoked, Unknown, ServerFailed}
// Status is one of {Good, Revoked, Unknown}
Status int
SerialNumber *big.Int
ProducedAt, ThisUpdate, NextUpdate, RevokedAt time.Time
@ -151,8 +356,48 @@ type Response struct {
TBSResponseData []byte
Signature []byte
SignatureAlgorithm x509.SignatureAlgorithm
// IssuerHash is the hash used to compute the IssuerNameHash and IssuerKeyHash.
// Valid values are crypto.SHA1, crypto.SHA256, crypto.SHA384, and crypto.SHA512.
// If zero, the default is crypto.SHA1.
IssuerHash crypto.Hash
// RawResponderName optionally contains the DER-encoded subject of the
// responder certificate. Exactly one of RawResponderName and
// ResponderKeyHash is set.
RawResponderName []byte
// ResponderKeyHash optionally contains the SHA-1 hash of the
// responder's public key. Exactly one of RawResponderName and
// ResponderKeyHash is set.
ResponderKeyHash []byte
// Extensions contains raw X.509 extensions from the singleExtensions field
// of the OCSP response. When parsing certificates, this can be used to
// extract non-critical extensions that are not parsed by this package. When
// marshaling OCSP responses, the Extensions field is ignored, see
// ExtraExtensions.
Extensions []pkix.Extension
// ExtraExtensions contains extensions to be copied, raw, into any marshaled
// OCSP response (in the singleExtensions field). Values override any
// extensions that would otherwise be produced based on the other fields. The
// ExtraExtensions field is not populated when parsing certificates, see
// Extensions.
ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
}
// These are pre-serialized error responses for the various non-success codes
// defined by OCSP. The Unauthorized code in particular can be used by an OCSP
// responder that supports only pre-signed responses as a response to requests
// for certificates with unknown status. See RFC 5019.
var (
MalformedRequestErrorResponse = []byte{0x30, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x01}
InternalErrorErrorResponse = []byte{0x30, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x02}
TryLaterErrorResponse = []byte{0x30, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x03}
SigRequredErrorResponse = []byte{0x30, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x05}
UnauthorizedErrorResponse = []byte{0x30, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x06}
)
// CheckSignatureFrom checks that the signature in resp is a valid signature
// from issuer. This should only be used if resp.Certificate is nil. Otherwise,
// the OCSP response contained an intermediate certificate that created the
@ -169,12 +414,57 @@ func (p ParseError) Error() string {
return string(p)
}
// ParseRequest parses an OCSP request in DER form. It only supports
// requests for a single certificate. Signed requests are not supported.
// If a request includes a signature, it will result in a ParseError.
func ParseRequest(bytes []byte) (*Request, error) {
var req ocspRequest
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(bytes, &req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(rest) > 0 {
return nil, ParseError("trailing data in OCSP request")
}
if len(req.TBSRequest.RequestList) == 0 {
return nil, ParseError("OCSP request contains no request body")
}
innerRequest := req.TBSRequest.RequestList[0]
hashFunc := getHashAlgorithmFromOID(innerRequest.Cert.HashAlgorithm.Algorithm)
if hashFunc == crypto.Hash(0) {
return nil, ParseError("OCSP request uses unknown hash function")
}
return &Request{
HashAlgorithm: hashFunc,
IssuerNameHash: innerRequest.Cert.NameHash,
IssuerKeyHash: innerRequest.Cert.IssuerKeyHash,
SerialNumber: innerRequest.Cert.SerialNumber,
}, nil
}
// ParseResponse parses an OCSP response in DER form. It only supports
// responses for a single certificate. If the response contains a certificate
// then the signature over the response is checked. If issuer is not nil then
// it will be used to validate the signature or embedded certificate. Invalid
// signatures or parse failures will result in a ParseError.
// it will be used to validate the signature or embedded certificate.
//
// Invalid responses and parse failures will result in a ParseError.
// Error responses will result in a ResponseError.
func ParseResponse(bytes []byte, issuer *x509.Certificate) (*Response, error) {
return ParseResponseForCert(bytes, nil, issuer)
}
// ParseResponseForCert parses an OCSP response in DER form and searches for a
// Response relating to cert. If such a Response is found and the OCSP response
// contains a certificate then the signature over the response is checked. If
// issuer is not nil then it will be used to validate the signature or embedded
// certificate.
//
// Invalid responses and parse failures will result in a ParseError.
// Error responses will result in a ResponseError.
func ParseResponseForCert(bytes []byte, cert, issuer *x509.Certificate) (*Response, error) {
var resp responseASN1
rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(bytes, &resp)
if err != nil {
@ -184,10 +474,8 @@ func ParseResponse(bytes []byte, issuer *x509.Certificate) (*Response, error) {
return nil, ParseError("trailing data in OCSP response")
}
ret := new(Response)
if resp.Status != ocspSuccess {
ret.Status = ServerFailed
return ret, nil
if status := ResponseStatus(resp.Status); status != Success {
return nil, ResponseError{status}
}
if !resp.Response.ResponseType.Equal(idPKIXOCSPBasic) {
@ -204,13 +492,56 @@ func ParseResponse(bytes []byte, issuer *x509.Certificate) (*Response, error) {
return nil, ParseError("OCSP response contains bad number of certificates")
}
if len(basicResp.TBSResponseData.Responses) != 1 {
if n := len(basicResp.TBSResponseData.Responses); n == 0 || cert == nil && n > 1 {
return nil, ParseError("OCSP response contains bad number of responses")
}
ret.TBSResponseData = basicResp.TBSResponseData.Raw
ret.Signature = basicResp.Signature.RightAlign()
ret.SignatureAlgorithm = getSignatureAlgorithmFromOID(basicResp.SignatureAlgorithm.Algorithm)
var singleResp singleResponse
if cert == nil {
singleResp = basicResp.TBSResponseData.Responses[0]
} else {
match := false
for _, resp := range basicResp.TBSResponseData.Responses {
if cert.SerialNumber.Cmp(resp.CertID.SerialNumber) == 0 {
singleResp = resp
match = true
break
}
}
if !match {
return nil, ParseError("no response matching the supplied certificate")
}
}
ret := &Response{
TBSResponseData: basicResp.TBSResponseData.Raw,
Signature: basicResp.Signature.RightAlign(),
SignatureAlgorithm: getSignatureAlgorithmFromOID(basicResp.SignatureAlgorithm.Algorithm),
Extensions: singleResp.SingleExtensions,
SerialNumber: singleResp.CertID.SerialNumber,
ProducedAt: basicResp.TBSResponseData.ProducedAt,
ThisUpdate: singleResp.ThisUpdate,
NextUpdate: singleResp.NextUpdate,
}
// Handle the ResponderID CHOICE tag. ResponderID can be flattened into
// TBSResponseData once https://go-review.googlesource.com/34503 has been
// released.
rawResponderID := basicResp.TBSResponseData.RawResponderID
switch rawResponderID.Tag {
case 1: // Name
var rdn pkix.RDNSequence
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawResponderID.Bytes, &rdn); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 {
return nil, ParseError("invalid responder name")
}
ret.RawResponderName = rawResponderID.Bytes
case 2: // KeyHash
if rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(rawResponderID.Bytes, &ret.ResponderKeyHash); err != nil || len(rest) != 0 {
return nil, ParseError("invalid responder key hash")
}
default:
return nil, ParseError("invalid responder id tag")
}
if len(basicResp.Certificates) > 0 {
ret.Certificate, err = x509.ParseCertificate(basicResp.Certificates[0].FullBytes)
@ -219,56 +550,50 @@ func ParseResponse(bytes []byte, issuer *x509.Certificate) (*Response, error) {
}
if err := ret.CheckSignatureFrom(ret.Certificate); err != nil {
return nil, ParseError("bad OCSP signature")
return nil, ParseError("bad signature on embedded certificate: " + err.Error())
}
if issuer != nil {
if err := issuer.CheckSignature(ret.Certificate.SignatureAlgorithm, ret.Certificate.RawTBSCertificate, ret.Certificate.Signature); err != nil {
return nil, ParseError("bad signature on embedded certificate")
return nil, ParseError("bad OCSP signature: " + err.Error())
}
}
} else if issuer != nil {
if err := ret.CheckSignatureFrom(issuer); err != nil {
return nil, ParseError("bad OCSP signature")
return nil, ParseError("bad OCSP signature: " + err.Error())
}
}
r := basicResp.TBSResponseData.Responses[0]
for _, ext := range singleResp.SingleExtensions {
if ext.Critical {
return nil, ParseError("unsupported critical extension")
}
}
ret.SerialNumber = r.CertID.SerialNumber
for h, oid := range hashOIDs {
if singleResp.CertID.HashAlgorithm.Algorithm.Equal(oid) {
ret.IssuerHash = h
break
}
}
if ret.IssuerHash == 0 {
return nil, ParseError("unsupported issuer hash algorithm")
}
switch {
case bool(r.Good):
case bool(singleResp.Good):
ret.Status = Good
case bool(r.Unknown):
case bool(singleResp.Unknown):
ret.Status = Unknown
default:
ret.Status = Revoked
ret.RevokedAt = r.Revoked.RevocationTime
ret.RevocationReason = r.Revoked.Reason
ret.RevokedAt = singleResp.Revoked.RevocationTime
ret.RevocationReason = int(singleResp.Revoked.Reason)
}
ret.ProducedAt = basicResp.TBSResponseData.ProducedAt
ret.ThisUpdate = r.ThisUpdate
ret.NextUpdate = r.NextUpdate
return ret, nil
}
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560#section-4.1.1
type ocspRequest struct {
TBSRequest tbsRequest
}
type tbsRequest struct {
Version int `asn1:"explicit,tag:0,default:0"`
RequestList []request
}
type request struct {
Cert certID
}
// RequestOptions contains options for constructing OCSP requests.
type RequestOptions struct {
// Hash contains the hash function that should be used when
@ -292,17 +617,8 @@ func CreateRequest(cert, issuer *x509.Certificate, opts *RequestOptions) ([]byte
// OCSP seems to be the only place where these raw hash identifiers are
// used. I took the following from
// http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff635603.aspx
var hashOID asn1.ObjectIdentifier
switch hashFunc {
case crypto.SHA1:
hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{1, 3, 14, 3, 2, 26})
case crypto.SHA256:
hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 1})
case crypto.SHA384:
hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 2})
case crypto.SHA512:
hashOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 101, 3, 4, 2, 3})
default:
_, ok := hashOIDs[hashFunc]
if !ok {
return nil, x509.ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
}
@ -326,22 +642,137 @@ func CreateRequest(cert, issuer *x509.Certificate, opts *RequestOptions) ([]byte
h.Write(issuer.RawSubject)
issuerNameHash := h.Sum(nil)
return asn1.Marshal(ocspRequest{
tbsRequest{
Version: 0,
RequestList: []request{
{
Cert: certID{
pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
Algorithm: hashOID,
Parameters: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 5 /* ASN.1 NULL */},
},
issuerNameHash,
issuerKeyHash,
cert.SerialNumber,
},
},
req := &Request{
HashAlgorithm: hashFunc,
IssuerNameHash: issuerNameHash,
IssuerKeyHash: issuerKeyHash,
SerialNumber: cert.SerialNumber,
}
return req.Marshal()
}
// CreateResponse returns a DER-encoded OCSP response with the specified contents.
// The fields in the response are populated as follows:
//
// The responder cert is used to populate the responder's name field, and the
// certificate itself is provided alongside the OCSP response signature.
//
// The issuer cert is used to puplate the IssuerNameHash and IssuerKeyHash fields.
//
// The template is used to populate the SerialNumber, Status, RevokedAt,
// RevocationReason, ThisUpdate, and NextUpdate fields.
//
// If template.IssuerHash is not set, SHA1 will be used.
//
// The ProducedAt date is automatically set to the current date, to the nearest minute.
func CreateResponse(issuer, responderCert *x509.Certificate, template Response, priv crypto.Signer) ([]byte, error) {
var publicKeyInfo struct {
Algorithm pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier
PublicKey asn1.BitString
}
if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(issuer.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo, &publicKeyInfo); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if template.IssuerHash == 0 {
template.IssuerHash = crypto.SHA1
}
hashOID := getOIDFromHashAlgorithm(template.IssuerHash)
if hashOID == nil {
return nil, errors.New("unsupported issuer hash algorithm")
}
if !template.IssuerHash.Available() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("issuer hash algorithm %v not linked into binary", template.IssuerHash)
}
h := template.IssuerHash.New()
h.Write(publicKeyInfo.PublicKey.RightAlign())
issuerKeyHash := h.Sum(nil)
h.Reset()
h.Write(issuer.RawSubject)
issuerNameHash := h.Sum(nil)
innerResponse := singleResponse{
CertID: certID{
HashAlgorithm: pkix.AlgorithmIdentifier{
Algorithm: hashOID,
Parameters: asn1.RawValue{Tag: 5 /* ASN.1 NULL */},
},
NameHash: issuerNameHash,
IssuerKeyHash: issuerKeyHash,
SerialNumber: template.SerialNumber,
},
ThisUpdate: template.ThisUpdate.UTC(),
NextUpdate: template.NextUpdate.UTC(),
SingleExtensions: template.ExtraExtensions,
}
switch template.Status {
case Good:
innerResponse.Good = true
case Unknown:
innerResponse.Unknown = true
case Revoked:
innerResponse.Revoked = revokedInfo{
RevocationTime: template.RevokedAt.UTC(),
Reason: asn1.Enumerated(template.RevocationReason),
}
}
rawResponderID := asn1.RawValue{
Class: 2, // context-specific
Tag: 1, // Name (explicit tag)
IsCompound: true,
Bytes: responderCert.RawSubject,
}
tbsResponseData := responseData{
Version: 0,
RawResponderID: rawResponderID,
ProducedAt: time.Now().Truncate(time.Minute).UTC(),
Responses: []singleResponse{innerResponse},
}
tbsResponseDataDER, err := asn1.Marshal(tbsResponseData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
hashFunc, signatureAlgorithm, err := signingParamsForPublicKey(priv.Public(), template.SignatureAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
responseHash := hashFunc.New()
responseHash.Write(tbsResponseDataDER)
signature, err := priv.Sign(rand.Reader, responseHash.Sum(nil), hashFunc)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
response := basicResponse{
TBSResponseData: tbsResponseData,
SignatureAlgorithm: signatureAlgorithm,
Signature: asn1.BitString{
Bytes: signature,
BitLength: 8 * len(signature),
},
}
if template.Certificate != nil {
response.Certificates = []asn1.RawValue{
{FullBytes: template.Certificate.Raw},
}
}
responseDER, err := asn1.Marshal(response)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return asn1.Marshal(responseASN1{
Status: asn1.Enumerated(Success),
Response: responseBytes{
ResponseType: idPKIXOCSPBasic,
Response: responseDER,
},
})
}

View file

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
// Package scrypt implements the scrypt key derivation function as defined in
// Colin Percival's paper "Stronger Key Derivation via Sequential Memory-Hard
// Functions" (http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf).
// Functions" (https://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf).
package scrypt // import "golang.org/x/crypto/scrypt"
import (
@ -218,11 +218,12 @@ func smix(b []byte, r, N int, v, xy []uint32) {
// For example, you can get a derived key for e.g. AES-256 (which needs a
// 32-byte key) by doing:
//
// dk := scrypt.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 16384, 8, 1, 32)
// dk, err := scrypt.Key([]byte("some password"), salt, 16384, 8, 1, 32)
//
// The recommended parameters for interactive logins as of 2009 are N=16384,
// r=8, p=1. They should be increased as memory latency and CPU parallelism
// increases. Remember to get a good random salt.
// The recommended parameters for interactive logins as of 2017 are N=32768, r=8
// and p=1. The parameters N, r, and p should be increased as memory latency and
// CPU parallelism increases; consider setting N to the highest power of 2 you
// can derive within 100 milliseconds. Remember to get a good random salt.
func Key(password, salt []byte, N, r, p, keyLen int) ([]byte, error) {
if N <= 1 || N&(N-1) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("scrypt: N must be > 1 and a power of 2")

97
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"io"
"sync"
)
// buffer provides a linked list buffer for data exchange
// between producer and consumer. Theoretically the buffer is
// of unlimited capacity as it does no allocation of its own.
type buffer struct {
// protects concurrent access to head, tail and closed
*sync.Cond
head *element // the buffer that will be read first
tail *element // the buffer that will be read last
closed bool
}
// An element represents a single link in a linked list.
type element struct {
buf []byte
next *element
}
// newBuffer returns an empty buffer that is not closed.
func newBuffer() *buffer {
e := new(element)
b := &buffer{
Cond: newCond(),
head: e,
tail: e,
}
return b
}
// write makes buf available for Read to receive.
// buf must not be modified after the call to write.
func (b *buffer) write(buf []byte) {
b.Cond.L.Lock()
e := &element{buf: buf}
b.tail.next = e
b.tail = e
b.Cond.Signal()
b.Cond.L.Unlock()
}
// eof closes the buffer. Reads from the buffer once all
// the data has been consumed will receive io.EOF.
func (b *buffer) eof() {
b.Cond.L.Lock()
b.closed = true
b.Cond.Signal()
b.Cond.L.Unlock()
}
// Read reads data from the internal buffer in buf. Reads will block
// if no data is available, or until the buffer is closed.
func (b *buffer) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
b.Cond.L.Lock()
defer b.Cond.L.Unlock()
for len(buf) > 0 {
// if there is data in b.head, copy it
if len(b.head.buf) > 0 {
r := copy(buf, b.head.buf)
buf, b.head.buf = buf[r:], b.head.buf[r:]
n += r
continue
}
// if there is a next buffer, make it the head
if len(b.head.buf) == 0 && b.head != b.tail {
b.head = b.head.next
continue
}
// if at least one byte has been copied, return
if n > 0 {
break
}
// if nothing was read, and there is nothing outstanding
// check to see if the buffer is closed.
if b.closed {
err = io.EOF
break
}
// out of buffers, wait for producer
b.Cond.Wait()
}
return
}

519
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"sort"
"time"
)
// These constants from [PROTOCOL.certkeys] represent the algorithm names
// for certificate types supported by this package.
const (
CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
)
// Certificate types distinguish between host and user
// certificates. The values can be set in the CertType field of
// Certificate.
const (
UserCert = 1
HostCert = 2
)
// Signature represents a cryptographic signature.
type Signature struct {
Format string
Blob []byte
}
// CertTimeInfinity can be used for OpenSSHCertV01.ValidBefore to indicate that
// a certificate does not expire.
const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1
// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in
// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8.
type Certificate struct {
Nonce []byte
Key PublicKey
Serial uint64
CertType uint32
KeyId string
ValidPrincipals []string
ValidAfter uint64
ValidBefore uint64
Permissions
Reserved []byte
SignatureKey PublicKey
Signature *Signature
}
// genericCertData holds the key-independent part of the certificate data.
// Overall, certificates contain an nonce, public key fields and
// key-independent fields.
type genericCertData struct {
Serial uint64
CertType uint32
KeyId string
ValidPrincipals []byte
ValidAfter uint64
ValidBefore uint64
CriticalOptions []byte
Extensions []byte
Reserved []byte
SignatureKey []byte
Signature []byte
}
func marshalStringList(namelist []string) []byte {
var to []byte
for _, name := range namelist {
s := struct{ N string }{name}
to = append(to, Marshal(&s)...)
}
return to
}
type optionsTuple struct {
Key string
Value []byte
}
type optionsTupleValue struct {
Value string
}
// serialize a map of critical options or extensions
// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation,
// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty string value
func marshalTuples(tups map[string]string) []byte {
keys := make([]string, 0, len(tups))
for key := range tups {
keys = append(keys, key)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
var ret []byte
for _, key := range keys {
s := optionsTuple{Key: key}
if value := tups[key]; len(value) > 0 {
s.Value = Marshal(&optionsTupleValue{value})
}
ret = append(ret, Marshal(&s)...)
}
return ret
}
// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation,
// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty option value
func parseTuples(in []byte) (map[string]string, error) {
tups := map[string]string{}
var lastKey string
var haveLastKey bool
for len(in) > 0 {
var key, val, extra []byte
var ok bool
if key, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok {
return nil, errShortRead
}
keyStr := string(key)
// according to [PROTOCOL.certkeys], the names must be in
// lexical order.
if haveLastKey && keyStr <= lastKey {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate options are not in lexical order")
}
lastKey, haveLastKey = keyStr, true
// the next field is a data field, which if non-empty has a string embedded
if val, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok {
return nil, errShortRead
}
if len(val) > 0 {
val, extra, ok = parseString(val)
if !ok {
return nil, errShortRead
}
if len(extra) > 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected trailing data after certificate option value")
}
tups[keyStr] = string(val)
} else {
tups[keyStr] = ""
}
}
return tups, nil
}
func parseCert(in []byte, privAlgo string) (*Certificate, error) {
nonce, rest, ok := parseString(in)
if !ok {
return nil, errShortRead
}
key, rest, err := parsePubKey(rest, privAlgo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var g genericCertData
if err := Unmarshal(rest, &g); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c := &Certificate{
Nonce: nonce,
Key: key,
Serial: g.Serial,
CertType: g.CertType,
KeyId: g.KeyId,
ValidAfter: g.ValidAfter,
ValidBefore: g.ValidBefore,
}
for principals := g.ValidPrincipals; len(principals) > 0; {
principal, rest, ok := parseString(principals)
if !ok {
return nil, errShortRead
}
c.ValidPrincipals = append(c.ValidPrincipals, string(principal))
principals = rest
}
c.CriticalOptions, err = parseTuples(g.CriticalOptions)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.Extensions, err = parseTuples(g.Extensions)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.Reserved = g.Reserved
k, err := ParsePublicKey(g.SignatureKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.SignatureKey = k
c.Signature, rest, ok = parseSignatureBody(g.Signature)
if !ok || len(rest) > 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: signature parse error")
}
return c, nil
}
type openSSHCertSigner struct {
pub *Certificate
signer Signer
}
// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose
// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert
// doesn't match the key used by signer.
func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) {
if bytes.Compare(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key")
}
return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil
}
func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) {
return s.signer.Sign(rand, data)
}
func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey {
return s.pub
}
const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address"
// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods
// can be plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback and
// ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. For the CertChecker to work,
// minimally, the IsAuthority callback should be set.
type CertChecker struct {
// SupportedCriticalOptions lists the CriticalOptions that the
// server application layer understands. These are only used
// for user certificates.
SupportedCriticalOptions []string
// IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an
// authority for the given user certificate. This allows for
// certificates to be signed by other certificates. This must be set
// if this CertChecker will be checking user certificates.
IsUserAuthority func(auth PublicKey) bool
// IsHostAuthority should report whether the key is recognized as
// an authority for this host. This allows for certificates to be
// signed by other keys, and for those other keys to only be valid
// signers for particular hostnames. This must be set if this
// CertChecker will be checking host certificates.
IsHostAuthority func(auth PublicKey, address string) bool
// Clock is used for verifying time stamps. If nil, time.Now
// is used.
Clock func() time.Time
// UserKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.Authenticate encounters a
// public key that is not a certificate. It must implement validation
// of user keys or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected.
UserKeyFallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
// HostKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.CheckHostKey encounters a
// public key that is not a certificate. It must implement host key
// validation or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected.
HostKeyFallback HostKeyCallback
// IsRevoked is called for each certificate so that revocation checking
// can be implemented. It should return true if the given certificate
// is revoked and false otherwise. If nil, no certificates are
// considered to have been revoked.
IsRevoked func(cert *Certificate) bool
}
// CheckHostKey checks a host key certificate. This method can be
// plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback.
func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error {
cert, ok := key.(*Certificate)
if !ok {
if c.HostKeyFallback != nil {
return c.HostKeyFallback(addr, remote, key)
}
return errors.New("ssh: non-certificate host key")
}
if cert.CertType != HostCert {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate presented as a host key has type %d", cert.CertType)
}
if !c.IsHostAuthority(cert.SignatureKey, addr) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: no authorities for hostname: %v", addr)
}
hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Pass hostname only as principal for host certificates (consistent with OpenSSH)
return c.CheckCert(hostname, cert)
}
// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as
// a value for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback.
func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) {
cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate)
if !ok {
if c.UserKeyFallback != nil {
return c.UserKeyFallback(conn, pubKey)
}
return nil, errors.New("ssh: normal key pairs not accepted")
}
if cert.CertType != UserCert {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has type %d", cert.CertType)
}
if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority")
}
if err := c.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &cert.Permissions, nil
}
// CheckCert checks CriticalOptions, ValidPrincipals, revocation, timestamp and
// the signature of the certificate.
func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error {
if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial)
}
for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions {
// sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by
// serverAuthenticate
if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption {
continue
}
found := false
for _, supp := range c.SupportedCriticalOptions {
if supp == opt {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported critical option %q in certificate", opt)
}
}
if len(cert.ValidPrincipals) > 0 {
// By default, certs are valid for all users/hosts.
found := false
for _, p := range cert.ValidPrincipals {
if p == principal {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: principal %q not in the set of valid principals for given certificate: %q", principal, cert.ValidPrincipals)
}
}
clock := c.Clock
if clock == nil {
clock = time.Now
}
unixNow := clock().Unix()
if after := int64(cert.ValidAfter); after < 0 || unixNow < int64(cert.ValidAfter) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert is not yet valid")
}
if before := int64(cert.ValidBefore); cert.ValidBefore != uint64(CertTimeInfinity) && (unixNow >= before || before < 0) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has expired")
}
if err := cert.SignatureKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signature does not verify")
}
return nil
}
// SignCert sets c.SignatureKey to the authority's public key and stores a
// Signature, by authority, in the certificate.
func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error {
c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil {
return err
}
c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey()
sig, err := authority.Sign(rand, c.bytesForSigning())
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.Signature = sig
return nil
}
var certAlgoNames = map[string]string{
KeyAlgoRSA: CertAlgoRSAv01,
KeyAlgoDSA: CertAlgoDSAv01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: CertAlgoECDSA384v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: CertAlgoECDSA521v01,
KeyAlgoED25519: CertAlgoED25519v01,
}
// certToPrivAlgo returns the underlying algorithm for a certificate algorithm.
// Panics if a non-certificate algorithm is passed.
func certToPrivAlgo(algo string) string {
for privAlgo, pubAlgo := range certAlgoNames {
if pubAlgo == algo {
return privAlgo
}
}
panic("unknown cert algorithm")
}
func (cert *Certificate) bytesForSigning() []byte {
c2 := *cert
c2.Signature = nil
out := c2.Marshal()
// Drop trailing signature length.
return out[:len(out)-4]
}
// Marshal serializes c into OpenSSH's wire format. It is part of the
// PublicKey interface.
func (c *Certificate) Marshal() []byte {
generic := genericCertData{
Serial: c.Serial,
CertType: c.CertType,
KeyId: c.KeyId,
ValidPrincipals: marshalStringList(c.ValidPrincipals),
ValidAfter: uint64(c.ValidAfter),
ValidBefore: uint64(c.ValidBefore),
CriticalOptions: marshalTuples(c.CriticalOptions),
Extensions: marshalTuples(c.Extensions),
Reserved: c.Reserved,
SignatureKey: c.SignatureKey.Marshal(),
}
if c.Signature != nil {
generic.Signature = Marshal(c.Signature)
}
genericBytes := Marshal(&generic)
keyBytes := c.Key.Marshal()
_, keyBytes, _ = parseString(keyBytes)
prefix := Marshal(&struct {
Name string
Nonce []byte
Key []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}{c.Type(), c.Nonce, keyBytes})
result := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(genericBytes))
result = append(result, prefix...)
result = append(result, genericBytes...)
return result
}
// Type returns the key name. It is part of the PublicKey interface.
func (c *Certificate) Type() string {
algo, ok := certAlgoNames[c.Key.Type()]
if !ok {
panic("unknown cert key type " + c.Key.Type())
}
return algo
}
// Verify verifies a signature against the certificate's public
// key. It is part of the PublicKey interface.
func (c *Certificate) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error {
return c.Key.Verify(data, sig)
}
func parseSignatureBody(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) {
format, in, ok := parseString(in)
if !ok {
return
}
out = &Signature{
Format: string(format),
}
if out.Blob, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok {
return
}
return out, in, ok
}
func parseSignature(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) {
sigBytes, rest, ok := parseString(in)
if !ok {
return
}
out, trailing, ok := parseSignatureBody(sigBytes)
if !ok || len(trailing) > 0 {
return nil, nil, false
}
return
}

633
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,633 @@
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"sync"
)
const (
minPacketLength = 9
// channelMaxPacket contains the maximum number of bytes that will be
// sent in a single packet. As per RFC 4253, section 6.1, 32k is also
// the minimum.
channelMaxPacket = 1 << 15
// We follow OpenSSH here.
channelWindowSize = 64 * channelMaxPacket
)
// NewChannel represents an incoming request to a channel. It must either be
// accepted for use by calling Accept, or rejected by calling Reject.
type NewChannel interface {
// Accept accepts the channel creation request. It returns the Channel
// and a Go channel containing SSH requests. The Go channel must be
// serviced otherwise the Channel will hang.
Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error)
// Reject rejects the channel creation request. After calling
// this, no other methods on the Channel may be called.
Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error
// ChannelType returns the type of the channel, as supplied by the
// client.
ChannelType() string
// ExtraData returns the arbitrary payload for this channel, as supplied
// by the client. This data is specific to the channel type.
ExtraData() []byte
}
// A Channel is an ordered, reliable, flow-controlled, duplex stream
// that is multiplexed over an SSH connection.
type Channel interface {
// Read reads up to len(data) bytes from the channel.
Read(data []byte) (int, error)
// Write writes len(data) bytes to the channel.
Write(data []byte) (int, error)
// Close signals end of channel use. No data may be sent after this
// call.
Close() error
// CloseWrite signals the end of sending in-band
// data. Requests may still be sent, and the other side may
// still send data
CloseWrite() error
// SendRequest sends a channel request. If wantReply is true,
// it will wait for a reply and return the result as a
// boolean, otherwise the return value will be false. Channel
// requests are out-of-band messages so they may be sent even
// if the data stream is closed or blocked by flow control.
// If the channel is closed before a reply is returned, io.EOF
// is returned.
SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error)
// Stderr returns an io.ReadWriter that writes to this channel
// with the extended data type set to stderr. Stderr may
// safely be read and written from a different goroutine than
// Read and Write respectively.
Stderr() io.ReadWriter
}
// Request is a request sent outside of the normal stream of
// data. Requests can either be specific to an SSH channel, or they
// can be global.
type Request struct {
Type string
WantReply bool
Payload []byte
ch *channel
mux *mux
}
// Reply sends a response to a request. It must be called for all requests
// where WantReply is true and is a no-op otherwise. The payload argument is
// ignored for replies to channel-specific requests.
func (r *Request) Reply(ok bool, payload []byte) error {
if !r.WantReply {
return nil
}
if r.ch == nil {
return r.mux.ackRequest(ok, payload)
}
return r.ch.ackRequest(ok)
}
// RejectionReason is an enumeration used when rejecting channel creation
// requests. See RFC 4254, section 5.1.
type RejectionReason uint32
const (
Prohibited RejectionReason = iota + 1
ConnectionFailed
UnknownChannelType
ResourceShortage
)
// String converts the rejection reason to human readable form.
func (r RejectionReason) String() string {
switch r {
case Prohibited:
return "administratively prohibited"
case ConnectionFailed:
return "connect failed"
case UnknownChannelType:
return "unknown channel type"
case ResourceShortage:
return "resource shortage"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("unknown reason %d", int(r))
}
func min(a uint32, b int) uint32 {
if a < uint32(b) {
return a
}
return uint32(b)
}
type channelDirection uint8
const (
channelInbound channelDirection = iota
channelOutbound
)
// channel is an implementation of the Channel interface that works
// with the mux class.
type channel struct {
// R/O after creation
chanType string
extraData []byte
localId, remoteId uint32
// maxIncomingPayload and maxRemotePayload are the maximum
// payload sizes of normal and extended data packets for
// receiving and sending, respectively. The wire packet will
// be 9 or 13 bytes larger (excluding encryption overhead).
maxIncomingPayload uint32
maxRemotePayload uint32
mux *mux
// decided is set to true if an accept or reject message has been sent
// (for outbound channels) or received (for inbound channels).
decided bool
// direction contains either channelOutbound, for channels created
// locally, or channelInbound, for channels created by the peer.
direction channelDirection
// Pending internal channel messages.
msg chan interface{}
// Since requests have no ID, there can be only one request
// with WantReply=true outstanding. This lock is held by a
// goroutine that has such an outgoing request pending.
sentRequestMu sync.Mutex
incomingRequests chan *Request
sentEOF bool
// thread-safe data
remoteWin window
pending *buffer
extPending *buffer
// windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window.
windowMu sync.Mutex
myWindow uint32
// writeMu serializes calls to mux.conn.writePacket() and
// protects sentClose and packetPool. This mutex must be
// different from windowMu, as writePacket can block if there
// is a key exchange pending.
writeMu sync.Mutex
sentClose bool
// packetPool has a buffer for each extended channel ID to
// save allocations during writes.
packetPool map[uint32][]byte
}
// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates
// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu.
func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
ch.writeMu.Lock()
if ch.sentClose {
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return io.EOF
}
ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose)
err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet)
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return err
}
func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error {
if debugMux {
log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg)
}
p := Marshal(msg)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId)
return ch.writePacket(p)
}
// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are
// used, for example, for stderr.
func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) {
if ch.sentEOF {
return 0, io.EOF
}
// 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length
opCode := byte(msgChannelData)
headerLength := uint32(9)
if extendedCode > 0 {
headerLength += 4
opCode = msgChannelExtendedData
}
ch.writeMu.Lock()
packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode]
// We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so
// WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be
// flagged as errors by the race detector.
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
for len(data) > 0 {
space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data))
if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil {
return n, err
}
if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want {
packet = make([]byte, want)
} else {
packet = packet[:want]
}
todo := data[:space]
packet[0] = opCode
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId)
if extendedCode > 0 {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode))
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo)))
copy(packet[headerLength:], todo)
if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil {
return n, err
}
n += len(todo)
data = data[len(todo):]
}
ch.writeMu.Lock()
ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet
ch.writeMu.Unlock()
return n, err
}
func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error {
headerLen := 9
isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData
if isExtendedData {
headerLen = 13
}
if len(packet) < headerLen {
// malformed data packet
return parseError(packet[0])
}
var extended uint32
if isExtendedData {
extended = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[5:])
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[headerLen-4 : headerLen])
if length == 0 {
return nil
}
if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload {
// TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect?
return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size")
}
data := packet[headerLen:]
if length != uint32(len(data)) {
return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length")
}
ch.windowMu.Lock()
if ch.myWindow < length {
ch.windowMu.Unlock()
// TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason?
return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much")
}
ch.myWindow -= length
ch.windowMu.Unlock()
if extended == 1 {
ch.extPending.write(data)
} else if extended > 0 {
// discard other extended data.
} else {
ch.pending.write(data)
}
return nil
}
func (c *channel) adjustWindow(n uint32) error {
c.windowMu.Lock()
// Since myWindow is managed on our side, and can never exceed
// the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow.
c.myWindow += uint32(n)
c.windowMu.Unlock()
return c.sendMessage(windowAdjustMsg{
AdditionalBytes: uint32(n),
})
}
func (c *channel) ReadExtended(data []byte, extended uint32) (n int, err error) {
switch extended {
case 1:
n, err = c.extPending.Read(data)
case 0:
n, err = c.pending.Read(data)
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: extended code %d unimplemented", extended)
}
if n > 0 {
err = c.adjustWindow(uint32(n))
// sendWindowAdjust can return io.EOF if the remote
// peer has closed the connection, however we want to
// defer forwarding io.EOF to the caller of Read until
// the buffer has been drained.
if n > 0 && err == io.EOF {
err = nil
}
}
return n, err
}
func (c *channel) close() {
c.pending.eof()
c.extPending.eof()
close(c.msg)
close(c.incomingRequests)
c.writeMu.Lock()
// This is not necessary for a normal channel teardown, but if
// there was another error, it is.
c.sentClose = true
c.writeMu.Unlock()
// Unblock writers.
c.remoteWin.close()
}
// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is
// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the
// given channel.
func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error {
if ch.direction == channelInbound {
return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel")
}
if ch.decided {
return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel")
}
ch.decided = true
return nil
}
func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error {
switch packet[0] {
case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData:
return ch.handleData(packet)
case msgChannelClose:
ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId})
ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId)
ch.close()
return nil
case msgChannelEOF:
// RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but
// it is logical to signal EOF at the same time.
ch.extPending.eof()
ch.pending.eof()
return nil
}
decoded, err := decode(packet)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch msg := decoded.(type) {
case *channelOpenFailureMsg:
if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
return err
}
ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID)
ch.msg <- msg
case *channelOpenConfirmMsg:
if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil {
return err
}
if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize)
}
ch.remoteId = msg.MyID
ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow)
ch.msg <- msg
case *windowAdjustMsg:
if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes)
}
case *channelRequestMsg:
req := Request{
Type: msg.Request,
WantReply: msg.WantReply,
Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData,
ch: ch,
}
ch.incomingRequests <- &req
default:
ch.msg <- msg
}
return nil
}
func (m *mux) newChannel(chanType string, direction channelDirection, extraData []byte) *channel {
ch := &channel{
remoteWin: window{Cond: newCond()},
myWindow: channelWindowSize,
pending: newBuffer(),
extPending: newBuffer(),
direction: direction,
incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize),
msg: make(chan interface{}, chanSize),
chanType: chanType,
extraData: extraData,
mux: m,
packetPool: make(map[uint32][]byte),
}
ch.localId = m.chanList.add(ch)
return ch
}
var errUndecided = errors.New("ssh: must Accept or Reject channel")
var errDecidedAlready = errors.New("ssh: can call Accept or Reject only once")
type extChannel struct {
code uint32
ch *channel
}
func (e *extChannel) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
return e.ch.WriteExtended(data, e.code)
}
func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code)
}
func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
if ch.decided {
return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready
}
ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket
confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
MyID: ch.localId,
MyWindow: ch.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
}
ch.decided = true
if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil
}
func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error {
if ch.decided {
return errDecidedAlready
}
reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
Reason: reason,
Message: message,
Language: "en",
}
ch.decided = true
return ch.sendMessage(reject)
}
func (ch *channel) Read(data []byte) (int, error) {
if !ch.decided {
return 0, errUndecided
}
return ch.ReadExtended(data, 0)
}
func (ch *channel) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
if !ch.decided {
return 0, errUndecided
}
return ch.WriteExtended(data, 0)
}
func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error {
if !ch.decided {
return errUndecided
}
ch.sentEOF = true
return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId})
}
func (ch *channel) Close() error {
if !ch.decided {
return errUndecided
}
return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId})
}
// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given,
// SSH extended stream. Such streams are used, for example, for stderr.
func (ch *channel) Extended(code uint32) io.ReadWriter {
if !ch.decided {
return nil
}
return &extChannel{code, ch}
}
func (ch *channel) Stderr() io.ReadWriter {
return ch.Extended(1)
}
func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) {
if !ch.decided {
return false, errUndecided
}
if wantReply {
ch.sentRequestMu.Lock()
defer ch.sentRequestMu.Unlock()
}
msg := channelRequestMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
Request: name,
WantReply: wantReply,
RequestSpecificData: payload,
}
if err := ch.sendMessage(msg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
if wantReply {
m, ok := (<-ch.msg)
if !ok {
return false, io.EOF
}
switch m.(type) {
case *channelRequestFailureMsg:
return false, nil
case *channelRequestSuccessMsg:
return true, nil
default:
return false, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to channel request: %#v", m)
}
}
return false, nil
}
// ackRequest either sends an ack or nack to the channel request.
func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error {
if !ch.decided {
return errUndecided
}
var msg interface{}
if !ok {
msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
}
} else {
msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{
PeersID: ch.remoteId,
}
}
return ch.sendMessage(msg)
}
func (ch *channel) ChannelType() string {
return ch.chanType
}
func (ch *channel) ExtraData() []byte {
return ch.extraData
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/des"
"crypto/rc4"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
)
const (
packetSizeMultiple = 16 // TODO(huin) this should be determined by the cipher.
// RFC 4253 section 6.1 defines a minimum packet size of 32768 that implementations
// MUST be able to process (plus a few more kilobytes for padding and mac). The RFC
// indicates implementations SHOULD be able to handle larger packet sizes, but then
// waffles on about reasonable limits.
//
// OpenSSH caps their maxPacket at 256kB so we choose to do
// the same. maxPacket is also used to ensure that uint32
// length fields do not overflow, so it should remain well
// below 4G.
maxPacket = 256 * 1024
)
// noneCipher implements cipher.Stream and provides no encryption. It is used
// by the transport before the first key-exchange.
type noneCipher struct{}
func (c noneCipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
copy(dst, src)
}
func newAESCTR(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cipher.NewCTR(c, iv), nil
}
func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
return rc4.NewCipher(key)
}
type streamCipherMode struct {
keySize int
ivSize int
skip int
createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)
}
func (c *streamCipherMode) createStream(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) {
if len(key) < c.keySize {
panic("ssh: key length too small for cipher")
}
if len(iv) < c.ivSize {
panic("ssh: iv too small for cipher")
}
stream, err := c.createFunc(key[:c.keySize], iv[:c.ivSize])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var streamDump []byte
if c.skip > 0 {
streamDump = make([]byte, 512)
}
for remainingToDump := c.skip; remainingToDump > 0; {
dumpThisTime := remainingToDump
if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) {
dumpThisTime = len(streamDump)
}
stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime])
remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime
}
return stream, nil
}
// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included
// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in
// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers.
var cipherModes = map[string]*streamCipherMode{
// Ciphers from RFC4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms
// are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
"aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
"aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
"aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, 0, newAESCTR},
// Ciphers from RFC4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers.
// They are defined in the order specified in the RFC.
"arcfour128": {16, 0, 1536, newRC4},
"arcfour256": {32, 0, 1536, newRC4},
// Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol.
// Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and
// RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution."
// RFC4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour.
"arcfour": {16, 0, 0, newRC4},
// AES-GCM is not a stream cipher, so it is constructed with a
// special case. If we add any more non-stream ciphers, we
// should invest a cleaner way to do this.
gcmCipherID: {16, 12, 0, nil},
// CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config.
// (See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf). If absolutely
// needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it.
// You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if
// you do.
aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, 0, nil},
// 3des-cbc is insecure and is disabled by default.
tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, 0, nil},
}
// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length
// and number of padding bytes.
const prefixLen = 5
// streamPacketCipher is a packetCipher using a stream cipher.
type streamPacketCipher struct {
mac hash.Hash
cipher cipher.Stream
etm bool
// The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations.
prefix [prefixLen]byte
seqNumBytes [4]byte
padding [2 * packetSizeMultiple]byte
packetData []byte
macResult []byte
}
// readPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument.
func (s *streamPacketCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var encryptedPaddingLength [1]byte
if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
copy(encryptedPaddingLength[:], s.prefix[4:5])
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5])
} else {
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:])
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(s.prefix[0:4])
paddingLength := uint32(s.prefix[4])
var macSize uint32
if s.mac != nil {
s.mac.Reset()
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum)
s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:])
if s.etm {
s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:4])
s.mac.Write(encryptedPaddingLength[:])
} else {
s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:])
}
macSize = uint32(s.mac.Size())
}
if length <= paddingLength+1 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too small")
}
if length > maxPacket {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large")
}
// the maxPacket check above ensures that length-1+macSize
// does not overflow.
if uint32(cap(s.packetData)) < length-1+macSize {
s.packetData = make([]byte, length-1+macSize)
} else {
s.packetData = s.packetData[:length-1+macSize]
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.packetData); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
mac := s.packetData[length-1:]
data := s.packetData[:length-1]
if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
s.mac.Write(data)
}
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(data, data)
if s.mac != nil {
if !s.etm {
s.mac.Write(data)
}
s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0])
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s.macResult, mac) != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure")
}
}
return s.packetData[:length-paddingLength-1], nil
}
// writePacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument
func (s *streamPacketCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
if len(packet) > maxPacket {
return errors.New("ssh: packet too large")
}
aadlen := 0
if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
// packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes
aadlen = 4
}
paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet)-aadlen)%packetSizeMultiple
if paddingLength < 4 {
paddingLength += packetSizeMultiple
}
length := len(packet) + 1 + paddingLength
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.prefix[:], uint32(length))
s.prefix[4] = byte(paddingLength)
padding := s.padding[:paddingLength]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, padding); err != nil {
return err
}
if s.mac != nil {
s.mac.Reset()
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum)
s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:])
if s.etm {
// For EtM algorithms, the packet length must stay unencrypted,
// but the following data (padding length) must be encrypted
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5])
}
s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:])
if !s.etm {
// For non-EtM algorithms, the algorithm is applied on unencrypted data
s.mac.Write(packet)
s.mac.Write(padding)
}
}
if !(s.mac != nil && s.etm) {
// For EtM algorithms, the padding length has already been encrypted
// and the packet length must remain unencrypted
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:])
}
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(packet, packet)
s.cipher.XORKeyStream(padding, padding)
if s.mac != nil && s.etm {
// For EtM algorithms, packet and padding must be encrypted
s.mac.Write(packet)
s.mac.Write(padding)
}
if _, err := w.Write(s.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := w.Write(packet); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := w.Write(padding); err != nil {
return err
}
if s.mac != nil {
s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0])
if _, err := w.Write(s.macResult); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
type gcmCipher struct {
aead cipher.AEAD
prefix [4]byte
iv []byte
buf []byte
}
func newGCMCipher(iv, key []byte) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(c)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &gcmCipher{
aead: aead,
iv: iv,
}, nil
}
const gcmTagSize = 16
func (c *gcmCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
// Pad out to multiple of 16 bytes. This is different from the
// stream cipher because that encrypts the length too.
padding := byte(packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple)
if padding < 4 {
padding += packetSizeMultiple
}
length := uint32(len(packet) + int(padding) + 1)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.prefix[:], length)
if _, err := w.Write(c.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
if cap(c.buf) < int(length) {
c.buf = make([]byte, length)
} else {
c.buf = c.buf[:length]
}
c.buf[0] = padding
copy(c.buf[1:], packet)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[1+len(packet):]); err != nil {
return err
}
c.buf = c.aead.Seal(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:])
if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil {
return err
}
c.incIV()
return nil
}
func (c *gcmCipher) incIV() {
for i := 4 + 7; i >= 4; i-- {
c.iv[i]++
if c.iv[i] != 0 {
break
}
}
}
func (c *gcmCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.prefix[:]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:])
if length > maxPacket {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded")
}
if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) {
c.buf = make([]byte, length+gcmTagSize)
} else {
c.buf = c.buf[:length+gcmTagSize]
}
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
plain, err := c.aead.Open(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.incIV()
padding := plain[0]
if padding < 4 {
// padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies
// the maximum size, which is 255.
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding)
}
if int(padding+1) >= len(plain) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding)
}
plain = plain[1 : length-uint32(padding)]
return plain, nil
}
// cbcCipher implements aes128-cbc cipher defined in RFC 4253 section 6.1
type cbcCipher struct {
mac hash.Hash
macSize uint32
decrypter cipher.BlockMode
encrypter cipher.BlockMode
// The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations.
seqNumBytes [4]byte
packetData []byte
macResult []byte
// Amount of data we should still read to hide which
// verification error triggered.
oracleCamouflage uint32
}
func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
cbc := &cbcCipher{
mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv),
encrypter: cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, iv),
packetData: make([]byte, 1024),
}
if cbc.mac != nil {
cbc.macSize = uint32(cbc.mac.Size())
}
return cbc, nil
}
func newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cbc, nil
}
func newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) {
c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, iv, key, macKey, algs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return cbc, nil
}
func maxUInt32(a, b int) uint32 {
if a > b {
return uint32(a)
}
return uint32(b)
}
const (
cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple = 8
cbcMinPacketSize = 16
cbcMinPaddingSize = 4
)
// cbcError represents a verification error that may leak information.
type cbcError string
func (e cbcError) Error() string { return string(e) }
func (c *cbcCipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
p, err := c.readPacketLeaky(seqNum, r)
if err != nil {
if _, ok := err.(cbcError); ok {
// Verification error: read a fixed amount of
// data, to make distinguishing between
// failing MAC and failing length check more
// difficult.
io.CopyN(ioutil.Discard, r, int64(c.oracleCamouflage))
}
}
return p, err
}
func (c *cbcCipher) readPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
blockSize := c.decrypter.BlockSize()
// Read the header, which will include some of the subsequent data in the
// case of block ciphers - this is copied back to the payload later.
// How many bytes of payload/padding will be read with this first read.
firstBlockLength := uint32((prefixLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize * blockSize)
firstBlock := c.packetData[:firstBlockLength]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, firstBlock); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.oracleCamouflage = maxPacket + 4 + c.macSize - firstBlockLength
c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(firstBlock, firstBlock)
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(firstBlock[:4])
if length > maxPacket {
return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too large")
}
if length+4 < maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSize, blockSize) {
// The minimum size of a packet is 16 (or the cipher block size, whichever
// is larger) bytes.
return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too small")
}
// The length of the packet (including the length field but not the MAC) must
// be a multiple of the block size or 8, whichever is larger.
if (length+4)%maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, blockSize) != 0 {
return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length multiple")
}
paddingLength := uint32(firstBlock[4])
if paddingLength < cbcMinPaddingSize || length <= paddingLength+1 {
return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length")
}
// Positions within the c.packetData buffer:
macStart := 4 + length
paddingStart := macStart - paddingLength
// Entire packet size, starting before length, ending at end of mac.
entirePacketSize := macStart + c.macSize
// Ensure c.packetData is large enough for the entire packet data.
if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < entirePacketSize {
// Still need to upsize and copy, but this should be rare at runtime, only
// on upsizing the packetData buffer.
c.packetData = make([]byte, entirePacketSize)
copy(c.packetData, firstBlock)
} else {
c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize]
}
n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n)
remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart]
c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted)
mac := c.packetData[macStart:]
if c.mac != nil {
c.mac.Reset()
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum)
c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:])
c.mac.Write(c.packetData[:macStart])
c.macResult = c.mac.Sum(c.macResult[:0])
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c.macResult, mac) != 1 {
return nil, cbcError("ssh: MAC failure")
}
}
return c.packetData[prefixLen:paddingStart], nil
}
func (c *cbcCipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
effectiveBlockSize := maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, c.encrypter.BlockSize())
// Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding).
// Enforce minimum padding and packet size.
encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPaddingSize)
// Enforce block size.
encLength = (encLength + effectiveBlockSize - 1) / effectiveBlockSize * effectiveBlockSize
length := encLength - 4
paddingLength := int(length) - (1 + len(packet))
// Overall buffer contains: header, payload, padding, mac.
// Space for the MAC is reserved in the capacity but not the slice length.
bufferSize := encLength + c.macSize
if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < bufferSize {
c.packetData = make([]byte, encLength, bufferSize)
} else {
c.packetData = c.packetData[:encLength]
}
p := c.packetData
// Packet header.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, length)
p = p[4:]
p[0] = byte(paddingLength)
// Payload.
p = p[1:]
copy(p, packet)
// Padding.
p = p[len(packet):]
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, p); err != nil {
return err
}
if c.mac != nil {
c.mac.Reset()
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum)
c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:])
c.mac.Write(c.packetData)
// The MAC is now appended into the capacity reserved for it earlier.
c.packetData = c.mac.Sum(c.packetData)
}
c.encrypter.CryptBlocks(c.packetData[:encLength], c.packetData[:encLength])
if _, err := w.Write(c.packetData); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}

278
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Client implements a traditional SSH client that supports shells,
// subprocesses, TCP port/streamlocal forwarding and tunneled dialing.
type Client struct {
Conn
forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side
mu sync.Mutex
channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel
}
// HandleChannelOpen returns a channel on which NewChannel requests
// for the given type are sent. If the type already is being handled,
// nil is returned. The channel is closed when the connection is closed.
func (c *Client) HandleChannelOpen(channelType string) <-chan NewChannel {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
if c.channelHandlers == nil {
// The SSH channel has been closed.
c := make(chan NewChannel)
close(c)
return c
}
ch := c.channelHandlers[channelType]
if ch != nil {
return nil
}
ch = make(chan NewChannel, chanSize)
c.channelHandlers[channelType] = ch
return ch
}
// NewClient creates a Client on top of the given connection.
func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client {
conn := &Client{
Conn: c,
channelHandlers: make(map[string]chan NewChannel, 1),
}
go conn.handleGlobalRequests(reqs)
go conn.handleChannelOpens(chans)
go func() {
conn.Wait()
conn.forwards.closeAll()
}()
go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip"))
go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"))
return conn
}
// NewClientConn establishes an authenticated SSH connection using c
// as the underlying transport. The Request and NewChannel channels
// must be serviced or the connection will hang.
func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
fullConf := *config
fullConf.SetDefaults()
if fullConf.HostKeyCallback == nil {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: must specify HostKeyCallback")
}
conn := &connection{
sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
}
if err := conn.clientHandshake(addr, &fullConf); err != nil {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %v", err)
}
conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport)
return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil
}
// clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section
// 7.
func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error {
if config.ClientVersion != "" {
c.clientVersion = []byte(config.ClientVersion)
} else {
c.clientVersion = []byte(packageVersion)
}
var err error
c.serverVersion, err = exchangeVersions(c.sshConn.conn, c.clientVersion)
if err != nil {
return err
}
c.transport = newClientTransport(
newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, true /* is client */),
c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, config, dialAddress, c.sshConn.RemoteAddr())
if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
return err
}
c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID()
return c.clientAuthenticate(config)
}
// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key
// exchange.
func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, result *kexResult) error {
sig, rest, ok := parseSignatureBody(result.Signature)
if len(rest) > 0 || !ok {
return errors.New("ssh: signature parse error")
}
return hostKey.Verify(result.H, sig)
}
// NewSession opens a new Session for this client. (A session is a remote
// execution of a program.)
func (c *Client) NewSession() (*Session, error) {
ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("session", nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return newSession(ch, in)
}
func (c *Client) handleGlobalRequests(incoming <-chan *Request) {
for r := range incoming {
// This handles keepalive messages and matches
// the behaviour of OpenSSH.
r.Reply(false, nil)
}
}
// handleChannelOpens channel open messages from the remote side.
func (c *Client) handleChannelOpens(in <-chan NewChannel) {
for ch := range in {
c.mu.Lock()
handler := c.channelHandlers[ch.ChannelType()]
c.mu.Unlock()
if handler != nil {
handler <- ch
} else {
ch.Reject(UnknownChannelType, fmt.Sprintf("unknown channel type: %v", ch.ChannelType()))
}
}
c.mu.Lock()
for _, ch := range c.channelHandlers {
close(ch)
}
c.channelHandlers = nil
c.mu.Unlock()
}
// Dial starts a client connection to the given SSH server. It is a
// convenience function that connects to the given network address,
// initiates the SSH handshake, and then sets up a Client. For access
// to incoming channels and requests, use net.Dial with NewClientConn
// instead.
func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) {
conn, err := net.DialTimeout(network, addr, config.Timeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c, chans, reqs, err := NewClientConn(conn, addr, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return NewClient(c, chans, reqs), nil
}
// HostKeyCallback is the function type used for verifying server
// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or
// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial
// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the
// net.Conn underlying the the SSH connection.
type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error
// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by
// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server.
type BannerCallback func(message string) error
// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be
// modified after having been passed to an SSH function.
type ClientConfig struct {
// Config contains configuration that is shared between clients and
// servers.
Config
// User contains the username to authenticate as.
User string
// Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the
// server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will
// be used during authentication.
Auth []AuthMethod
// HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic
// handshake to validate the server's host key. The client
// configuration must supply this callback for the connection
// to succeed. The functions InsecureIgnoreHostKey or
// FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks.
HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback
// BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom
// server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to
// handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for
// simplistic display on Stderr.
BannerCallback BannerCallback
// ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will
// be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used.
ClientVersion string
// HostKeyAlgorithms lists the key types that the client will
// accept from the server as host key, in order of
// preference. If empty, a reasonable default is used. Any
// string returned from PublicKey.Type method may be used, or
// any of the CertAlgoXxxx and KeyAlgoXxxx constants.
HostKeyAlgorithms []string
// Timeout is the maximum amount of time for the TCP connection to establish.
//
// A Timeout of zero means no timeout.
Timeout time.Duration
}
// InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for
// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept any host key. It should
// not be used for production code.
func InsecureIgnoreHostKey() HostKeyCallback {
return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error {
return nil
}
}
type fixedHostKey struct {
key PublicKey
}
func (f *fixedHostKey) check(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error {
if f.key == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: required host key was nil")
}
if !bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), f.key.Marshal()) {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: host key mismatch")
}
return nil
}
// FixedHostKey returns a function for use in
// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept only a specific host key.
func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback {
hk := &fixedHostKey{key}
return hk.check
}
// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for
// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr.
func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback {
return func(banner string) error {
_, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner)
return err
}
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
)
// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252.
func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error {
// initiate user auth session
if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceRequestMsg{serviceUserAuth})); err != nil {
return err
}
packet, err := c.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return err
}
var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil {
return err
}
// during the authentication phase the client first attempts the "none" method
// then any untried methods suggested by the server.
tried := make(map[string]bool)
var lastMethods []string
sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID()
for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; {
ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if ok {
// success
return nil
}
tried[auth.method()] = true
if methods == nil {
methods = lastMethods
}
lastMethods = methods
auth = nil
findNext:
for _, a := range config.Auth {
candidateMethod := a.method()
if tried[candidateMethod] {
continue
}
for _, meth := range methods {
if meth == candidateMethod {
auth = a
break findNext
}
}
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", keys(tried))
}
func keys(m map[string]bool) []string {
s := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for key := range m {
s = append(s, key)
}
return s
}
// An AuthMethod represents an instance of an RFC 4252 authentication method.
type AuthMethod interface {
// auth authenticates user over transport t.
// Returns true if authentication is successful.
// If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative
// method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored
// and the previous set of possible methods will be reused.
auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error)
// method returns the RFC 4252 method name.
method() string
}
// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2.
type noneAuth int
func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "none",
})); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
return handleAuthResponse(c)
}
func (n *noneAuth) method() string {
return "none"
}
// passwordCallback is an AuthMethod that fetches the password through
// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user.
type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error)
func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
type passwordAuthMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
Method string
Reply bool
Password string
}
pw, err := cb()
// REVIEW NOTE: is there a need to support skipping a password attempt?
// The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password
// when prompting.
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: cb.method(),
Reply: false,
Password: pw,
})); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
return handleAuthResponse(c)
}
func (cb passwordCallback) method() string {
return "password"
}
// Password returns an AuthMethod using the given password.
func Password(secret string) AuthMethod {
return passwordCallback(func() (string, error) { return secret, nil })
}
// PasswordCallback returns an AuthMethod that uses a callback for
// fetching a password.
func PasswordCallback(prompt func() (secret string, err error)) AuthMethod {
return passwordCallback(prompt)
}
type publickeyAuthMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
Method string
// HasSig indicates to the receiver packet that the auth request is signed and
// should be used for authentication of the request.
HasSig bool
Algoname string
PubKey []byte
// Sig is tagged with "rest" so Marshal will exclude it during
// validateKey
Sig []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// publicKeyCallback is an AuthMethod that uses a set of key
// pairs for authentication.
type publicKeyCallback func() ([]Signer, error)
func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string {
return "publickey"
}
func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
// Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is
// acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will
// attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat
// the process with the remaining keys.
signers, err := cb()
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
var methods []string
for _, signer := range signers {
ok, err := validateKey(signer.PublicKey(), user, c)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
if !ok {
continue
}
pub := signer.PublicKey()
pubKey := pub.Marshal()
sign, err := signer.Sign(rand, buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: cb.method(),
}, []byte(pub.Type()), pubKey))
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
// manually wrap the serialized signature in a string
s := Marshal(sign)
sig := make([]byte, stringLength(len(s)))
marshalString(sig, s)
msg := publickeyAuthMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: cb.method(),
HasSig: true,
Algoname: pub.Type(),
PubKey: pubKey,
Sig: sig,
}
p := Marshal(&msg)
if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
var success bool
success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
// If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not
// contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any
// other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when
// additional authentication methods are required.
if success || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) {
return success, methods, err
}
}
return false, methods, nil
}
func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool {
for _, m := range methods {
if m == method {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server.
func validateKey(key PublicKey, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
pubKey := key.Marshal()
msg := publickeyAuthMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "publickey",
HasSig: false,
Algoname: key.Type(),
PubKey: pubKey,
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&msg)); err != nil {
return false, err
}
return confirmKeyAck(key, c)
}
func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) {
pubKey := key.Marshal()
algoname := key.Type()
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return false, err
}
case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk:
var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
if msg.Algo != algoname || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) {
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
case msgUserAuthFailure:
return false, nil
default:
return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
}
}
}
// PublicKeys returns an AuthMethod that uses the given key
// pairs.
func PublicKeys(signers ...Signer) AuthMethod {
return publicKeyCallback(func() ([]Signer, error) { return signers, nil })
}
// PublicKeysCallback returns an AuthMethod that runs the given
// function to obtain a list of key pairs.
func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMethod {
return publicKeyCallback(getSigners)
}
// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded
// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and
// an error if an unexpected response was received.
func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (bool, []string, error) {
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
return false, msg.Methods, nil
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
return true, nil, nil
default:
return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0])
}
}
}
func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error {
var msg userAuthBannerMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return err
}
transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport)
if !ok {
return nil
}
if transport.bannerCallback != nil {
return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message)
}
return nil
}
// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally
// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers.
// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After
// successful authentication, the server may send a challenge with no
// questions, for which the user and instruction messages should be
// printed. RFC 4256 section 3.3 details how the UI should behave for
// both CLI and GUI environments.
type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(user, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error)
// KeyboardInteractive returns an AuthMethod using a prompt/response
// sequence controlled by the server.
func KeyboardInteractive(challenge KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) AuthMethod {
return challenge
}
func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string {
return "keyboard-interactive"
}
func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (bool, []string, error) {
type initiateMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
Method string
Language string
Submethods string
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&initiateMsg{
User: user,
Service: serviceSSH,
Method: "keyboard-interactive",
})); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
for {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
// like handleAuthResponse, but with less options.
switch packet[0] {
case msgUserAuthBanner:
if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
continue
case msgUserAuthInfoRequest:
// OK
case msgUserAuthFailure:
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
return false, msg.Methods, nil
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
return true, nil, nil
default:
return false, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0])
}
var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
// Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs.
rest := msg.Prompts
var prompts []string
var echos []bool
for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ {
prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest)
if !ok || len(r) == 0 {
return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error")
}
prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt))
echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0)
rest = r[1:]
}
if len(rest) != 0 {
return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs")
}
answers, err := cb(msg.User, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos)
if err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
if len(answers) != len(prompts) {
return false, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback")
}
responseLength := 1 + 4
for _, a := range answers {
responseLength += stringLength(len(a))
}
serialized := make([]byte, responseLength)
p := serialized
p[0] = msgUserAuthInfoResponse
p = p[1:]
p = marshalUint32(p, uint32(len(answers)))
for _, a := range answers {
p = marshalString(p, []byte(a))
}
if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
}
}
type retryableAuthMethod struct {
authMethod AuthMethod
maxTries int
}
func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok bool, methods []string, err error) {
for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ {
ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand)
if ok || err != nil { // either success or error terminate
return ok, methods, err
}
}
return ok, methods, err
}
func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string {
return r.authMethod.method()
}
// RetryableAuthMethod is a decorator for other auth methods enabling them to
// be retried up to maxTries before considering that AuthMethod itself failed.
// If maxTries is <= 0, will retry indefinitely
//
// This is useful for interactive clients using challenge/response type
// authentication (e.g. Keyboard-Interactive, Password, etc) where the user
// could mistype their response resulting in the server issuing a
// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (rfc4252 #8 [password] and rfc4256 #3.4
// [keyboard-interactive]); Without this decorator, the non-retryable
// AuthMethod would be removed from future consideration, and never tried again
// (and so the user would never be able to retry their entry).
func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod {
return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries}
}

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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"io"
"math"
"sync"
_ "crypto/sha1"
_ "crypto/sha256"
_ "crypto/sha512"
)
// These are string constants in the SSH protocol.
const (
compressionNone = "none"
serviceUserAuth = "ssh-userauth"
serviceSSH = "ssh-connection"
)
// supportedCiphers specifies the supported ciphers in preference order.
var supportedCiphers = []string{
"aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr",
"aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
"arcfour256", "arcfour128",
}
// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in
// preference order.
var supportedKexAlgos = []string{
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256,
// P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't
// reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK.
kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521,
kexAlgoDH14SHA1, kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
}
// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods
// of authenticating servers) in preference order.
var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01,
CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01,
KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521,
KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA,
KeyAlgoED25519,
}
// supportedMACs specifies a default set of MAC algorithms in preference order.
// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed
// because they have reached the end of their useful life.
var supportedMACs = []string{
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96",
}
var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone}
// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported algorithms to their respective
// hashes needed for signature verification.
var hashFuncs = map[string]crypto.Hash{
KeyAlgoRSA: crypto.SHA1,
KeyAlgoDSA: crypto.SHA1,
KeyAlgoECDSA256: crypto.SHA256,
KeyAlgoECDSA384: crypto.SHA384,
KeyAlgoECDSA521: crypto.SHA512,
CertAlgoRSAv01: crypto.SHA1,
CertAlgoDSAv01: crypto.SHA1,
CertAlgoECDSA256v01: crypto.SHA256,
CertAlgoECDSA384v01: crypto.SHA384,
CertAlgoECDSA521v01: crypto.SHA512,
}
// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't
// match what we wanted.
func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected %d)", got, expected)
}
// parseError results from a malformed SSH message.
func parseError(tag uint8) error {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: parse error in message type %d", tag)
}
func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, err error) {
for _, c := range client {
for _, s := range server {
if c == s {
return c, nil
}
}
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; client offered: %v, server offered: %v", what, client, server)
}
type directionAlgorithms struct {
Cipher string
MAC string
Compression string
}
// rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes.
func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 {
// According to RFC4344 block ciphers should rekey after
// 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is
// 128.
switch a.Cipher {
case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcmCipherID, aes128cbcID:
return 16 * (1 << 32)
}
// For others, stick with RFC4253 recommendation to rekey after 1 Gb of data.
return 1 << 30
}
type algorithms struct {
kex string
hostKey string
w directionAlgorithms
r directionAlgorithms
}
func findAgreedAlgorithms(clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) {
result := &algorithms{}
result.kex, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.hostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.w.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.r.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.w.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.r.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.w.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer)
if err != nil {
return
}
result.r.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient)
if err != nil {
return
}
return result, nil
}
// If rekeythreshold is too small, we can't make any progress sending
// stuff.
const minRekeyThreshold uint64 = 256
// Config contains configuration data common to both ServerConfig and
// ClientConfig.
type Config struct {
// Rand provides the source of entropy for cryptographic
// primitives. If Rand is nil, the cryptographic random reader
// in package crypto/rand will be used.
Rand io.Reader
// The maximum number of bytes sent or received after which a
// new key is negotiated. It must be at least 256. If
// unspecified, a size suitable for the chosen cipher is used.
RekeyThreshold uint64
// The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a
// default set of algorithms is used.
KeyExchanges []string
// The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible
// default is used.
Ciphers []string
// The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default
// is used.
MACs []string
}
// SetDefaults sets sensible values for unset fields in config. This is
// exported for testing: Configs passed to SSH functions are copied and have
// default values set automatically.
func (c *Config) SetDefaults() {
if c.Rand == nil {
c.Rand = rand.Reader
}
if c.Ciphers == nil {
c.Ciphers = supportedCiphers
}
var ciphers []string
for _, c := range c.Ciphers {
if cipherModes[c] != nil {
// reject the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition
ciphers = append(ciphers, c)
}
}
c.Ciphers = ciphers
if c.KeyExchanges == nil {
c.KeyExchanges = supportedKexAlgos
}
if c.MACs == nil {
c.MACs = supportedMACs
}
if c.RekeyThreshold == 0 {
// cipher specific default
} else if c.RekeyThreshold < minRekeyThreshold {
c.RekeyThreshold = minRekeyThreshold
} else if c.RekeyThreshold >= math.MaxInt64 {
// Avoid weirdness if somebody uses -1 as a threshold.
c.RekeyThreshold = math.MaxInt64
}
}
// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove
// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7.
func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte {
data := struct {
Session []byte
Type byte
User string
Service string
Method string
Sign bool
Algo []byte
PubKey []byte
}{
sessionID,
msgUserAuthRequest,
req.User,
req.Service,
req.Method,
true,
algo,
pubKey,
}
return Marshal(data)
}
func appendU16(buf []byte, n uint16) []byte {
return append(buf, byte(n>>8), byte(n))
}
func appendU32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte {
return append(buf, byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n))
}
func appendU64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte {
return append(buf,
byte(n>>56), byte(n>>48), byte(n>>40), byte(n>>32),
byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n))
}
func appendInt(buf []byte, n int) []byte {
return appendU32(buf, uint32(n))
}
func appendString(buf []byte, s string) []byte {
buf = appendU32(buf, uint32(len(s)))
buf = append(buf, s...)
return buf
}
func appendBool(buf []byte, b bool) []byte {
if b {
return append(buf, 1)
}
return append(buf, 0)
}
// newCond is a helper to hide the fact that there is no usable zero
// value for sync.Cond.
func newCond() *sync.Cond { return sync.NewCond(new(sync.Mutex)) }
// window represents the buffer available to clients
// wishing to write to a channel.
type window struct {
*sync.Cond
win uint32 // RFC 4254 5.2 says the window size can grow to 2^32-1
writeWaiters int
closed bool
}
// add adds win to the amount of window available
// for consumers.
func (w *window) add(win uint32) bool {
// a zero sized window adjust is a noop.
if win == 0 {
return true
}
w.L.Lock()
if w.win+win < win {
w.L.Unlock()
return false
}
w.win += win
// It is unusual that multiple goroutines would be attempting to reserve
// window space, but not guaranteed. Use broadcast to notify all waiters
// that additional window is available.
w.Broadcast()
w.L.Unlock()
return true
}
// close sets the window to closed, so all reservations fail
// immediately.
func (w *window) close() {
w.L.Lock()
w.closed = true
w.Broadcast()
w.L.Unlock()
}
// reserve reserves win from the available window capacity.
// If no capacity remains, reserve will block. reserve may
// return less than requested.
func (w *window) reserve(win uint32) (uint32, error) {
var err error
w.L.Lock()
w.writeWaiters++
w.Broadcast()
for w.win == 0 && !w.closed {
w.Wait()
}
w.writeWaiters--
if w.win < win {
win = w.win
}
w.win -= win
if w.closed {
err = io.EOF
}
w.L.Unlock()
return win, err
}
// waitWriterBlocked waits until some goroutine is blocked for further
// writes. It is used in tests only.
func (w *window) waitWriterBlocked() {
w.Cond.L.Lock()
for w.writeWaiters == 0 {
w.Cond.Wait()
}
w.Cond.L.Unlock()
}

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// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"fmt"
"net"
)
// OpenChannelError is returned if the other side rejects an
// OpenChannel request.
type OpenChannelError struct {
Reason RejectionReason
Message string
}
func (e *OpenChannelError) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: rejected: %s (%s)", e.Reason, e.Message)
}
// ConnMetadata holds metadata for the connection.
type ConnMetadata interface {
// User returns the user ID for this connection.
User() string
// SessionID returns the session hash, also denoted by H.
SessionID() []byte
// ClientVersion returns the client's version string as hashed
// into the session ID.
ClientVersion() []byte
// ServerVersion returns the server's version string as hashed
// into the session ID.
ServerVersion() []byte
// RemoteAddr returns the remote address for this connection.
RemoteAddr() net.Addr
// LocalAddr returns the local address for this connection.
LocalAddr() net.Addr
}
// Conn represents an SSH connection for both server and client roles.
// Conn is the basis for implementing an application layer, such
// as ClientConn, which implements the traditional shell access for
// clients.
type Conn interface {
ConnMetadata
// SendRequest sends a global request, and returns the
// reply. If wantReply is true, it returns the response status
// and payload. See also RFC4254, section 4.
SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error)
// OpenChannel tries to open an channel. If the request is
// rejected, it returns *OpenChannelError. On success it returns
// the SSH Channel and a Go channel for incoming, out-of-band
// requests. The Go channel must be serviced, or the
// connection will hang.
OpenChannel(name string, data []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error)
// Close closes the underlying network connection
Close() error
// Wait blocks until the connection has shut down, and returns the
// error causing the shutdown.
Wait() error
// TODO(hanwen): consider exposing:
// RequestKeyChange
// Disconnect
}
// DiscardRequests consumes and rejects all requests from the
// passed-in channel.
func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) {
for req := range in {
if req.WantReply {
req.Reply(false, nil)
}
}
}
// A connection represents an incoming connection.
type connection struct {
transport *handshakeTransport
sshConn
// The connection protocol.
*mux
}
func (c *connection) Close() error {
return c.sshConn.conn.Close()
}
// sshconn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and
// writes.
type sshConn struct {
conn net.Conn
user string
sessionID []byte
clientVersion []byte
serverVersion []byte
}
func dup(src []byte) []byte {
dst := make([]byte, len(src))
copy(dst, src)
return dst
}
func (c *sshConn) User() string {
return c.user
}
func (c *sshConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr {
return c.conn.RemoteAddr()
}
func (c *sshConn) Close() error {
return c.conn.Close()
}
func (c *sshConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr {
return c.conn.LocalAddr()
}
func (c *sshConn) SessionID() []byte {
return dup(c.sessionID)
}
func (c *sshConn) ClientVersion() []byte {
return dup(c.clientVersion)
}
func (c *sshConn) ServerVersion() []byte {
return dup(c.serverVersion)
}

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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
/*
Package ssh implements an SSH client and server.
SSH is a transport security protocol, an authentication protocol and a
family of application protocols. The most typical application level
protocol is a remote shell and this is specifically implemented. However,
the multiplexed nature of SSH is exposed to users that wish to support
others.
References:
[PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD
[SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1
This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself,
so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise.
*/
package ssh // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"

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// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net"
"sync"
)
// debugHandshake, if set, prints messages sent and received. Key
// exchange messages are printed as if DH were used, so the debug
// messages are wrong when using ECDH.
const debugHandshake = false
// chanSize sets the amount of buffering SSH connections. This is
// primarily for testing: setting chanSize=0 uncovers deadlocks more
// quickly.
const chanSize = 16
// keyingTransport is a packet based transport that supports key
// changes. It need not be thread-safe. It should pass through
// msgNewKeys in both directions.
type keyingTransport interface {
packetConn
// prepareKeyChange sets up a key change. The key change for a
// direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent
// or received.
prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error
}
// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport
// and offers a thread-safe writePacket() interface.
type handshakeTransport struct {
conn keyingTransport
config *Config
serverVersion []byte
clientVersion []byte
// hostKeys is non-empty if we are the server. In that case,
// it contains all host keys that can be used to sign the
// connection.
hostKeys []Signer
// hostKeyAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the client. In that case,
// we accept these key types from the server as host key.
hostKeyAlgorithms []string
// On read error, incoming is closed, and readError is set.
incoming chan []byte
readError error
mu sync.Mutex
writeError error
sentInitPacket []byte
sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg
pendingPackets [][]byte // Used when a key exchange is in progress.
// If the read loop wants to schedule a kex, it pings this
// channel, and the write loop will send out a kex
// message.
requestKex chan struct{}
// If the other side requests or confirms a kex, its kexInit
// packet is sent here for the write loop to find it.
startKex chan *pendingKex
// data for host key checking
hostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback
dialAddress string
remoteAddr net.Addr
// bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in
// ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication
// dance to handle a custom server's message.
bannerCallback BannerCallback
// Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange.
algorithms *algorithms
readPacketsLeft uint32
readBytesLeft int64
writePacketsLeft uint32
writeBytesLeft int64
// The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet.
sessionID []byte
}
type pendingKex struct {
otherInit []byte
done chan error
}
func newHandshakeTransport(conn keyingTransport, config *Config, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte) *handshakeTransport {
t := &handshakeTransport{
conn: conn,
serverVersion: serverVersion,
clientVersion: clientVersion,
incoming: make(chan []byte, chanSize),
requestKex: make(chan struct{}, 1),
startKex: make(chan *pendingKex, 1),
config: config,
}
t.resetReadThresholds()
t.resetWriteThresholds()
// We always start with a mandatory key exchange.
t.requestKex <- struct{}{}
return t
}
func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ClientConfig, dialAddr string, addr net.Addr) *handshakeTransport {
t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion)
t.dialAddress = dialAddr
t.remoteAddr = addr
t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback
t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback
if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil {
t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms
} else {
t.hostKeyAlgorithms = supportedHostKeyAlgos
}
go t.readLoop()
go t.kexLoop()
return t
}
func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ServerConfig) *handshakeTransport {
t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion)
t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys
go t.readLoop()
go t.kexLoop()
return t
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte {
return t.sessionID
}
// waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be
// the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport.
func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error {
p, err := t.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if p[0] != msgNewKeys {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgNewKeys")
}
return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string {
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
return "server"
}
return "client"
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) {
action := "got"
if write {
action = "sent"
}
if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData {
log.Printf("%s %s data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), action, len(p))
} else {
msg, err := decode(p)
log.Printf("%s %s %T %v (%v)", t.id(), action, msg, msg, err)
}
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) {
p, ok := <-t.incoming
if !ok {
return nil, t.readError
}
return p, nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() {
first := true
for {
p, err := t.readOnePacket(first)
first = false
if err != nil {
t.readError = err
close(t.incoming)
break
}
if p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug {
continue
}
t.incoming <- p
}
// Stop writers too.
t.recordWriteError(t.readError)
// Unblock the writer should it wait for this.
close(t.startKex)
// Don't close t.requestKex; it's also written to from writePacket.
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) pushPacket(p []byte) error {
if debugHandshake {
t.printPacket(p, true)
}
return t.conn.writePacket(p)
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) getWriteError() error {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
return t.writeError
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) recordWriteError(err error) {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.writeError == nil && err != nil {
t.writeError = err
}
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyExchange() {
select {
case t.requestKex <- struct{}{}:
default:
// something already requested a kex, so do nothing.
}
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) resetWriteThresholds() {
t.writePacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold
if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 {
t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold)
} else if t.algorithms != nil {
t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.w.rekeyBytes()
} else {
t.writeBytesLeft = 1 << 30
}
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) kexLoop() {
write:
for t.getWriteError() == nil {
var request *pendingKex
var sent bool
for request == nil || !sent {
var ok bool
select {
case request, ok = <-t.startKex:
if !ok {
break write
}
case <-t.requestKex:
break
}
if !sent {
if err := t.sendKexInit(); err != nil {
t.recordWriteError(err)
break
}
sent = true
}
}
if err := t.getWriteError(); err != nil {
if request != nil {
request.done <- err
}
break
}
// We're not servicing t.requestKex, but that is OK:
// we never block on sending to t.requestKex.
// We're not servicing t.startKex, but the remote end
// has just sent us a kexInitMsg, so it can't send
// another key change request, until we close the done
// channel on the pendingKex request.
err := t.enterKeyExchange(request.otherInit)
t.mu.Lock()
t.writeError = err
t.sentInitPacket = nil
t.sentInitMsg = nil
t.resetWriteThresholds()
// we have completed the key exchange. Since the
// reader is still blocked, it is safe to clear out
// the requestKex channel. This avoids the situation
// where: 1) we consumed our own request for the
// initial kex, and 2) the kex from the remote side
// caused another send on the requestKex channel,
clear:
for {
select {
case <-t.requestKex:
//
default:
break clear
}
}
request.done <- t.writeError
// kex finished. Push packets that we received while
// the kex was in progress. Don't look at t.startKex
// and don't increment writtenSinceKex: if we trigger
// another kex while we are still busy with the last
// one, things will become very confusing.
for _, p := range t.pendingPackets {
t.writeError = t.pushPacket(p)
if t.writeError != nil {
break
}
}
t.pendingPackets = t.pendingPackets[:0]
t.mu.Unlock()
}
// drain startKex channel. We don't service t.requestKex
// because nobody does blocking sends there.
go func() {
for init := range t.startKex {
init.done <- t.writeError
}
}()
// Unblock reader.
t.conn.Close()
}
// The protocol uses uint32 for packet counters, so we can't let them
// reach 1<<32. We will actually read and write more packets than
// this, though: the other side may send more packets, and after we
// hit this limit on writing we will send a few more packets for the
// key exchange itself.
const packetRekeyThreshold = (1 << 31)
func (t *handshakeTransport) resetReadThresholds() {
t.readPacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold
if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 {
t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold)
} else if t.algorithms != nil {
t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.r.rekeyBytes()
} else {
t.readBytesLeft = 1 << 30
}
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) {
p, err := t.conn.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if t.readPacketsLeft > 0 {
t.readPacketsLeft--
} else {
t.requestKeyExchange()
}
if t.readBytesLeft > 0 {
t.readBytesLeft -= int64(len(p))
} else {
t.requestKeyExchange()
}
if debugHandshake {
t.printPacket(p, false)
}
if first && p[0] != msgKexInit {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgKexInit")
}
if p[0] != msgKexInit {
return p, nil
}
firstKex := t.sessionID == nil
kex := pendingKex{
done: make(chan error, 1),
otherInit: p,
}
t.startKex <- &kex
err = <-kex.done
if debugHandshake {
log.Printf("%s exited key exchange (first %v), err %v", t.id(), firstKex, err)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
t.resetReadThresholds()
// By default, a key exchange is hidden from higher layers by
// translating it into msgIgnore.
successPacket := []byte{msgIgnore}
if firstKex {
// sendKexInit() for the first kex waits for
// msgNewKeys so the authentication process is
// guaranteed to happen over an encrypted transport.
successPacket = []byte{msgNewKeys}
}
return successPacket, nil
}
// sendKexInit sends a key change message.
func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error {
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.sentInitMsg != nil {
// kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side,
// or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we
// may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a
// second kexInit.
return nil
}
msg := &kexInitMsg{
KexAlgos: t.config.KeyExchanges,
CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers,
CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers,
MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs,
MACsServerClient: t.config.MACs,
CompressionClientServer: supportedCompressions,
CompressionServerClient: supportedCompressions,
}
io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:])
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
for _, k := range t.hostKeys {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, k.PublicKey().Type())
}
} else {
msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms
}
packet := Marshal(msg)
// writePacket destroys the contents, so save a copy.
packetCopy := make([]byte, len(packet))
copy(packetCopy, packet)
if err := t.pushPacket(packetCopy); err != nil {
return err
}
t.sentInitMsg = msg
t.sentInitPacket = packet
return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) writePacket(p []byte) error {
switch p[0] {
case msgKexInit:
return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit")
case msgNewKeys:
return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys")
}
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if t.writeError != nil {
return t.writeError
}
if t.sentInitMsg != nil {
// Copy the packet so the writer can reuse the buffer.
cp := make([]byte, len(p))
copy(cp, p)
t.pendingPackets = append(t.pendingPackets, cp)
return nil
}
if t.writeBytesLeft > 0 {
t.writeBytesLeft -= int64(len(p))
} else {
t.requestKeyExchange()
}
if t.writePacketsLeft > 0 {
t.writePacketsLeft--
} else {
t.requestKeyExchange()
}
if err := t.pushPacket(p); err != nil {
t.writeError = err
}
return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) Close() error {
return t.conn.Close()
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error {
if debugHandshake {
log.Printf("%s entered key exchange", t.id())
}
otherInit := &kexInitMsg{}
if err := Unmarshal(otherInitPacket, otherInit); err != nil {
return err
}
magics := handshakeMagics{
clientVersion: t.clientVersion,
serverVersion: t.serverVersion,
clientKexInit: otherInitPacket,
serverKexInit: t.sentInitPacket,
}
clientInit := otherInit
serverInit := t.sentInitMsg
if len(t.hostKeys) == 0 {
clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit
magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket
magics.serverKexInit = otherInitPacket
}
var err error
t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(clientInit, serverInit)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it.
//
// RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for
// first_kex_packet_follows. It states that the guessed packet
// should be ignored if the "kex algorithm and/or the host
// key algorithm is guessed wrong (server and client have
// different preferred algorithm), or if any of the other
// algorithms cannot be agreed upon". The other algorithms have
// already been checked above so the kex algorithm and host key
// algorithm are checked here.
if otherInit.FirstKexFollows && (clientInit.KexAlgos[0] != serverInit.KexAlgos[0] || clientInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0] != serverInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0]) {
// other side sent a kex message for the wrong algorithm,
// which we have to ignore.
if _, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.kex]
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.kex)
}
var result *kexResult
if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 {
result, err = t.server(kex, t.algorithms, &magics)
} else {
result, err = t.client(kex, t.algorithms, &magics)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
if t.sessionID == nil {
t.sessionID = result.H
}
result.SessionID = t.sessionID
if err := t.conn.prepareKeyChange(t.algorithms, result); err != nil {
return err
}
if err = t.conn.writePacket([]byte{msgNewKeys}); err != nil {
return err
}
if packet, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil {
return err
} else if packet[0] != msgNewKeys {
return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0])
}
return nil
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
var hostKey Signer
for _, k := range t.hostKeys {
if algs.hostKey == k.PublicKey().Type() {
hostKey = k
}
}
r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey)
return r, err
}
func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
result, err := kex.Client(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
hostKey, err := ParsePublicKey(result.HostKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, result); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = t.hostKeyCallback(t.dialAddress, t.remoteAddr, hostKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return result, nil
}

540
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"io"
"math/big"
"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
)
const (
kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
)
// kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange.
type kexResult struct {
// Session hash. See also RFC 4253, section 8.
H []byte
// Shared secret. See also RFC 4253, section 8.
K []byte
// Host key as hashed into H.
HostKey []byte
// Signature of H.
Signature []byte
// A cryptographic hash function that matches the security
// level of the key exchange algorithm. It is used for
// calculating H, and for deriving keys from H and K.
Hash crypto.Hash
// The session ID, which is the first H computed. This is used
// to derive key material inside the transport.
SessionID []byte
}
// handshakeMagics contains data that is always included in the
// session hash.
type handshakeMagics struct {
clientVersion, serverVersion []byte
clientKexInit, serverKexInit []byte
}
func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) {
writeString(w, m.clientVersion)
writeString(w, m.serverVersion)
writeString(w, m.clientKexInit)
writeString(w, m.serverKexInit)
}
// kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms.
type kexAlgorithm interface {
// Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result
// with a hostkey.
Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s Signer) (*kexResult, error)
// Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is
// responsible for verifying the host key signature.
Client(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error)
}
// dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
type dhGroup struct {
g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int
}
func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) {
if theirPublic.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(group.pMinus1) >= 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds")
}
return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, group.p), nil
}
func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
hashFunc := crypto.SHA1
var x *big.Int
for {
var err error
if x, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if x.Sign() > 0 {
break
}
}
X := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, x, group.p)
kexDHInit := kexDHInitMsg{
X: X,
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHInit)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var kexDHReply kexDHReplyMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHReply); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
h := hashFunc.New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey)
writeInt(h, X)
writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y)
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
H: h.Sum(nil),
K: K,
HostKey: kexDHReply.HostKey,
Signature: kexDHReply.Signature,
Hash: crypto.SHA1,
}, nil
}
func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
hashFunc := crypto.SHA1
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return
}
var kexDHInit kexDHInitMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHInit); err != nil {
return
}
var y *big.Int
for {
if y, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil {
return
}
if y.Sign() > 0 {
break
}
}
Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p)
ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
h := hashFunc.New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X)
writeInt(h, Y)
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)
// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
// own key-specific hash algorithm.
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
kexDHReply := kexDHReplyMsg{
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
Y: Y,
Signature: sig,
}
packet = Marshal(&kexDHReply)
err = c.writePacket(packet)
return &kexResult{
H: H,
K: K,
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
Signature: sig,
Hash: crypto.SHA1,
}, nil
}
// ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as
// described in RFC 5656, section 4.
type ecdh struct {
curve elliptic.Curve
}
func (kex *ecdh) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
kexInit := kexECDHInitMsg{
ClientPubKey: elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y),
}
serialized := Marshal(&kexInit)
if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var reply kexECDHReplyMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
x, y, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// generate shared secret
secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ephKey.D.Bytes())
h := ecHash(kex.curve).New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, reply.HostKey)
writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey)
writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
K := make([]byte, intLength(secret))
marshalInt(K, secret)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
H: h.Sum(nil),
K: K,
HostKey: reply.HostKey,
Signature: reply.Signature,
Hash: ecHash(kex.curve),
}, nil
}
// unmarshalECKey parses and checks an EC key.
func unmarshalECKey(curve elliptic.Curve, pubkey []byte) (x, y *big.Int, err error) {
x, y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey)
if x == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: elliptic.Unmarshal failure")
}
if !validateECPublicKey(curve, x, y) {
return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: public key not on curve")
}
return x, y, nil
}
// validateECPublicKey checks that the point is a valid public key for
// the given curve. See [SEC1], 3.2.2
func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool {
if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 {
return false
}
if x.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 {
return false
}
if y.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 {
return false
}
if !curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) {
return false
}
// We don't check if N * PubKey == 0, since
//
// - the NIST curves have cofactor = 1, so this is implicit.
// (We don't foresee an implementation that supports non NIST
// curves)
//
// - for ephemeral keys, we don't need to worry about small
// subgroup attacks.
return true
}
func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var kexECDHInit kexECDHInitMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexECDHInit); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clientX, clientY, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We could cache this key across multiple users/multiple
// connection attempts, but the benefit is small. OpenSSH
// generates a new key for each incoming connection.
ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
serializedEphKey := elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y)
// generate shared secret
secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(clientX, clientY, ephKey.D.Bytes())
h := ecHash(kex.curve).New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
writeString(h, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey)
writeString(h, serializedEphKey)
K := make([]byte, intLength(secret))
marshalInt(K, secret)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)
// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
// own key-specific hash algorithm.
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{
EphemeralPubKey: serializedEphKey,
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
Signature: sig,
}
serialized := Marshal(&reply)
if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &kexResult{
H: H,
K: K,
HostKey: reply.HostKey,
Signature: sig,
Hash: ecHash(kex.curve),
}, nil
}
var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{}
func init() {
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in RFC
// 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409.
p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{
g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
p: p,
pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
}
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC
// 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{
g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
p: p,
pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{}
}
// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key
// agreement protocol, as described in
// https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/tree/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt
type curve25519sha256 struct{}
type curve25519KeyPair struct {
priv [32]byte
pub [32]byte
}
func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error {
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil {
return err
}
curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&kp.pub, &kp.priv)
return nil
}
// curve25519Zeros is just an array of 32 zero bytes so that we have something
// convenient to compare against in order to reject curve25519 points with the
// wrong order.
var curve25519Zeros [32]byte
func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
var kp curve25519KeyPair
if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{kp.pub[:]})); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var reply kexECDHReplyMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != 32 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length")
}
var servPub, secret [32]byte
copy(servPub[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey)
curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &servPub)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order")
}
h := crypto.SHA256.New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, reply.HostKey)
writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
return &kexResult{
H: h.Sum(nil),
K: K,
HostKey: reply.HostKey,
Signature: reply.Signature,
Hash: crypto.SHA256,
}, nil
}
func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
packet, err := c.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return
}
var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil {
return
}
if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != 32 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length")
}
var kp curve25519KeyPair
if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var clientPub, secret [32]byte
copy(clientPub[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey)
curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &clientPub)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order")
}
hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
h := crypto.SHA256.New()
magics.write(h)
writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey)
writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
K := make([]byte, intLength(ki))
marshalInt(K, ki)
h.Write(K)
H := h.Sum(nil)
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{
EphemeralPubKey: kp.pub[:],
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
Signature: sig,
}
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &kexResult{
H: H,
K: K,
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
Signature: sig,
Hash: crypto.SHA256,
}, nil
}

1031
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go generated vendored Normal file

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61
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
// Message authentication support
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha1"
"crypto/sha256"
"hash"
)
type macMode struct {
keySize int
etm bool
new func(key []byte) hash.Hash
}
// truncatingMAC wraps around a hash.Hash and truncates the output digest to
// a given size.
type truncatingMAC struct {
length int
hmac hash.Hash
}
func (t truncatingMAC) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
return t.hmac.Write(data)
}
func (t truncatingMAC) Sum(in []byte) []byte {
out := t.hmac.Sum(in)
return out[:len(in)+t.length]
}
func (t truncatingMAC) Reset() {
t.hmac.Reset()
}
func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int {
return t.length
}
func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() }
var macModes = map[string]*macMode{
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}},
"hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
}},
"hmac-sha1": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return hmac.New(sha1.New, key)
}},
"hmac-sha1-96": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash {
return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)}
}},
}

766
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"reflect"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// These are SSH message type numbers. They are scattered around several
// documents but many were taken from [SSH-PARAMETERS].
const (
msgIgnore = 2
msgUnimplemented = 3
msgDebug = 4
msgNewKeys = 21
)
// SSH messages:
//
// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding SSH messages.
// They are marshaled using reflection with the marshal and unmarshal functions
// in this file. The only wrinkle is that a final member of type []byte with a
// ssh tag of "rest" receives the remainder of a packet when unmarshaling.
// See RFC 4253, section 11.1.
const msgDisconnect = 1
// disconnectMsg is the message that signals a disconnect. It is also
// the error type returned from mux.Wait()
type disconnectMsg struct {
Reason uint32 `sshtype:"1"`
Message string
Language string
}
func (d *disconnectMsg) Error() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %s", d.Reason, d.Message)
}
// See RFC 4253, section 7.1.
const msgKexInit = 20
type kexInitMsg struct {
Cookie [16]byte `sshtype:"20"`
KexAlgos []string
ServerHostKeyAlgos []string
CiphersClientServer []string
CiphersServerClient []string
MACsClientServer []string
MACsServerClient []string
CompressionClientServer []string
CompressionServerClient []string
LanguagesClientServer []string
LanguagesServerClient []string
FirstKexFollows bool
Reserved uint32
}
// See RFC 4253, section 8.
// Diffie-Helman
const msgKexDHInit = 30
type kexDHInitMsg struct {
X *big.Int `sshtype:"30"`
}
const msgKexECDHInit = 30
type kexECDHInitMsg struct {
ClientPubKey []byte `sshtype:"30"`
}
const msgKexECDHReply = 31
type kexECDHReplyMsg struct {
HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"`
EphemeralPubKey []byte
Signature []byte
}
const msgKexDHReply = 31
type kexDHReplyMsg struct {
HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"`
Y *big.Int
Signature []byte
}
// See RFC 4253, section 10.
const msgServiceRequest = 5
type serviceRequestMsg struct {
Service string `sshtype:"5"`
}
// See RFC 4253, section 10.
const msgServiceAccept = 6
type serviceAcceptMsg struct {
Service string `sshtype:"6"`
}
// See RFC 4252, section 5.
const msgUserAuthRequest = 50
type userAuthRequestMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"50"`
Service string
Method string
Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// Used for debug printouts of packets.
type userAuthSuccessMsg struct {
}
// See RFC 4252, section 5.1
const msgUserAuthFailure = 51
type userAuthFailureMsg struct {
Methods []string `sshtype:"51"`
PartialSuccess bool
}
// See RFC 4252, section 5.1
const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52
// See RFC 4252, section 5.4
const msgUserAuthBanner = 53
type userAuthBannerMsg struct {
Message string `sshtype:"53"`
// unused, but required to allow message parsing
Language string
}
// See RFC 4256, section 3.2
const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60
const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61
type userAuthInfoRequestMsg struct {
User string `sshtype:"60"`
Instruction string
DeprecatedLanguage string
NumPrompts uint32
Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.1.
const msgChannelOpen = 90
type channelOpenMsg struct {
ChanType string `sshtype:"90"`
PeersID uint32
PeersWindow uint32
MaxPacketSize uint32
TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
const msgChannelExtendedData = 95
const msgChannelData = 94
// Used for debug print outs of packets.
type channelDataMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"`
Length uint32
Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.1.
const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91
type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"`
MyID uint32
MyWindow uint32
MaxPacketSize uint32
TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.1.
const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92
type channelOpenFailureMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"`
Reason RejectionReason
Message string
Language string
}
const msgChannelRequest = 98
type channelRequestMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"`
Request string
WantReply bool
RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.4.
const msgChannelSuccess = 99
type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.4.
const msgChannelFailure = 100
type channelRequestFailureMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.3
const msgChannelClose = 97
type channelCloseMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.3
const msgChannelEOF = 96
type channelEOFMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 4
const msgGlobalRequest = 80
type globalRequestMsg struct {
Type string `sshtype:"80"`
WantReply bool
Data []byte `ssh:"rest"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 4
const msgRequestSuccess = 81
type globalRequestSuccessMsg struct {
Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"81"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 4
const msgRequestFailure = 82
type globalRequestFailureMsg struct {
Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"82"`
}
// See RFC 4254, section 5.2
const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93
type windowAdjustMsg struct {
PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"`
AdditionalBytes uint32
}
// See RFC 4252, section 7
const msgUserAuthPubKeyOk = 60
type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct {
Algo string `sshtype:"60"`
PubKey []byte
}
// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which
// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character.
func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) {
tagStr := structType.Field(0).Tag.Get("sshtype")
for _, tag := range strings.Split(tagStr, "|") {
i, err := strconv.Atoi(tag)
if err == nil {
tags = append(tags, byte(i))
}
}
return tags
}
func fieldError(t reflect.Type, field int, problem string) error {
if problem != "" {
problem = ": " + problem
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unmarshal error for field %s of type %s%s", t.Field(field).Name, t.Name(), problem)
}
var errShortRead = errors.New("ssh: short read")
// Unmarshal parses data in SSH wire format into a structure. The out
// argument should be a pointer to struct. If the first member of the
// struct has the "sshtype" tag set to a '|'-separated set of numbers
// in decimal, the packet must start with one of those numbers. In
// case of error, Unmarshal returns a ParseError or
// UnexpectedMessageError.
func Unmarshal(data []byte, out interface{}) error {
v := reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem()
structType := v.Type()
expectedTypes := typeTags(structType)
var expectedType byte
if len(expectedTypes) > 0 {
expectedType = expectedTypes[0]
}
if len(data) == 0 {
return parseError(expectedType)
}
if len(expectedTypes) > 0 {
goodType := false
for _, e := range expectedTypes {
if e > 0 && data[0] == e {
goodType = true
break
}
}
if !goodType {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected one of %v)", data[0], expectedTypes)
}
data = data[1:]
}
var ok bool
for i := 0; i < v.NumField(); i++ {
field := v.Field(i)
t := field.Type()
switch t.Kind() {
case reflect.Bool:
if len(data) < 1 {
return errShortRead
}
field.SetBool(data[0] != 0)
data = data[1:]
case reflect.Array:
if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 {
return fieldError(structType, i, "array of unsupported type")
}
if len(data) < t.Len() {
return errShortRead
}
for j, n := 0, t.Len(); j < n; j++ {
field.Index(j).Set(reflect.ValueOf(data[j]))
}
data = data[t.Len():]
case reflect.Uint64:
var u64 uint64
if u64, data, ok = parseUint64(data); !ok {
return errShortRead
}
field.SetUint(u64)
case reflect.Uint32:
var u32 uint32
if u32, data, ok = parseUint32(data); !ok {
return errShortRead
}
field.SetUint(uint64(u32))
case reflect.Uint8:
if len(data) < 1 {
return errShortRead
}
field.SetUint(uint64(data[0]))
data = data[1:]
case reflect.String:
var s []byte
if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok {
return fieldError(structType, i, "")
}
field.SetString(string(s))
case reflect.Slice:
switch t.Elem().Kind() {
case reflect.Uint8:
if structType.Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") == "rest" {
field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(data))
data = nil
} else {
var s []byte
if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok {
return errShortRead
}
field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(s))
}
case reflect.String:
var nl []string
if nl, data, ok = parseNameList(data); !ok {
return errShortRead
}
field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(nl))
default:
return fieldError(structType, i, "slice of unsupported type")
}
case reflect.Ptr:
if t == bigIntType {
var n *big.Int
if n, data, ok = parseInt(data); !ok {
return errShortRead
}
field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(n))
} else {
return fieldError(structType, i, "pointer to unsupported type")
}
default:
return fieldError(structType, i, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported type: %v", t))
}
}
if len(data) != 0 {
return parseError(expectedType)
}
return nil
}
// Marshal serializes the message in msg to SSH wire format. The msg
// argument should be a struct or pointer to struct. If the first
// member has the "sshtype" tag set to a number in decimal, that
// number is prepended to the result. If the last of member has the
// "ssh" tag set to "rest", its contents are appended to the output.
func Marshal(msg interface{}) []byte {
out := make([]byte, 0, 64)
return marshalStruct(out, msg)
}
func marshalStruct(out []byte, msg interface{}) []byte {
v := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(msg))
msgTypes := typeTags(v.Type())
if len(msgTypes) > 0 {
out = append(out, msgTypes[0])
}
for i, n := 0, v.NumField(); i < n; i++ {
field := v.Field(i)
switch t := field.Type(); t.Kind() {
case reflect.Bool:
var v uint8
if field.Bool() {
v = 1
}
out = append(out, v)
case reflect.Array:
if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("array of non-uint8 in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface()))
}
for j, l := 0, t.Len(); j < l; j++ {
out = append(out, uint8(field.Index(j).Uint()))
}
case reflect.Uint32:
out = appendU32(out, uint32(field.Uint()))
case reflect.Uint64:
out = appendU64(out, uint64(field.Uint()))
case reflect.Uint8:
out = append(out, uint8(field.Uint()))
case reflect.String:
s := field.String()
out = appendInt(out, len(s))
out = append(out, s...)
case reflect.Slice:
switch t.Elem().Kind() {
case reflect.Uint8:
if v.Type().Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") != "rest" {
out = appendInt(out, field.Len())
}
out = append(out, field.Bytes()...)
case reflect.String:
offset := len(out)
out = appendU32(out, 0)
if n := field.Len(); n > 0 {
for j := 0; j < n; j++ {
f := field.Index(j)
if j != 0 {
out = append(out, ',')
}
out = append(out, f.String()...)
}
// overwrite length value
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[offset:], uint32(len(out)-offset-4))
}
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("slice of unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface()))
}
case reflect.Ptr:
if t == bigIntType {
var n *big.Int
nValue := reflect.ValueOf(&n)
nValue.Elem().Set(field)
needed := intLength(n)
oldLength := len(out)
if cap(out)-len(out) < needed {
newOut := make([]byte, len(out), 2*(len(out)+needed))
copy(newOut, out)
out = newOut
}
out = out[:oldLength+needed]
marshalInt(out[oldLength:], n)
} else {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("pointer to unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface()))
}
}
}
return out
}
var bigOne = big.NewInt(1)
func parseString(in []byte) (out, rest []byte, ok bool) {
if len(in) < 4 {
return
}
length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in)
in = in[4:]
if uint32(len(in)) < length {
return
}
out = in[:length]
rest = in[length:]
ok = true
return
}
var (
comma = []byte{','}
emptyNameList = []string{}
)
func parseNameList(in []byte) (out []string, rest []byte, ok bool) {
contents, rest, ok := parseString(in)
if !ok {
return
}
if len(contents) == 0 {
out = emptyNameList
return
}
parts := bytes.Split(contents, comma)
out = make([]string, len(parts))
for i, part := range parts {
out[i] = string(part)
}
return
}
func parseInt(in []byte) (out *big.Int, rest []byte, ok bool) {
contents, rest, ok := parseString(in)
if !ok {
return
}
out = new(big.Int)
if len(contents) > 0 && contents[0]&0x80 == 0x80 {
// This is a negative number
notBytes := make([]byte, len(contents))
for i := range notBytes {
notBytes[i] = ^contents[i]
}
out.SetBytes(notBytes)
out.Add(out, bigOne)
out.Neg(out)
} else {
// Positive number
out.SetBytes(contents)
}
ok = true
return
}
func parseUint32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) {
if len(in) < 4 {
return 0, nil, false
}
return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in), in[4:], true
}
func parseUint64(in []byte) (uint64, []byte, bool) {
if len(in) < 8 {
return 0, nil, false
}
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(in), in[8:], true
}
func intLength(n *big.Int) int {
length := 4 /* length bytes */
if n.Sign() < 0 {
nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n)
nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne)
bitLen := nMinus1.BitLen()
if bitLen%8 == 0 {
// The number will need 0xff padding
length++
}
length += (bitLen + 7) / 8
} else if n.Sign() == 0 {
// A zero is the zero length string
} else {
bitLen := n.BitLen()
if bitLen%8 == 0 {
// The number will need 0x00 padding
length++
}
length += (bitLen + 7) / 8
}
return length
}
func marshalUint32(to []byte, n uint32) []byte {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(to, n)
return to[4:]
}
func marshalUint64(to []byte, n uint64) []byte {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(to, n)
return to[8:]
}
func marshalInt(to []byte, n *big.Int) []byte {
lengthBytes := to
to = to[4:]
length := 0
if n.Sign() < 0 {
// A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement
// form. So we'll subtract 1 and invert. If the
// most-significant-bit isn't set then we'll need to pad the
// beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number negative.
nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n)
nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne)
bytes := nMinus1.Bytes()
for i := range bytes {
bytes[i] ^= 0xff
}
if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 {
to[0] = 0xff
to = to[1:]
length++
}
nBytes := copy(to, bytes)
to = to[nBytes:]
length += nBytes
} else if n.Sign() == 0 {
// A zero is the zero length string
} else {
bytes := n.Bytes()
if len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 {
// We'll have to pad this with a 0x00 in order to
// stop it looking like a negative number.
to[0] = 0
to = to[1:]
length++
}
nBytes := copy(to, bytes)
to = to[nBytes:]
length += nBytes
}
lengthBytes[0] = byte(length >> 24)
lengthBytes[1] = byte(length >> 16)
lengthBytes[2] = byte(length >> 8)
lengthBytes[3] = byte(length)
return to
}
func writeInt(w io.Writer, n *big.Int) {
length := intLength(n)
buf := make([]byte, length)
marshalInt(buf, n)
w.Write(buf)
}
func writeString(w io.Writer, s []byte) {
var lengthBytes [4]byte
lengthBytes[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24)
lengthBytes[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16)
lengthBytes[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8)
lengthBytes[3] = byte(len(s))
w.Write(lengthBytes[:])
w.Write(s)
}
func stringLength(n int) int {
return 4 + n
}
func marshalString(to []byte, s []byte) []byte {
to[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24)
to[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16)
to[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8)
to[3] = byte(len(s))
to = to[4:]
copy(to, s)
return to[len(s):]
}
var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil))
// Decode a packet into its corresponding message.
func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {
var msg interface{}
switch packet[0] {
case msgDisconnect:
msg = new(disconnectMsg)
case msgServiceRequest:
msg = new(serviceRequestMsg)
case msgServiceAccept:
msg = new(serviceAcceptMsg)
case msgKexInit:
msg = new(kexInitMsg)
case msgKexDHInit:
msg = new(kexDHInitMsg)
case msgKexDHReply:
msg = new(kexDHReplyMsg)
case msgUserAuthRequest:
msg = new(userAuthRequestMsg)
case msgUserAuthSuccess:
return new(userAuthSuccessMsg), nil
case msgUserAuthFailure:
msg = new(userAuthFailureMsg)
case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk:
msg = new(userAuthPubKeyOkMsg)
case msgGlobalRequest:
msg = new(globalRequestMsg)
case msgRequestSuccess:
msg = new(globalRequestSuccessMsg)
case msgRequestFailure:
msg = new(globalRequestFailureMsg)
case msgChannelOpen:
msg = new(channelOpenMsg)
case msgChannelData:
msg = new(channelDataMsg)
case msgChannelOpenConfirm:
msg = new(channelOpenConfirmMsg)
case msgChannelOpenFailure:
msg = new(channelOpenFailureMsg)
case msgChannelWindowAdjust:
msg = new(windowAdjustMsg)
case msgChannelEOF:
msg = new(channelEOFMsg)
case msgChannelClose:
msg = new(channelCloseMsg)
case msgChannelRequest:
msg = new(channelRequestMsg)
case msgChannelSuccess:
msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg)
case msgChannelFailure:
msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg)
default:
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0])
}
if err := Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return msg, nil
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// debugMux, if set, causes messages in the connection protocol to be
// logged.
const debugMux = false
// chanList is a thread safe channel list.
type chanList struct {
// protects concurrent access to chans
sync.Mutex
// chans are indexed by the local id of the channel, which the
// other side should send in the PeersId field.
chans []*channel
// This is a debugging aid: it offsets all IDs by this
// amount. This helps distinguish otherwise identical
// server/client muxes
offset uint32
}
// Assigns a channel ID to the given channel.
func (c *chanList) add(ch *channel) uint32 {
c.Lock()
defer c.Unlock()
for i := range c.chans {
if c.chans[i] == nil {
c.chans[i] = ch
return uint32(i) + c.offset
}
}
c.chans = append(c.chans, ch)
return uint32(len(c.chans)-1) + c.offset
}
// getChan returns the channel for the given ID.
func (c *chanList) getChan(id uint32) *channel {
id -= c.offset
c.Lock()
defer c.Unlock()
if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) {
return c.chans[id]
}
return nil
}
func (c *chanList) remove(id uint32) {
id -= c.offset
c.Lock()
if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) {
c.chans[id] = nil
}
c.Unlock()
}
// dropAll forgets all channels it knows, returning them in a slice.
func (c *chanList) dropAll() []*channel {
c.Lock()
defer c.Unlock()
var r []*channel
for _, ch := range c.chans {
if ch == nil {
continue
}
r = append(r, ch)
}
c.chans = nil
return r
}
// mux represents the state for the SSH connection protocol, which
// multiplexes many channels onto a single packet transport.
type mux struct {
conn packetConn
chanList chanList
incomingChannels chan NewChannel
globalSentMu sync.Mutex
globalResponses chan interface{}
incomingRequests chan *Request
errCond *sync.Cond
err error
}
// When debugging, each new chanList instantiation has a different
// offset.
var globalOff uint32
func (m *mux) Wait() error {
m.errCond.L.Lock()
defer m.errCond.L.Unlock()
for m.err == nil {
m.errCond.Wait()
}
return m.err
}
// newMux returns a mux that runs over the given connection.
func newMux(p packetConn) *mux {
m := &mux{
conn: p,
incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, chanSize),
globalResponses: make(chan interface{}, 1),
incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize),
errCond: newCond(),
}
if debugMux {
m.chanList.offset = atomic.AddUint32(&globalOff, 1)
}
go m.loop()
return m
}
func (m *mux) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error {
p := Marshal(msg)
if debugMux {
log.Printf("send global(%d): %#v", m.chanList.offset, msg)
}
return m.conn.writePacket(p)
}
func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) {
if wantReply {
m.globalSentMu.Lock()
defer m.globalSentMu.Unlock()
}
if err := m.sendMessage(globalRequestMsg{
Type: name,
WantReply: wantReply,
Data: payload,
}); err != nil {
return false, nil, err
}
if !wantReply {
return false, nil, nil
}
msg, ok := <-m.globalResponses
if !ok {
return false, nil, io.EOF
}
switch msg := msg.(type) {
case *globalRequestFailureMsg:
return false, msg.Data, nil
case *globalRequestSuccessMsg:
return true, msg.Data, nil
default:
return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to request: %#v", msg)
}
}
// ackRequest must be called after processing a global request that
// has WantReply set.
func (m *mux) ackRequest(ok bool, data []byte) error {
if ok {
return m.sendMessage(globalRequestSuccessMsg{Data: data})
}
return m.sendMessage(globalRequestFailureMsg{Data: data})
}
func (m *mux) Close() error {
return m.conn.Close()
}
// loop runs the connection machine. It will process packets until an
// error is encountered. To synchronize on loop exit, use mux.Wait.
func (m *mux) loop() {
var err error
for err == nil {
err = m.onePacket()
}
for _, ch := range m.chanList.dropAll() {
ch.close()
}
close(m.incomingChannels)
close(m.incomingRequests)
close(m.globalResponses)
m.conn.Close()
m.errCond.L.Lock()
m.err = err
m.errCond.Broadcast()
m.errCond.L.Unlock()
if debugMux {
log.Println("loop exit", err)
}
}
// onePacket reads and processes one packet.
func (m *mux) onePacket() error {
packet, err := m.conn.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if debugMux {
if packet[0] == msgChannelData || packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData {
log.Printf("decoding(%d): data packet - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, len(packet))
} else {
p, _ := decode(packet)
log.Printf("decoding(%d): %d %#v - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, packet[0], p, len(packet))
}
}
switch packet[0] {
case msgChannelOpen:
return m.handleChannelOpen(packet)
case msgGlobalRequest, msgRequestSuccess, msgRequestFailure:
return m.handleGlobalPacket(packet)
}
// assume a channel packet.
if len(packet) < 5 {
return parseError(packet[0])
}
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[1:])
ch := m.chanList.getChan(id)
if ch == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid channel %d", id)
}
return ch.handlePacket(packet)
}
func (m *mux) handleGlobalPacket(packet []byte) error {
msg, err := decode(packet)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch msg := msg.(type) {
case *globalRequestMsg:
m.incomingRequests <- &Request{
Type: msg.Type,
WantReply: msg.WantReply,
Payload: msg.Data,
mux: m,
}
case *globalRequestSuccessMsg, *globalRequestFailureMsg:
m.globalResponses <- msg
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("not a global message %#v", msg))
}
return nil
}
// handleChannelOpen schedules a channel to be Accept()ed.
func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error {
var msg channelOpenMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return err
}
if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 {
failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{
PeersID: msg.PeersID,
Reason: ConnectionFailed,
Message: "invalid request",
Language: "en_US.UTF-8",
}
return m.sendMessage(failMsg)
}
c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData)
c.remoteId = msg.PeersID
c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize
c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow)
m.incomingChannels <- c
return nil
}
func (m *mux) OpenChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) {
ch, err := m.openChannel(chanType, extra)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil
}
func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) {
ch := m.newChannel(chanType, channelOutbound, extra)
ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket
open := channelOpenMsg{
ChanType: chanType,
PeersWindow: ch.myWindow,
MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload,
TypeSpecificData: extra,
PeersID: ch.localId,
}
if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch msg := (<-ch.msg).(type) {
case *channelOpenConfirmMsg:
return ch, nil
case *channelOpenFailureMsg:
return nil, &OpenChannelError{msg.Reason, msg.Message}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected packet in response to channel open: %T", msg)
}
}

582
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"strings"
)
// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are
// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user.
// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is
// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from
// the user-authentication phase to the application layer.
type Permissions struct {
// CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default
// permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with
// user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates
// defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to
// execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from
// the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces
// the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server
// implementations to enforce other critical options, such as
// "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake
// is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject
// connections that specify critical options that are unknown
// or not supported.
CriticalOptions map[string]string
// Extensions are extra functionality that the server may
// offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an
// extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common
// extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding",
// "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does
// not act on any extension, and it is up to server
// implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to
// pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server
// application layer.
Extensions map[string]string
}
// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data.
type ServerConfig struct {
// Config contains configuration shared between client and server.
Config
hostKeys []Signer
// NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without
// authenticating.
NoClientAuth bool
// MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts
// permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of
// attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited
// to 6.
MaxAuthTries int
// PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user
// attempts to authenticate using a password.
PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error)
// PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client
// offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error
// if the given public key can be used to authenticate the
// given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A
// call to this function does not guarantee that the key
// offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data
// depending on the public key, store it inside a
// Permissions.Extensions entry.
PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
// KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when
// keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC
// 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be
// used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple
// Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client
// should be presented a challenge even if the user is
// unknown.
KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error)
// AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication
// attempts.
AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error)
// ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in
// the public handshake.
// If empty, a reasonable default is used.
// Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with
// "SSH-2.0-".
ServerVersion string
// BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
// the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
}
// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
// key exists with the same algorithm, it is overwritten. Each server
// config must have at least one host key.
func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) {
for i, k := range s.hostKeys {
if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() {
s.hostKeys[i] = key
return
}
}
s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key)
}
// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is
// acceptable for a user.
type cachedPubKey struct {
user string
pubKeyData []byte
result error
perms *Permissions
}
const maxCachedPubKeys = 16
// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients
// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to
// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public
// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn.
type pubKeyCache struct {
keys []cachedPubKey
}
// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple.
func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) {
for _, k := range c.keys {
if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) {
return k, true
}
}
return cachedPubKey{}, false
}
// add adds the given tuple to the cache.
func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) {
if len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys {
c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)
}
}
// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the
// server
type ServerConn struct {
Conn
// If the succeeding authentication callback returned a
// non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here.
Permissions *Permissions
}
// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying
// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is
// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The
// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection
// will hang.
func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
fullConf := *config
fullConf.SetDefaults()
if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 {
fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6
}
s := &connection{
sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
}
perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf)
if err != nil {
c.Close()
return nil, nil, nil, err
}
return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil
}
// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm,
// and serializes the result in SSH wire format.
func signAndMarshal(k Signer, rand io.Reader, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
sig, err := k.Sign(rand, data)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return Marshal(sig), nil
}
// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication.
func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys")
}
if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
}
if config.ServerVersion != "" {
s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion)
} else {
s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion)
}
var err error
s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */)
s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config)
if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We just did the key change, so the session ID is established.
s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID()
var packet []byte
if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating")
}
serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{
Service: serviceUserAuth,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.mux = newMux(s.transport)
return perms, err
}
func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool {
switch algo {
case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoED25519,
CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01:
return true
}
return false
}
func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
if addr == nil {
return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required")
}
tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr)
}
for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") {
if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil {
if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) {
return nil
}
} else {
_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err)
}
if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) {
return nil
}
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
}
// ServerAuthError implements the error interface. It appends any authentication
// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication methods
// provided by the user failed to authenticate.
type ServerAuthError struct {
// Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication
// callback methods.
Errors []error
}
func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
var errs []string
for _, err := range l.Errors {
errs = append(errs, err.Error())
}
return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
}
func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
var cache pubKeyCache
var perms *Permissions
authFailures := 0
var authErrs []error
var displayedBanner bool
userAuthLoop:
for {
if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 {
discMsg := &disconnectMsg{
Reason: 2,
Message: "too many authentication failures",
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nil, discMsg
}
var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg
if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
if err == io.EOF {
return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
}
return nil, err
} else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service)
}
s.user = userAuthReq.User
if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
displayedBanner = true
msg := config.BannerCallback(s)
if msg != "" {
bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
Message: msg,
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
}
perms = nil
authErr := errors.New("no auth passed yet")
switch userAuthReq.Method {
case "none":
if config.NoClientAuth {
authErr = nil
}
// allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty
if authFailures == 0 {
authFailures--
}
case "password":
if config.PasswordCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured")
break
}
payload := userAuthReq.Payload
if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
payload = payload[1:]
password, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password)
case "keyboard-interactive":
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configubred")
break
}
prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s}
perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
case "publickey":
if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured")
break
}
payload := userAuthReq.Payload
if len(payload) < 1 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
isQuery := payload[0] == 0
payload = payload[1:]
algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
algo := string(algoBytes)
if !isAcceptableAlgo(algo) {
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo)
break
}
pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
if !ok {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData)
if !ok {
candidate.user = s.user
candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData
candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
candidate.result = checkSourceAddress(
s.RemoteAddr(),
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption])
}
cache.add(candidate)
}
if isQuery {
// The client can query if the given public key
// would be okay.
if len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
if candidate.result == nil {
okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{
Algo: algo,
PubKey: pubKeyData,
}
if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
continue userAuthLoop
}
authErr = candidate.result
} else {
sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload)
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
}
// Ensure the public key algo and signature algo
// are supported. Compare the private key
// algorithm name that corresponds to algo with
// sig.Format. This is usually the same, but
// for certs, the names differ.
if !isAcceptableAlgo(sig.Format) {
break
}
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData)
if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
authErr = candidate.result
perms = candidate.perms
}
default:
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method)
}
authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr)
if config.AuthLogCallback != nil {
config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr)
}
if authErr == nil {
break userAuthLoop
}
authFailures++
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
if config.PasswordCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password")
}
if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey")
}
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
}
if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return perms, nil
}
// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by
// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn.
type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct {
*connection
}
func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(user, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) {
if len(questions) != len(echos) {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length")
}
var prompts []byte
for i := range questions {
prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i])
prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i])
}
if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{
Instruction: instruction,
NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)),
Prompts: prompts,
})); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
packet, err := c.transport.readPacket()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse {
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0])
}
packet = packet[1:]
n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet)
if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse)
}
for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ {
ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet)
if !ok {
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse)
}
answers = append(answers, string(ans))
packet = rest
}
if len(packet) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message")
}
return answers, nil
}

647
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
// Session implements an interactive session described in
// "RFC 4254, section 6".
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/ioutil"
"sync"
)
type Signal string
// POSIX signals as listed in RFC 4254 Section 6.10.
const (
SIGABRT Signal = "ABRT"
SIGALRM Signal = "ALRM"
SIGFPE Signal = "FPE"
SIGHUP Signal = "HUP"
SIGILL Signal = "ILL"
SIGINT Signal = "INT"
SIGKILL Signal = "KILL"
SIGPIPE Signal = "PIPE"
SIGQUIT Signal = "QUIT"
SIGSEGV Signal = "SEGV"
SIGTERM Signal = "TERM"
SIGUSR1 Signal = "USR1"
SIGUSR2 Signal = "USR2"
)
var signals = map[Signal]int{
SIGABRT: 6,
SIGALRM: 14,
SIGFPE: 8,
SIGHUP: 1,
SIGILL: 4,
SIGINT: 2,
SIGKILL: 9,
SIGPIPE: 13,
SIGQUIT: 3,
SIGSEGV: 11,
SIGTERM: 15,
}
type TerminalModes map[uint8]uint32
// POSIX terminal mode flags as listed in RFC 4254 Section 8.
const (
tty_OP_END = 0
VINTR = 1
VQUIT = 2
VERASE = 3
VKILL = 4
VEOF = 5
VEOL = 6
VEOL2 = 7
VSTART = 8
VSTOP = 9
VSUSP = 10
VDSUSP = 11
VREPRINT = 12
VWERASE = 13
VLNEXT = 14
VFLUSH = 15
VSWTCH = 16
VSTATUS = 17
VDISCARD = 18
IGNPAR = 30
PARMRK = 31
INPCK = 32
ISTRIP = 33
INLCR = 34
IGNCR = 35
ICRNL = 36
IUCLC = 37
IXON = 38
IXANY = 39
IXOFF = 40
IMAXBEL = 41
ISIG = 50
ICANON = 51
XCASE = 52
ECHO = 53
ECHOE = 54
ECHOK = 55
ECHONL = 56
NOFLSH = 57
TOSTOP = 58
IEXTEN = 59
ECHOCTL = 60
ECHOKE = 61
PENDIN = 62
OPOST = 70
OLCUC = 71
ONLCR = 72
OCRNL = 73
ONOCR = 74
ONLRET = 75
CS7 = 90
CS8 = 91
PARENB = 92
PARODD = 93
TTY_OP_ISPEED = 128
TTY_OP_OSPEED = 129
)
// A Session represents a connection to a remote command or shell.
type Session struct {
// Stdin specifies the remote process's standard input.
// If Stdin is nil, the remote process reads from an empty
// bytes.Buffer.
Stdin io.Reader
// Stdout and Stderr specify the remote process's standard
// output and error.
//
// If either is nil, Run connects the corresponding file
// descriptor to an instance of ioutil.Discard. There is a
// fixed amount of buffering that is shared for the two streams.
// If either blocks it may eventually cause the remote
// command to block.
Stdout io.Writer
Stderr io.Writer
ch Channel // the channel backing this session
started bool // true once Start, Run or Shell is invoked.
copyFuncs []func() error
errors chan error // one send per copyFunc
// true if pipe method is active
stdinpipe, stdoutpipe, stderrpipe bool
// stdinPipeWriter is non-nil if StdinPipe has not been called
// and Stdin was specified by the user; it is the write end of
// a pipe connecting Session.Stdin to the stdin channel.
stdinPipeWriter io.WriteCloser
exitStatus chan error
}
// SendRequest sends an out-of-band channel request on the SSH channel
// underlying the session.
func (s *Session) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) {
return s.ch.SendRequest(name, wantReply, payload)
}
func (s *Session) Close() error {
return s.ch.Close()
}
// RFC 4254 Section 6.4.
type setenvRequest struct {
Name string
Value string
}
// Setenv sets an environment variable that will be applied to any
// command executed by Shell or Run.
func (s *Session) Setenv(name, value string) error {
msg := setenvRequest{
Name: name,
Value: value,
}
ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("env", true, Marshal(&msg))
if err == nil && !ok {
err = errors.New("ssh: setenv failed")
}
return err
}
// RFC 4254 Section 6.2.
type ptyRequestMsg struct {
Term string
Columns uint32
Rows uint32
Width uint32
Height uint32
Modelist string
}
// RequestPty requests the association of a pty with the session on the remote host.
func (s *Session) RequestPty(term string, h, w int, termmodes TerminalModes) error {
var tm []byte
for k, v := range termmodes {
kv := struct {
Key byte
Val uint32
}{k, v}
tm = append(tm, Marshal(&kv)...)
}
tm = append(tm, tty_OP_END)
req := ptyRequestMsg{
Term: term,
Columns: uint32(w),
Rows: uint32(h),
Width: uint32(w * 8),
Height: uint32(h * 8),
Modelist: string(tm),
}
ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("pty-req", true, Marshal(&req))
if err == nil && !ok {
err = errors.New("ssh: pty-req failed")
}
return err
}
// RFC 4254 Section 6.5.
type subsystemRequestMsg struct {
Subsystem string
}
// RequestSubsystem requests the association of a subsystem with the session on the remote host.
// A subsystem is a predefined command that runs in the background when the ssh session is initiated
func (s *Session) RequestSubsystem(subsystem string) error {
msg := subsystemRequestMsg{
Subsystem: subsystem,
}
ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("subsystem", true, Marshal(&msg))
if err == nil && !ok {
err = errors.New("ssh: subsystem request failed")
}
return err
}
// RFC 4254 Section 6.7.
type ptyWindowChangeMsg struct {
Columns uint32
Rows uint32
Width uint32
Height uint32
}
// WindowChange informs the remote host about a terminal window dimension change to h rows and w columns.
func (s *Session) WindowChange(h, w int) error {
req := ptyWindowChangeMsg{
Columns: uint32(w),
Rows: uint32(h),
Width: uint32(w * 8),
Height: uint32(h * 8),
}
_, err := s.ch.SendRequest("window-change", false, Marshal(&req))
return err
}
// RFC 4254 Section 6.9.
type signalMsg struct {
Signal string
}
// Signal sends the given signal to the remote process.
// sig is one of the SIG* constants.
func (s *Session) Signal(sig Signal) error {
msg := signalMsg{
Signal: string(sig),
}
_, err := s.ch.SendRequest("signal", false, Marshal(&msg))
return err
}
// RFC 4254 Section 6.5.
type execMsg struct {
Command string
}
// Start runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote
// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation.
// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start or Shell.
func (s *Session) Start(cmd string) error {
if s.started {
return errors.New("ssh: session already started")
}
req := execMsg{
Command: cmd,
}
ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("exec", true, Marshal(&req))
if err == nil && !ok {
err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: command %v failed", cmd)
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
return s.start()
}
// Run runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote
// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation.
// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output,
// or CombinedOutput.
//
// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems
// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit
// status.
//
// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type
// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes
// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type
// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems.
func (s *Session) Run(cmd string) error {
err := s.Start(cmd)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return s.Wait()
}
// Output runs cmd on the remote host and returns its standard output.
func (s *Session) Output(cmd string) ([]byte, error) {
if s.Stdout != nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set")
}
var b bytes.Buffer
s.Stdout = &b
err := s.Run(cmd)
return b.Bytes(), err
}
type singleWriter struct {
b bytes.Buffer
mu sync.Mutex
}
func (w *singleWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
return w.b.Write(p)
}
// CombinedOutput runs cmd on the remote host and returns its combined
// standard output and standard error.
func (s *Session) CombinedOutput(cmd string) ([]byte, error) {
if s.Stdout != nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set")
}
if s.Stderr != nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set")
}
var b singleWriter
s.Stdout = &b
s.Stderr = &b
err := s.Run(cmd)
return b.b.Bytes(), err
}
// Shell starts a login shell on the remote host. A Session only
// accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, or CombinedOutput.
func (s *Session) Shell() error {
if s.started {
return errors.New("ssh: session already started")
}
ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("shell", true, nil)
if err == nil && !ok {
return errors.New("ssh: could not start shell")
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
return s.start()
}
func (s *Session) start() error {
s.started = true
type F func(*Session)
for _, setupFd := range []F{(*Session).stdin, (*Session).stdout, (*Session).stderr} {
setupFd(s)
}
s.errors = make(chan error, len(s.copyFuncs))
for _, fn := range s.copyFuncs {
go func(fn func() error) {
s.errors <- fn()
}(fn)
}
return nil
}
// Wait waits for the remote command to exit.
//
// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems
// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit
// status.
//
// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type
// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes
// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type
// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems.
func (s *Session) Wait() error {
if !s.started {
return errors.New("ssh: session not started")
}
waitErr := <-s.exitStatus
if s.stdinPipeWriter != nil {
s.stdinPipeWriter.Close()
}
var copyError error
for range s.copyFuncs {
if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil {
copyError = err
}
}
if waitErr != nil {
return waitErr
}
return copyError
}
func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error {
wm := Waitmsg{status: -1}
// Wait for msg channel to be closed before returning.
for msg := range reqs {
switch msg.Type {
case "exit-status":
wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload))
case "exit-signal":
var sigval struct {
Signal string
CoreDumped bool
Error string
Lang string
}
if err := Unmarshal(msg.Payload, &sigval); err != nil {
return err
}
// Must sanitize strings?
wm.signal = sigval.Signal
wm.msg = sigval.Error
wm.lang = sigval.Lang
default:
// This handles keepalives and matches
// OpenSSH's behaviour.
if msg.WantReply {
msg.Reply(false, nil)
}
}
}
if wm.status == 0 {
return nil
}
if wm.status == -1 {
// exit-status was never sent from server
if wm.signal == "" {
// signal was not sent either. RFC 4254
// section 6.10 recommends against this
// behavior, but it is allowed, so we let
// clients handle it.
return &ExitMissingError{}
}
wm.status = 128
if _, ok := signals[Signal(wm.signal)]; ok {
wm.status += signals[Signal(wm.signal)]
}
}
return &ExitError{wm}
}
// ExitMissingError is returned if a session is torn down cleanly, but
// the server sends no confirmation of the exit status.
type ExitMissingError struct{}
func (e *ExitMissingError) Error() string {
return "wait: remote command exited without exit status or exit signal"
}
func (s *Session) stdin() {
if s.stdinpipe {
return
}
var stdin io.Reader
if s.Stdin == nil {
stdin = new(bytes.Buffer)
} else {
r, w := io.Pipe()
go func() {
_, err := io.Copy(w, s.Stdin)
w.CloseWithError(err)
}()
stdin, s.stdinPipeWriter = r, w
}
s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error {
_, err := io.Copy(s.ch, stdin)
if err1 := s.ch.CloseWrite(); err == nil && err1 != io.EOF {
err = err1
}
return err
})
}
func (s *Session) stdout() {
if s.stdoutpipe {
return
}
if s.Stdout == nil {
s.Stdout = ioutil.Discard
}
s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error {
_, err := io.Copy(s.Stdout, s.ch)
return err
})
}
func (s *Session) stderr() {
if s.stderrpipe {
return
}
if s.Stderr == nil {
s.Stderr = ioutil.Discard
}
s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error {
_, err := io.Copy(s.Stderr, s.ch.Stderr())
return err
})
}
// sessionStdin reroutes Close to CloseWrite.
type sessionStdin struct {
io.Writer
ch Channel
}
func (s *sessionStdin) Close() error {
return s.ch.CloseWrite()
}
// StdinPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the
// remote command's standard input when the command starts.
func (s *Session) StdinPipe() (io.WriteCloser, error) {
if s.Stdin != nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdin already set")
}
if s.started {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdinPipe after process started")
}
s.stdinpipe = true
return &sessionStdin{s.ch, s.ch}, nil
}
// StdoutPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the
// remote command's standard output when the command starts.
// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between
// stdout and stderr streams. If the StdoutPipe reader is
// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the
// remote command to block.
func (s *Session) StdoutPipe() (io.Reader, error) {
if s.Stdout != nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set")
}
if s.started {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdoutPipe after process started")
}
s.stdoutpipe = true
return s.ch, nil
}
// StderrPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the
// remote command's standard error when the command starts.
// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between
// stdout and stderr streams. If the StderrPipe reader is
// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the
// remote command to block.
func (s *Session) StderrPipe() (io.Reader, error) {
if s.Stderr != nil {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set")
}
if s.started {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: StderrPipe after process started")
}
s.stderrpipe = true
return s.ch.Stderr(), nil
}
// newSession returns a new interactive session on the remote host.
func newSession(ch Channel, reqs <-chan *Request) (*Session, error) {
s := &Session{
ch: ch,
}
s.exitStatus = make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
s.exitStatus <- s.wait(reqs)
}()
return s, nil
}
// An ExitError reports unsuccessful completion of a remote command.
type ExitError struct {
Waitmsg
}
func (e *ExitError) Error() string {
return e.Waitmsg.String()
}
// Waitmsg stores the information about an exited remote command
// as reported by Wait.
type Waitmsg struct {
status int
signal string
msg string
lang string
}
// ExitStatus returns the exit status of the remote command.
func (w Waitmsg) ExitStatus() int {
return w.status
}
// Signal returns the exit signal of the remote command if
// it was terminated violently.
func (w Waitmsg) Signal() string {
return w.signal
}
// Msg returns the exit message given by the remote command
func (w Waitmsg) Msg() string {
return w.msg
}
// Lang returns the language tag. See RFC 3066
func (w Waitmsg) Lang() string {
return w.lang
}
func (w Waitmsg) String() string {
str := fmt.Sprintf("Process exited with status %v", w.status)
if w.signal != "" {
str += fmt.Sprintf(" from signal %v", w.signal)
}
if w.msg != "" {
str += fmt.Sprintf(". Reason was: %v", w.msg)
}
return str
}

115
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go generated vendored Normal file
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package ssh
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net"
)
// streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message
// with "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" string.
//
// See openssh-portable/PROTOCOL, section 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL#L235
type streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg struct {
socketPath string
reserved0 string
reserved1 uint32
}
// forwardedStreamLocalPayload is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message
// with "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" string.
type forwardedStreamLocalPayload struct {
SocketPath string
Reserved0 string
}
// streamLocalChannelForwardMsg is a struct used for SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message
// with "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"/"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" string.
type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct {
socketPath string
}
// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket.
func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) {
m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{
socketPath,
}
// send message
ok, _, err := c.SendRequest("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer")
}
ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"})
return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil
}
func (c *Client) dialStreamLocal(socketPath string) (Channel, error) {
msg := streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg{
socketPath: socketPath,
}
ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", Marshal(&msg))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
go DiscardRequests(in)
return ch, err
}
type unixListener struct {
socketPath string
conn *Client
in <-chan forward
}
// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener.
func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
s, ok := <-l.in
if !ok {
return nil, io.EOF
}
ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
go DiscardRequests(incoming)
return &chanConn{
Channel: ch,
laddr: &net.UnixAddr{
Name: l.socketPath,
Net: "unix",
},
raddr: &net.UnixAddr{
Name: "@",
Net: "unix",
},
}, nil
}
// Close closes the listener.
func (l *unixListener) Close() error {
// this also closes the listener.
l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"})
m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{
l.socketPath,
}
ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m))
if err == nil && !ok {
err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com failed")
}
return err
}
// Addr returns the listener's network address.
func (l *unixListener) Addr() net.Addr {
return &net.UnixAddr{
Name: l.socketPath,
Net: "unix",
}
}

465
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/rand"
"net"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// Listen requests the remote peer open a listening socket on
// addr. Incoming connections will be available by calling Accept on
// the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the
// SSH connection may hang.
// N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix".
func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) {
switch n {
case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6":
laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c.ListenTCP(laddr)
case "unix":
return c.ListenUnix(addr)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n)
}
}
// Automatic port allocation is broken with OpenSSH before 6.0. See
// also https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2017. In
// particular, OpenSSH 5.9 sends a channelOpenMsg with port number 0,
// rather than the actual port number. This means you can never open
// two different listeners with auto allocated ports. We work around
// this by trying explicit ports until we succeed.
const openSSHPrefix = "OpenSSH_"
var portRandomizer = rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano()))
// isBrokenOpenSSHVersion returns true if the given version string
// specifies a version of OpenSSH that is known to have a bug in port
// forwarding.
func isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(versionStr string) bool {
i := strings.Index(versionStr, openSSHPrefix)
if i < 0 {
return false
}
i += len(openSSHPrefix)
j := i
for ; j < len(versionStr); j++ {
if versionStr[j] < '0' || versionStr[j] > '9' {
break
}
}
version, _ := strconv.Atoi(versionStr[i:j])
return version < 6
}
// autoPortListenWorkaround simulates automatic port allocation by
// trying random ports repeatedly.
func (c *Client) autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) {
var sshListener net.Listener
var err error
const tries = 10
for i := 0; i < tries; i++ {
addr := *laddr
addr.Port = 1024 + portRandomizer.Intn(60000)
sshListener, err = c.ListenTCP(&addr)
if err == nil {
laddr.Port = addr.Port
return sshListener, err
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: listen on random port failed after %d tries: %v", tries, err)
}
// RFC 4254 7.1
type channelForwardMsg struct {
addr string
rport uint32
}
// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket
// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling
// Accept on the returned net.Listener.
func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) {
if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) {
return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr)
}
m := channelForwardMsg{
laddr.IP.String(),
uint32(laddr.Port),
}
// send message
ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: tcpip-forward request denied by peer")
}
// If the original port was 0, then the remote side will
// supply a real port number in the response.
if laddr.Port == 0 {
var p struct {
Port uint32
}
if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
laddr.Port = int(p.Port)
}
// Register this forward, using the port number we obtained.
ch := c.forwards.add(laddr)
return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil
}
// forwardList stores a mapping between remote
// forward requests and the tcpListeners.
type forwardList struct {
sync.Mutex
entries []forwardEntry
}
// forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a
// remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener.
type forwardEntry struct {
laddr net.Addr
c chan forward
}
// forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The
// arguments to add/remove/lookup should be address as specified in
// the original forward-request.
type forward struct {
newCh NewChannel // the ssh client channel underlying this forward
raddr net.Addr // the raddr of the incoming connection
}
func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward {
l.Lock()
defer l.Unlock()
f := forwardEntry{
laddr: addr,
c: make(chan forward, 1),
}
l.entries = append(l.entries, f)
return f.c
}
// See RFC 4254, section 7.2
type forwardedTCPPayload struct {
Addr string
Port uint32
OriginAddr string
OriginPort uint32
}
// parseTCPAddr parses the originating address from the remote into a *net.TCPAddr.
func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) {
if port == 0 || port > 65535 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port)
}
ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr))
if ip == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr)
}
return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil
}
func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) {
for ch := range in {
var (
laddr net.Addr
raddr net.Addr
err error
)
switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType {
case "forwarded-tcpip":
var payload forwardedTCPPayload
if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil {
ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-tcpip payload: "+err.Error())
continue
}
// RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming
// addresses should list the address, in string
// format. It is implied that this should be an IP
// address, as it would be impossible to connect to it
// otherwise.
laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port)
if err != nil {
ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error())
continue
}
raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort)
if err != nil {
ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error())
continue
}
case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com":
var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload
if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil {
ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error())
continue
}
laddr = &net.UnixAddr{
Name: payload.SocketPath,
Net: "unix",
}
raddr = &net.UnixAddr{
Name: "@",
Net: "unix",
}
default:
panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType))
}
if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok {
// Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming
// connections.
ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address")
continue
}
}
}
// remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its
// listener.
func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) {
l.Lock()
defer l.Unlock()
for i, f := range l.entries {
if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() {
l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...)
close(f.c)
return
}
}
}
// closeAll closes and clears all forwards.
func (l *forwardList) closeAll() {
l.Lock()
defer l.Unlock()
for _, f := range l.entries {
close(f.c)
}
l.entries = nil
}
func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool {
l.Lock()
defer l.Unlock()
for _, f := range l.entries {
if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() {
f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr}
return true
}
}
return false
}
type tcpListener struct {
laddr *net.TCPAddr
conn *Client
in <-chan forward
}
// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener.
func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
s, ok := <-l.in
if !ok {
return nil, io.EOF
}
ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
go DiscardRequests(incoming)
return &chanConn{
Channel: ch,
laddr: l.laddr,
raddr: s.raddr,
}, nil
}
// Close closes the listener.
func (l *tcpListener) Close() error {
m := channelForwardMsg{
l.laddr.IP.String(),
uint32(l.laddr.Port),
}
// this also closes the listener.
l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr)
ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m))
if err == nil && !ok {
err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed")
}
return err
}
// Addr returns the listener's network address.
func (l *tcpListener) Addr() net.Addr {
return l.laddr
}
// Dial initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host.
// The resulting connection has a zero LocalAddr() and RemoteAddr().
func (c *Client) Dial(n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
var ch Channel
switch n {
case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6":
// Parse the address into host and numeric port.
host, portString, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
port, err := strconv.ParseUint(portString, 10, 16)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ch, err = c.dial(net.IPv4zero.String(), 0, host, int(port))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Use a zero address for local and remote address.
zeroAddr := &net.TCPAddr{
IP: net.IPv4zero,
Port: 0,
}
return &chanConn{
Channel: ch,
laddr: zeroAddr,
raddr: zeroAddr,
}, nil
case "unix":
var err error
ch, err = c.dialStreamLocal(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &chanConn{
Channel: ch,
laddr: &net.UnixAddr{
Name: "@",
Net: "unix",
},
raddr: &net.UnixAddr{
Name: addr,
Net: "unix",
},
}, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n)
}
}
// DialTCP connects to the remote address raddr on the network net,
// which must be "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6". If laddr is not nil, it is used
// as the local address for the connection.
func (c *Client) DialTCP(n string, laddr, raddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Conn, error) {
if laddr == nil {
laddr = &net.TCPAddr{
IP: net.IPv4zero,
Port: 0,
}
}
ch, err := c.dial(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port, raddr.IP.String(), raddr.Port)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &chanConn{
Channel: ch,
laddr: laddr,
raddr: raddr,
}, nil
}
// RFC 4254 7.2
type channelOpenDirectMsg struct {
raddr string
rport uint32
laddr string
lport uint32
}
func (c *Client) dial(laddr string, lport int, raddr string, rport int) (Channel, error) {
msg := channelOpenDirectMsg{
raddr: raddr,
rport: uint32(rport),
laddr: laddr,
lport: uint32(lport),
}
ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-tcpip", Marshal(&msg))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
go DiscardRequests(in)
return ch, err
}
type tcpChan struct {
Channel // the backing channel
}
// chanConn fulfills the net.Conn interface without
// the tcpChan having to hold laddr or raddr directly.
type chanConn struct {
Channel
laddr, raddr net.Addr
}
// LocalAddr returns the local network address.
func (t *chanConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr {
return t.laddr
}
// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address.
func (t *chanConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr {
return t.raddr
}
// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated
// with the connection.
func (t *chanConn) SetDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
if err := t.SetReadDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
return err
}
return t.SetWriteDeadline(deadline)
}
// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline.
// A zero value for t means Read will not time out.
// After the deadline, the error from Read will implement net.Error
// with Timeout() == true.
func (t *chanConn) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
// for compatibility with previous version,
// the error message contains "tcpChan"
return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported")
}
// SetWriteDeadline exists to satisfy the net.Conn interface
// but is not implemented by this type. It always returns an error.
func (t *chanConn) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error {
return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported")
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,951 @@
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package terminal
import (
"bytes"
"io"
"sync"
"unicode/utf8"
)
// EscapeCodes contains escape sequences that can be written to the terminal in
// order to achieve different styles of text.
type EscapeCodes struct {
// Foreground colors
Black, Red, Green, Yellow, Blue, Magenta, Cyan, White []byte
// Reset all attributes
Reset []byte
}
var vt100EscapeCodes = EscapeCodes{
Black: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '0', 'm'},
Red: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '1', 'm'},
Green: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '2', 'm'},
Yellow: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '3', 'm'},
Blue: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '4', 'm'},
Magenta: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '5', 'm'},
Cyan: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '6', 'm'},
White: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '3', '7', 'm'},
Reset: []byte{keyEscape, '[', '0', 'm'},
}
// Terminal contains the state for running a VT100 terminal that is capable of
// reading lines of input.
type Terminal struct {
// AutoCompleteCallback, if non-null, is called for each keypress with
// the full input line and the current position of the cursor (in
// bytes, as an index into |line|). If it returns ok=false, the key
// press is processed normally. Otherwise it returns a replacement line
// and the new cursor position.
AutoCompleteCallback func(line string, pos int, key rune) (newLine string, newPos int, ok bool)
// Escape contains a pointer to the escape codes for this terminal.
// It's always a valid pointer, although the escape codes themselves
// may be empty if the terminal doesn't support them.
Escape *EscapeCodes
// lock protects the terminal and the state in this object from
// concurrent processing of a key press and a Write() call.
lock sync.Mutex
c io.ReadWriter
prompt []rune
// line is the current line being entered.
line []rune
// pos is the logical position of the cursor in line
pos int
// echo is true if local echo is enabled
echo bool
// pasteActive is true iff there is a bracketed paste operation in
// progress.
pasteActive bool
// cursorX contains the current X value of the cursor where the left
// edge is 0. cursorY contains the row number where the first row of
// the current line is 0.
cursorX, cursorY int
// maxLine is the greatest value of cursorY so far.
maxLine int
termWidth, termHeight int
// outBuf contains the terminal data to be sent.
outBuf []byte
// remainder contains the remainder of any partial key sequences after
// a read. It aliases into inBuf.
remainder []byte
inBuf [256]byte
// history contains previously entered commands so that they can be
// accessed with the up and down keys.
history stRingBuffer
// historyIndex stores the currently accessed history entry, where zero
// means the immediately previous entry.
historyIndex int
// When navigating up and down the history it's possible to return to
// the incomplete, initial line. That value is stored in
// historyPending.
historyPending string
}
// NewTerminal runs a VT100 terminal on the given ReadWriter. If the ReadWriter is
// a local terminal, that terminal must first have been put into raw mode.
// prompt is a string that is written at the start of each input line (i.e.
// "> ").
func NewTerminal(c io.ReadWriter, prompt string) *Terminal {
return &Terminal{
Escape: &vt100EscapeCodes,
c: c,
prompt: []rune(prompt),
termWidth: 80,
termHeight: 24,
echo: true,
historyIndex: -1,
}
}
const (
keyCtrlD = 4
keyCtrlU = 21
keyEnter = '\r'
keyEscape = 27
keyBackspace = 127
keyUnknown = 0xd800 /* UTF-16 surrogate area */ + iota
keyUp
keyDown
keyLeft
keyRight
keyAltLeft
keyAltRight
keyHome
keyEnd
keyDeleteWord
keyDeleteLine
keyClearScreen
keyPasteStart
keyPasteEnd
)
var (
crlf = []byte{'\r', '\n'}
pasteStart = []byte{keyEscape, '[', '2', '0', '0', '~'}
pasteEnd = []byte{keyEscape, '[', '2', '0', '1', '~'}
)
// bytesToKey tries to parse a key sequence from b. If successful, it returns
// the key and the remainder of the input. Otherwise it returns utf8.RuneError.
func bytesToKey(b []byte, pasteActive bool) (rune, []byte) {
if len(b) == 0 {
return utf8.RuneError, nil
}
if !pasteActive {
switch b[0] {
case 1: // ^A
return keyHome, b[1:]
case 5: // ^E
return keyEnd, b[1:]
case 8: // ^H
return keyBackspace, b[1:]
case 11: // ^K
return keyDeleteLine, b[1:]
case 12: // ^L
return keyClearScreen, b[1:]
case 23: // ^W
return keyDeleteWord, b[1:]
}
}
if b[0] != keyEscape {
if !utf8.FullRune(b) {
return utf8.RuneError, b
}
r, l := utf8.DecodeRune(b)
return r, b[l:]
}
if !pasteActive && len(b) >= 3 && b[0] == keyEscape && b[1] == '[' {
switch b[2] {
case 'A':
return keyUp, b[3:]
case 'B':
return keyDown, b[3:]
case 'C':
return keyRight, b[3:]
case 'D':
return keyLeft, b[3:]
case 'H':
return keyHome, b[3:]
case 'F':
return keyEnd, b[3:]
}
}
if !pasteActive && len(b) >= 6 && b[0] == keyEscape && b[1] == '[' && b[2] == '1' && b[3] == ';' && b[4] == '3' {
switch b[5] {
case 'C':
return keyAltRight, b[6:]
case 'D':
return keyAltLeft, b[6:]
}
}
if !pasteActive && len(b) >= 6 && bytes.Equal(b[:6], pasteStart) {
return keyPasteStart, b[6:]
}
if pasteActive && len(b) >= 6 && bytes.Equal(b[:6], pasteEnd) {
return keyPasteEnd, b[6:]
}
// If we get here then we have a key that we don't recognise, or a
// partial sequence. It's not clear how one should find the end of a
// sequence without knowing them all, but it seems that [a-zA-Z~] only
// appears at the end of a sequence.
for i, c := range b[0:] {
if c >= 'a' && c <= 'z' || c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z' || c == '~' {
return keyUnknown, b[i+1:]
}
}
return utf8.RuneError, b
}
// queue appends data to the end of t.outBuf
func (t *Terminal) queue(data []rune) {
t.outBuf = append(t.outBuf, []byte(string(data))...)
}
var eraseUnderCursor = []rune{' ', keyEscape, '[', 'D'}
var space = []rune{' '}
func isPrintable(key rune) bool {
isInSurrogateArea := key >= 0xd800 && key <= 0xdbff
return key >= 32 && !isInSurrogateArea
}
// moveCursorToPos appends data to t.outBuf which will move the cursor to the
// given, logical position in the text.
func (t *Terminal) moveCursorToPos(pos int) {
if !t.echo {
return
}
x := visualLength(t.prompt) + pos
y := x / t.termWidth
x = x % t.termWidth
up := 0
if y < t.cursorY {
up = t.cursorY - y
}
down := 0
if y > t.cursorY {
down = y - t.cursorY
}
left := 0
if x < t.cursorX {
left = t.cursorX - x
}
right := 0
if x > t.cursorX {
right = x - t.cursorX
}
t.cursorX = x
t.cursorY = y
t.move(up, down, left, right)
}
func (t *Terminal) move(up, down, left, right int) {
movement := make([]rune, 3*(up+down+left+right))
m := movement
for i := 0; i < up; i++ {
m[0] = keyEscape
m[1] = '['
m[2] = 'A'
m = m[3:]
}
for i := 0; i < down; i++ {
m[0] = keyEscape
m[1] = '['
m[2] = 'B'
m = m[3:]
}
for i := 0; i < left; i++ {
m[0] = keyEscape
m[1] = '['
m[2] = 'D'
m = m[3:]
}
for i := 0; i < right; i++ {
m[0] = keyEscape
m[1] = '['
m[2] = 'C'
m = m[3:]
}
t.queue(movement)
}
func (t *Terminal) clearLineToRight() {
op := []rune{keyEscape, '[', 'K'}
t.queue(op)
}
const maxLineLength = 4096
func (t *Terminal) setLine(newLine []rune, newPos int) {
if t.echo {
t.moveCursorToPos(0)
t.writeLine(newLine)
for i := len(newLine); i < len(t.line); i++ {
t.writeLine(space)
}
t.moveCursorToPos(newPos)
}
t.line = newLine
t.pos = newPos
}
func (t *Terminal) advanceCursor(places int) {
t.cursorX += places
t.cursorY += t.cursorX / t.termWidth
if t.cursorY > t.maxLine {
t.maxLine = t.cursorY
}
t.cursorX = t.cursorX % t.termWidth
if places > 0 && t.cursorX == 0 {
// Normally terminals will advance the current position
// when writing a character. But that doesn't happen
// for the last character in a line. However, when
// writing a character (except a new line) that causes
// a line wrap, the position will be advanced two
// places.
//
// So, if we are stopping at the end of a line, we
// need to write a newline so that our cursor can be
// advanced to the next line.
t.outBuf = append(t.outBuf, '\r', '\n')
}
}
func (t *Terminal) eraseNPreviousChars(n int) {
if n == 0 {
return
}
if t.pos < n {
n = t.pos
}
t.pos -= n
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
copy(t.line[t.pos:], t.line[n+t.pos:])
t.line = t.line[:len(t.line)-n]
if t.echo {
t.writeLine(t.line[t.pos:])
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
t.queue(space)
}
t.advanceCursor(n)
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
}
}
// countToLeftWord returns then number of characters from the cursor to the
// start of the previous word.
func (t *Terminal) countToLeftWord() int {
if t.pos == 0 {
return 0
}
pos := t.pos - 1
for pos > 0 {
if t.line[pos] != ' ' {
break
}
pos--
}
for pos > 0 {
if t.line[pos] == ' ' {
pos++
break
}
pos--
}
return t.pos - pos
}
// countToRightWord returns then number of characters from the cursor to the
// start of the next word.
func (t *Terminal) countToRightWord() int {
pos := t.pos
for pos < len(t.line) {
if t.line[pos] == ' ' {
break
}
pos++
}
for pos < len(t.line) {
if t.line[pos] != ' ' {
break
}
pos++
}
return pos - t.pos
}
// visualLength returns the number of visible glyphs in s.
func visualLength(runes []rune) int {
inEscapeSeq := false
length := 0
for _, r := range runes {
switch {
case inEscapeSeq:
if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') {
inEscapeSeq = false
}
case r == '\x1b':
inEscapeSeq = true
default:
length++
}
}
return length
}
// handleKey processes the given key and, optionally, returns a line of text
// that the user has entered.
func (t *Terminal) handleKey(key rune) (line string, ok bool) {
if t.pasteActive && key != keyEnter {
t.addKeyToLine(key)
return
}
switch key {
case keyBackspace:
if t.pos == 0 {
return
}
t.eraseNPreviousChars(1)
case keyAltLeft:
// move left by a word.
t.pos -= t.countToLeftWord()
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyAltRight:
// move right by a word.
t.pos += t.countToRightWord()
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyLeft:
if t.pos == 0 {
return
}
t.pos--
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyRight:
if t.pos == len(t.line) {
return
}
t.pos++
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyHome:
if t.pos == 0 {
return
}
t.pos = 0
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyEnd:
if t.pos == len(t.line) {
return
}
t.pos = len(t.line)
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyUp:
entry, ok := t.history.NthPreviousEntry(t.historyIndex + 1)
if !ok {
return "", false
}
if t.historyIndex == -1 {
t.historyPending = string(t.line)
}
t.historyIndex++
runes := []rune(entry)
t.setLine(runes, len(runes))
case keyDown:
switch t.historyIndex {
case -1:
return
case 0:
runes := []rune(t.historyPending)
t.setLine(runes, len(runes))
t.historyIndex--
default:
entry, ok := t.history.NthPreviousEntry(t.historyIndex - 1)
if ok {
t.historyIndex--
runes := []rune(entry)
t.setLine(runes, len(runes))
}
}
case keyEnter:
t.moveCursorToPos(len(t.line))
t.queue([]rune("\r\n"))
line = string(t.line)
ok = true
t.line = t.line[:0]
t.pos = 0
t.cursorX = 0
t.cursorY = 0
t.maxLine = 0
case keyDeleteWord:
// Delete zero or more spaces and then one or more characters.
t.eraseNPreviousChars(t.countToLeftWord())
case keyDeleteLine:
// Delete everything from the current cursor position to the
// end of line.
for i := t.pos; i < len(t.line); i++ {
t.queue(space)
t.advanceCursor(1)
}
t.line = t.line[:t.pos]
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
case keyCtrlD:
// Erase the character under the current position.
// The EOF case when the line is empty is handled in
// readLine().
if t.pos < len(t.line) {
t.pos++
t.eraseNPreviousChars(1)
}
case keyCtrlU:
t.eraseNPreviousChars(t.pos)
case keyClearScreen:
// Erases the screen and moves the cursor to the home position.
t.queue([]rune("\x1b[2J\x1b[H"))
t.queue(t.prompt)
t.cursorX, t.cursorY = 0, 0
t.advanceCursor(visualLength(t.prompt))
t.setLine(t.line, t.pos)
default:
if t.AutoCompleteCallback != nil {
prefix := string(t.line[:t.pos])
suffix := string(t.line[t.pos:])
t.lock.Unlock()
newLine, newPos, completeOk := t.AutoCompleteCallback(prefix+suffix, len(prefix), key)
t.lock.Lock()
if completeOk {
t.setLine([]rune(newLine), utf8.RuneCount([]byte(newLine)[:newPos]))
return
}
}
if !isPrintable(key) {
return
}
if len(t.line) == maxLineLength {
return
}
t.addKeyToLine(key)
}
return
}
// addKeyToLine inserts the given key at the current position in the current
// line.
func (t *Terminal) addKeyToLine(key rune) {
if len(t.line) == cap(t.line) {
newLine := make([]rune, len(t.line), 2*(1+len(t.line)))
copy(newLine, t.line)
t.line = newLine
}
t.line = t.line[:len(t.line)+1]
copy(t.line[t.pos+1:], t.line[t.pos:])
t.line[t.pos] = key
if t.echo {
t.writeLine(t.line[t.pos:])
}
t.pos++
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
}
func (t *Terminal) writeLine(line []rune) {
for len(line) != 0 {
remainingOnLine := t.termWidth - t.cursorX
todo := len(line)
if todo > remainingOnLine {
todo = remainingOnLine
}
t.queue(line[:todo])
t.advanceCursor(visualLength(line[:todo]))
line = line[todo:]
}
}
// writeWithCRLF writes buf to w but replaces all occurrences of \n with \r\n.
func writeWithCRLF(w io.Writer, buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
for len(buf) > 0 {
i := bytes.IndexByte(buf, '\n')
todo := len(buf)
if i >= 0 {
todo = i
}
var nn int
nn, err = w.Write(buf[:todo])
n += nn
if err != nil {
return n, err
}
buf = buf[todo:]
if i >= 0 {
if _, err = w.Write(crlf); err != nil {
return n, err
}
n++
buf = buf[1:]
}
}
return n, nil
}
func (t *Terminal) Write(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
t.lock.Lock()
defer t.lock.Unlock()
if t.cursorX == 0 && t.cursorY == 0 {
// This is the easy case: there's nothing on the screen that we
// have to move out of the way.
return writeWithCRLF(t.c, buf)
}
// We have a prompt and possibly user input on the screen. We
// have to clear it first.
t.move(0 /* up */, 0 /* down */, t.cursorX /* left */, 0 /* right */)
t.cursorX = 0
t.clearLineToRight()
for t.cursorY > 0 {
t.move(1 /* up */, 0, 0, 0)
t.cursorY--
t.clearLineToRight()
}
if _, err = t.c.Write(t.outBuf); err != nil {
return
}
t.outBuf = t.outBuf[:0]
if n, err = writeWithCRLF(t.c, buf); err != nil {
return
}
t.writeLine(t.prompt)
if t.echo {
t.writeLine(t.line)
}
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
if _, err = t.c.Write(t.outBuf); err != nil {
return
}
t.outBuf = t.outBuf[:0]
return
}
// ReadPassword temporarily changes the prompt and reads a password, without
// echo, from the terminal.
func (t *Terminal) ReadPassword(prompt string) (line string, err error) {
t.lock.Lock()
defer t.lock.Unlock()
oldPrompt := t.prompt
t.prompt = []rune(prompt)
t.echo = false
line, err = t.readLine()
t.prompt = oldPrompt
t.echo = true
return
}
// ReadLine returns a line of input from the terminal.
func (t *Terminal) ReadLine() (line string, err error) {
t.lock.Lock()
defer t.lock.Unlock()
return t.readLine()
}
func (t *Terminal) readLine() (line string, err error) {
// t.lock must be held at this point
if t.cursorX == 0 && t.cursorY == 0 {
t.writeLine(t.prompt)
t.c.Write(t.outBuf)
t.outBuf = t.outBuf[:0]
}
lineIsPasted := t.pasteActive
for {
rest := t.remainder
lineOk := false
for !lineOk {
var key rune
key, rest = bytesToKey(rest, t.pasteActive)
if key == utf8.RuneError {
break
}
if !t.pasteActive {
if key == keyCtrlD {
if len(t.line) == 0 {
return "", io.EOF
}
}
if key == keyPasteStart {
t.pasteActive = true
if len(t.line) == 0 {
lineIsPasted = true
}
continue
}
} else if key == keyPasteEnd {
t.pasteActive = false
continue
}
if !t.pasteActive {
lineIsPasted = false
}
line, lineOk = t.handleKey(key)
}
if len(rest) > 0 {
n := copy(t.inBuf[:], rest)
t.remainder = t.inBuf[:n]
} else {
t.remainder = nil
}
t.c.Write(t.outBuf)
t.outBuf = t.outBuf[:0]
if lineOk {
if t.echo {
t.historyIndex = -1
t.history.Add(line)
}
if lineIsPasted {
err = ErrPasteIndicator
}
return
}
// t.remainder is a slice at the beginning of t.inBuf
// containing a partial key sequence
readBuf := t.inBuf[len(t.remainder):]
var n int
t.lock.Unlock()
n, err = t.c.Read(readBuf)
t.lock.Lock()
if err != nil {
return
}
t.remainder = t.inBuf[:n+len(t.remainder)]
}
}
// SetPrompt sets the prompt to be used when reading subsequent lines.
func (t *Terminal) SetPrompt(prompt string) {
t.lock.Lock()
defer t.lock.Unlock()
t.prompt = []rune(prompt)
}
func (t *Terminal) clearAndRepaintLinePlusNPrevious(numPrevLines int) {
// Move cursor to column zero at the start of the line.
t.move(t.cursorY, 0, t.cursorX, 0)
t.cursorX, t.cursorY = 0, 0
t.clearLineToRight()
for t.cursorY < numPrevLines {
// Move down a line
t.move(0, 1, 0, 0)
t.cursorY++
t.clearLineToRight()
}
// Move back to beginning.
t.move(t.cursorY, 0, 0, 0)
t.cursorX, t.cursorY = 0, 0
t.queue(t.prompt)
t.advanceCursor(visualLength(t.prompt))
t.writeLine(t.line)
t.moveCursorToPos(t.pos)
}
func (t *Terminal) SetSize(width, height int) error {
t.lock.Lock()
defer t.lock.Unlock()
if width == 0 {
width = 1
}
oldWidth := t.termWidth
t.termWidth, t.termHeight = width, height
switch {
case width == oldWidth:
// If the width didn't change then nothing else needs to be
// done.
return nil
case len(t.line) == 0 && t.cursorX == 0 && t.cursorY == 0:
// If there is nothing on current line and no prompt printed,
// just do nothing
return nil
case width < oldWidth:
// Some terminals (e.g. xterm) will truncate lines that were
// too long when shinking. Others, (e.g. gnome-terminal) will
// attempt to wrap them. For the former, repainting t.maxLine
// works great, but that behaviour goes badly wrong in the case
// of the latter because they have doubled every full line.
// We assume that we are working on a terminal that wraps lines
// and adjust the cursor position based on every previous line
// wrapping and turning into two. This causes the prompt on
// xterms to move upwards, which isn't great, but it avoids a
// huge mess with gnome-terminal.
if t.cursorX >= t.termWidth {
t.cursorX = t.termWidth - 1
}
t.cursorY *= 2
t.clearAndRepaintLinePlusNPrevious(t.maxLine * 2)
case width > oldWidth:
// If the terminal expands then our position calculations will
// be wrong in the future because we think the cursor is
// |t.pos| chars into the string, but there will be a gap at
// the end of any wrapped line.
//
// But the position will actually be correct until we move, so
// we can move back to the beginning and repaint everything.
t.clearAndRepaintLinePlusNPrevious(t.maxLine)
}
_, err := t.c.Write(t.outBuf)
t.outBuf = t.outBuf[:0]
return err
}
type pasteIndicatorError struct{}
func (pasteIndicatorError) Error() string {
return "terminal: ErrPasteIndicator not correctly handled"
}
// ErrPasteIndicator may be returned from ReadLine as the error, in addition
// to valid line data. It indicates that bracketed paste mode is enabled and
// that the returned line consists only of pasted data. Programs may wish to
// interpret pasted data more literally than typed data.
var ErrPasteIndicator = pasteIndicatorError{}
// SetBracketedPasteMode requests that the terminal bracket paste operations
// with markers. Not all terminals support this but, if it is supported, then
// enabling this mode will stop any autocomplete callback from running due to
// pastes. Additionally, any lines that are completely pasted will be returned
// from ReadLine with the error set to ErrPasteIndicator.
func (t *Terminal) SetBracketedPasteMode(on bool) {
if on {
io.WriteString(t.c, "\x1b[?2004h")
} else {
io.WriteString(t.c, "\x1b[?2004l")
}
}
// stRingBuffer is a ring buffer of strings.
type stRingBuffer struct {
// entries contains max elements.
entries []string
max int
// head contains the index of the element most recently added to the ring.
head int
// size contains the number of elements in the ring.
size int
}
func (s *stRingBuffer) Add(a string) {
if s.entries == nil {
const defaultNumEntries = 100
s.entries = make([]string, defaultNumEntries)
s.max = defaultNumEntries
}
s.head = (s.head + 1) % s.max
s.entries[s.head] = a
if s.size < s.max {
s.size++
}
}
// NthPreviousEntry returns the value passed to the nth previous call to Add.
// If n is zero then the immediately prior value is returned, if one, then the
// next most recent, and so on. If such an element doesn't exist then ok is
// false.
func (s *stRingBuffer) NthPreviousEntry(n int) (value string, ok bool) {
if n >= s.size {
return "", false
}
index := s.head - n
if index < 0 {
index += s.max
}
return s.entries[index], true
}
// readPasswordLine reads from reader until it finds \n or io.EOF.
// The slice returned does not include the \n.
// readPasswordLine also ignores any \r it finds.
func readPasswordLine(reader io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
var buf [1]byte
var ret []byte
for {
n, err := reader.Read(buf[:])
if n > 0 {
switch buf[0] {
case '\n':
return ret, nil
case '\r':
// remove \r from passwords on Windows
default:
ret = append(ret, buf[0])
}
continue
}
if err != nil {
if err == io.EOF && len(ret) > 0 {
return ret, nil
}
return ret, err
}
}
}

116
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build darwin dragonfly freebsd linux,!appengine netbsd openbsd
// Package terminal provides support functions for dealing with terminals, as
// commonly found on UNIX systems.
//
// Putting a terminal into raw mode is the most common requirement:
//
// oldState, err := terminal.MakeRaw(0)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// defer terminal.Restore(0, oldState)
package terminal // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal"
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// State contains the state of a terminal.
type State struct {
termios unix.Termios
}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
_, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
return err == nil
}
// MakeRaw put the terminal connected to the given file descriptor into raw
// mode and returns the previous state of the terminal so that it can be
// restored.
func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
oldState := State{termios: *termios}
// This attempts to replicate the behaviour documented for cfmakeraw in
// the termios(3) manpage.
termios.Iflag &^= unix.IGNBRK | unix.BRKINT | unix.PARMRK | unix.ISTRIP | unix.INLCR | unix.IGNCR | unix.ICRNL | unix.IXON
termios.Oflag &^= unix.OPOST
termios.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO | unix.ECHONL | unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG | unix.IEXTEN
termios.Cflag &^= unix.CSIZE | unix.PARENB
termios.Cflag |= unix.CS8
termios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
termios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &oldState, nil
}
// GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
// restore the terminal after a signal.
func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{termios: *termios}, nil
}
// Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
// previous state.
func Restore(fd int, state *State) error {
return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, &state.termios)
}
// GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.
func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
ws, err := unix.IoctlGetWinsize(fd, unix.TIOCGWINSZ)
if err != nil {
return -1, -1, err
}
return int(ws.Col), int(ws.Row), nil
}
// passwordReader is an io.Reader that reads from a specific file descriptor.
type passwordReader int
func (r passwordReader) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
return unix.Read(int(r), buf)
}
// ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo. This
// is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
// returned does not include the \n.
func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newState := *termios
newState.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO
newState.Lflag |= unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG
newState.Iflag |= unix.ICRNL
if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, &newState); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios)
}()
return readPasswordLine(passwordReader(fd))
}

12
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_bsd.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build darwin dragonfly freebsd netbsd openbsd
package terminal
import "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
const ioctlReadTermios = unix.TIOCGETA
const ioctlWriteTermios = unix.TIOCSETA

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@ -2,10 +2,9 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build dragonfly freebsd netbsd openbsd
package terminal
package unix
import "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
const ImplementsGetwd = false
func Getwd() (string, error) { return "", ENOTSUP }
const ioctlReadTermios = unix.TCGETS
const ioctlWriteTermios = unix.TCSETS

58
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_plan9.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package terminal provides support functions for dealing with terminals, as
// commonly found on UNIX systems.
//
// Putting a terminal into raw mode is the most common requirement:
//
// oldState, err := terminal.MakeRaw(0)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// defer terminal.Restore(0, oldState)
package terminal
import (
"fmt"
"runtime"
)
type State struct{}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
return false
}
// MakeRaw put the terminal connected to the given file descriptor into raw
// mode and returns the previous state of the terminal so that it can be
// restored.
func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("terminal: MakeRaw not implemented on %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
}
// GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
// restore the terminal after a signal.
func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("terminal: GetState not implemented on %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
}
// Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
// previous state.
func Restore(fd int, state *State) error {
return fmt.Errorf("terminal: Restore not implemented on %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
}
// GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.
func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
return 0, 0, fmt.Errorf("terminal: GetSize not implemented on %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
}
// ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo. This
// is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
// returned does not include the \n.
func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("terminal: ReadPassword not implemented on %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
}

128
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build solaris
package terminal // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal"
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
"io"
"syscall"
)
// State contains the state of a terminal.
type State struct {
state *unix.Termios
}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
_, err := unix.IoctlGetTermio(fd, unix.TCGETA)
return err == nil
}
// ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo. This
// is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
// returned does not include the \n.
func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
// see also: http://src.illumos.org/source/xref/illumos-gate/usr/src/lib/libast/common/uwin/getpass.c
val, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
oldState := *val
newState := oldState
newState.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO
newState.Lflag |= syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG
newState.Iflag |= syscall.ICRNL
err = unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &newState)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &oldState)
var buf [16]byte
var ret []byte
for {
n, err := syscall.Read(fd, buf[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if n == 0 {
if len(ret) == 0 {
return nil, io.EOF
}
break
}
if buf[n-1] == '\n' {
n--
}
ret = append(ret, buf[:n]...)
if n < len(buf) {
break
}
}
return ret, nil
}
// MakeRaw puts the terminal connected to the given file descriptor into raw
// mode and returns the previous state of the terminal so that it can be
// restored.
// see http://cr.illumos.org/~webrev/andy_js/1060/
func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
oldTermios := *oldTermiosPtr
newTermios := oldTermios
newTermios.Iflag &^= syscall.IGNBRK | syscall.BRKINT | syscall.PARMRK | syscall.ISTRIP | syscall.INLCR | syscall.IGNCR | syscall.ICRNL | syscall.IXON
newTermios.Oflag &^= syscall.OPOST
newTermios.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO | syscall.ECHONL | syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG | syscall.IEXTEN
newTermios.Cflag &^= syscall.CSIZE | syscall.PARENB
newTermios.Cflag |= syscall.CS8
newTermios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
newTermios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &newTermios); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{
state: oldTermiosPtr,
}, nil
}
// Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
// previous state.
func Restore(fd int, oldState *State) error {
return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, oldState.state)
}
// GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
// restore the terminal after a signal.
func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{
state: oldTermiosPtr,
}, nil
}
// GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.
func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
ws, err := unix.IoctlGetWinsize(fd, unix.TIOCGWINSZ)
if err != nil {
return 0, 0, err
}
return int(ws.Col), int(ws.Row), nil
}

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@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build windows
// Package terminal provides support functions for dealing with terminals, as
// commonly found on UNIX systems.
//
// Putting a terminal into raw mode is the most common requirement:
//
// oldState, err := terminal.MakeRaw(0)
// if err != nil {
// panic(err)
// }
// defer terminal.Restore(0, oldState)
package terminal
import (
"os"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
type State struct {
mode uint32
}
// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
var st uint32
err := windows.GetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), &st)
return err == nil
}
// MakeRaw put the terminal connected to the given file descriptor into raw
// mode and returns the previous state of the terminal so that it can be
// restored.
func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
var st uint32
if err := windows.GetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), &st); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
raw := st &^ (windows.ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT | windows.ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT | windows.ENABLE_LINE_INPUT | windows.ENABLE_PROCESSED_OUTPUT)
if err := windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), raw); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{st}, nil
}
// GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
// restore the terminal after a signal.
func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
var st uint32
if err := windows.GetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), &st); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &State{st}, nil
}
// Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
// previous state.
func Restore(fd int, state *State) error {
return windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), state.mode)
}
// GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.
func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
var info windows.ConsoleScreenBufferInfo
if err := windows.GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(windows.Handle(fd), &info); err != nil {
return 0, 0, err
}
return int(info.Size.X), int(info.Size.Y), nil
}
// ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo. This
// is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
// returned does not include the \n.
func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
var st uint32
if err := windows.GetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), &st); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
old := st
st &^= (windows.ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT)
st |= (windows.ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT | windows.ENABLE_LINE_INPUT | windows.ENABLE_PROCESSED_OUTPUT)
if err := windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), st); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer func() {
windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old)
}()
return readPasswordLine(os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), "stdin"))
}

383
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go generated vendored Normal file
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// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package ssh
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"errors"
"io"
"log"
)
// debugTransport if set, will print packet types as they go over the
// wire. No message decoding is done, to minimize the impact on timing.
const debugTransport = false
const (
gcmCipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com"
aes128cbcID = "aes128-cbc"
tripledescbcID = "3des-cbc"
)
// packetConn represents a transport that implements packet based
// operations.
type packetConn interface {
// Encrypt and send a packet of data to the remote peer.
writePacket(packet []byte) error
// Read a packet from the connection. The read is blocking,
// i.e. if error is nil, then the returned byte slice is
// always non-empty.
readPacket() ([]byte, error)
// Close closes the write-side of the connection.
Close() error
}
// transport is the keyingTransport that implements the SSH packet
// protocol.
type transport struct {
reader connectionState
writer connectionState
bufReader *bufio.Reader
bufWriter *bufio.Writer
rand io.Reader
isClient bool
io.Closer
}
// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC
// protocol. A single instance should be used for one direction only.
type packetCipher interface {
// writePacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The
// contents of the packet are generally scrambled.
writePacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error
// readPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The
// returned packet may be overwritten by future calls of
// readPacket.
readPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error)
}
// connectionState represents one side (read or write) of the
// connection. This is necessary because each direction has its own
// keys, and can even have its own algorithms
type connectionState struct {
packetCipher
seqNum uint32
dir direction
pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher
}
// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in
// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet
// respectively.
func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error {
ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult)
if err != nil {
return err
}
t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult)
if err != nil {
return err
}
t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph
return nil
}
func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) {
if len(p) == 0 {
return
}
who := "server"
if t.isClient {
who = "client"
}
what := "read"
if write {
what = "write"
}
log.Println(what, who, p[0])
}
// Read and decrypt next packet.
func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) {
for {
p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader)
if err != nil {
break
}
if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) {
break
}
}
if debugTransport {
t.printPacket(p, false)
}
return p, err
}
func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
packet, err := s.packetCipher.readPacket(s.seqNum, r)
s.seqNum++
if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 {
err = errors.New("ssh: zero length packet")
}
if len(packet) > 0 {
switch packet[0] {
case msgNewKeys:
select {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
default:
return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message")
}
case msgDisconnect:
// Transform a disconnect message into an
// error. Since this is lowest level at which
// we interpret message types, doing it here
// ensures that we don't have to handle it
// elsewhere.
var msg disconnectMsg
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nil, &msg
}
}
// The packet may point to an internal buffer, so copy the
// packet out here.
fresh := make([]byte, len(packet))
copy(fresh, packet)
return fresh, err
}
func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error {
if debugTransport {
t.printPacket(packet, true)
}
return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet)
}
func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error {
changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys
err := s.packetCipher.writePacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err = w.Flush(); err != nil {
return err
}
s.seqNum++
if changeKeys {
select {
case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange:
s.packetCipher = cipher
default:
panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys")
}
}
return err
}
func newTransport(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, rand io.Reader, isClient bool) *transport {
t := &transport{
bufReader: bufio.NewReader(rwc),
bufWriter: bufio.NewWriter(rwc),
rand: rand,
reader: connectionState{
packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}},
pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1),
},
writer: connectionState{
packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}},
pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1),
},
Closer: rwc,
}
t.isClient = isClient
if isClient {
t.reader.dir = serverKeys
t.writer.dir = clientKeys
} else {
t.reader.dir = clientKeys
t.writer.dir = serverKeys
}
return t
}
type direction struct {
ivTag []byte
keyTag []byte
macKeyTag []byte
}
var (
serverKeys = direction{[]byte{'B'}, []byte{'D'}, []byte{'F'}}
clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}}
)
// generateKeys generates key material for IV, MAC and encryption.
func generateKeys(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (iv, key, macKey []byte) {
cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher]
macMode := macModes[algs.MAC]
iv = make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize)
key = make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize)
macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize)
generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex)
generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex)
return
}
// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as
// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys
// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys).
func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) {
iv, key, macKey := generateKeys(d, algs, kex)
if algs.Cipher == gcmCipherID {
return newGCMCipher(iv, key)
}
if algs.Cipher == aes128cbcID {
return newAESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs)
}
if algs.Cipher == tripledescbcID {
return newTripleDESCBCCipher(iv, key, macKey, algs)
}
c := &streamPacketCipher{
mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey),
etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm,
}
c.macResult = make([]byte, c.mac.Size())
var err error
c.cipher, err = cipherModes[algs.Cipher].createStream(key, iv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return c, nil
}
// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H
// and sessionId, as specified in RFC 4253, section 7.2.
func generateKeyMaterial(out, tag []byte, r *kexResult) {
var digestsSoFar []byte
h := r.Hash.New()
for len(out) > 0 {
h.Reset()
h.Write(r.K)
h.Write(r.H)
if len(digestsSoFar) == 0 {
h.Write(tag)
h.Write(r.SessionID)
} else {
h.Write(digestsSoFar)
}
digest := h.Sum(nil)
n := copy(out, digest)
out = out[n:]
if len(out) > 0 {
digestsSoFar = append(digestsSoFar, digest...)
}
}
}
const packageVersion = "SSH-2.0-Go"
// Sends and receives a version line. The versionLine string should
// be US ASCII, start with "SSH-2.0-", and should not include a
// newline. exchangeVersions returns the other side's version line.
func exchangeVersions(rw io.ReadWriter, versionLine []byte) (them []byte, err error) {
// Contrary to the RFC, we do not ignore lines that don't
// start with "SSH-2.0-" to make the library usable with
// nonconforming servers.
for _, c := range versionLine {
// The spec disallows non US-ASCII chars, and
// specifically forbids null chars.
if c < 32 {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk character in version line")
}
}
if _, err = rw.Write(append(versionLine, '\r', '\n')); err != nil {
return
}
them, err = readVersion(rw)
return them, err
}
// maxVersionStringBytes is the maximum number of bytes that we'll
// accept as a version string. RFC 4253 section 4.2 limits this at 255
// chars
const maxVersionStringBytes = 255
// Read version string as specified by RFC 4253, section 4.2.
func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
versionString := make([]byte, 0, 64)
var ok bool
var buf [1]byte
for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ {
_, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:])
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n
// but several SSH servers actually only send a \n.
if buf[0] == '\n' {
if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) {
// RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines
// except the one containing the SSH version (provided that
// all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total).
versionString = versionString[:0]
continue
}
ok = true
break
}
// non ASCII chars are disallowed, but we are lenient,
// since Go doesn't use null-terminated strings.
// The RFC allows a comment after a space, however,
// all of it (version and comments) goes into the
// session hash.
versionString = append(versionString, buf[0])
}
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("ssh: overflow reading version string")
}
// There might be a '\r' on the end which we should remove.
if len(versionString) > 0 && versionString[len(versionString)-1] == '\r' {
versionString = versionString[:len(versionString)-1]
}
return versionString, nil
}

View file

@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
// Package context defines the Context type, which carries deadlines,
// cancelation signals, and other request-scoped values across API boundaries
// and between processes.
// As of Go 1.7 this package is available in the standard library under the
// name context. https://golang.org/pkg/context.
//
// Incoming requests to a server should create a Context, and outgoing calls to
// servers should accept a Context. The chain of function calls between must
@ -36,103 +38,6 @@
// Contexts.
package context // import "golang.org/x/net/context"
import "time"
// A Context carries a deadline, a cancelation signal, and other values across
// API boundaries.
//
// Context's methods may be called by multiple goroutines simultaneously.
type Context interface {
// Deadline returns the time when work done on behalf of this context
// should be canceled. Deadline returns ok==false when no deadline is
// set. Successive calls to Deadline return the same results.
Deadline() (deadline time.Time, ok bool)
// Done returns a channel that's closed when work done on behalf of this
// context should be canceled. Done may return nil if this context can
// never be canceled. Successive calls to Done return the same value.
//
// WithCancel arranges for Done to be closed when cancel is called;
// WithDeadline arranges for Done to be closed when the deadline
// expires; WithTimeout arranges for Done to be closed when the timeout
// elapses.
//
// Done is provided for use in select statements:
//
// // Stream generates values with DoSomething and sends them to out
// // until DoSomething returns an error or ctx.Done is closed.
// func Stream(ctx context.Context, out chan<- Value) error {
// for {
// v, err := DoSomething(ctx)
// if err != nil {
// return err
// }
// select {
// case <-ctx.Done():
// return ctx.Err()
// case out <- v:
// }
// }
// }
//
// See http://blog.golang.org/pipelines for more examples of how to use
// a Done channel for cancelation.
Done() <-chan struct{}
// Err returns a non-nil error value after Done is closed. Err returns
// Canceled if the context was canceled or DeadlineExceeded if the
// context's deadline passed. No other values for Err are defined.
// After Done is closed, successive calls to Err return the same value.
Err() error
// Value returns the value associated with this context for key, or nil
// if no value is associated with key. Successive calls to Value with
// the same key returns the same result.
//
// Use context values only for request-scoped data that transits
// processes and API boundaries, not for passing optional parameters to
// functions.
//
// A key identifies a specific value in a Context. Functions that wish
// to store values in Context typically allocate a key in a global
// variable then use that key as the argument to context.WithValue and
// Context.Value. A key can be any type that supports equality;
// packages should define keys as an unexported type to avoid
// collisions.
//
// Packages that define a Context key should provide type-safe accessors
// for the values stores using that key:
//
// // Package user defines a User type that's stored in Contexts.
// package user
//
// import "golang.org/x/net/context"
//
// // User is the type of value stored in the Contexts.
// type User struct {...}
//
// // key is an unexported type for keys defined in this package.
// // This prevents collisions with keys defined in other packages.
// type key int
//
// // userKey is the key for user.User values in Contexts. It is
// // unexported; clients use user.NewContext and user.FromContext
// // instead of using this key directly.
// var userKey key = 0
//
// // NewContext returns a new Context that carries value u.
// func NewContext(ctx context.Context, u *User) context.Context {
// return context.WithValue(ctx, userKey, u)
// }
//
// // FromContext returns the User value stored in ctx, if any.
// func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (*User, bool) {
// u, ok := ctx.Value(userKey).(*User)
// return u, ok
// }
Value(key interface{}) interface{}
}
// Background returns a non-nil, empty Context. It is never canceled, has no
// values, and has no deadline. It is typically used by the main function,
// initialization, and tests, and as the top-level Context for incoming
@ -149,8 +54,3 @@ func Background() Context {
func TODO() Context {
return todo
}
// A CancelFunc tells an operation to abandon its work.
// A CancelFunc does not wait for the work to stop.
// After the first call, subsequent calls to a CancelFunc do nothing.
type CancelFunc func()

20
vendor/golang.org/x/net/context/go19.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.9
package context
import "context" // standard library's context, as of Go 1.7
// A Context carries a deadline, a cancelation signal, and other values across
// API boundaries.
//
// Context's methods may be called by multiple goroutines simultaneously.
type Context = context.Context
// A CancelFunc tells an operation to abandon its work.
// A CancelFunc does not wait for the work to stop.
// After the first call, subsequent calls to a CancelFunc do nothing.
type CancelFunc = context.CancelFunc

109
vendor/golang.org/x/net/context/pre_go19.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.9
package context
import "time"
// A Context carries a deadline, a cancelation signal, and other values across
// API boundaries.
//
// Context's methods may be called by multiple goroutines simultaneously.
type Context interface {
// Deadline returns the time when work done on behalf of this context
// should be canceled. Deadline returns ok==false when no deadline is
// set. Successive calls to Deadline return the same results.
Deadline() (deadline time.Time, ok bool)
// Done returns a channel that's closed when work done on behalf of this
// context should be canceled. Done may return nil if this context can
// never be canceled. Successive calls to Done return the same value.
//
// WithCancel arranges for Done to be closed when cancel is called;
// WithDeadline arranges for Done to be closed when the deadline
// expires; WithTimeout arranges for Done to be closed when the timeout
// elapses.
//
// Done is provided for use in select statements:
//
// // Stream generates values with DoSomething and sends them to out
// // until DoSomething returns an error or ctx.Done is closed.
// func Stream(ctx context.Context, out chan<- Value) error {
// for {
// v, err := DoSomething(ctx)
// if err != nil {
// return err
// }
// select {
// case <-ctx.Done():
// return ctx.Err()
// case out <- v:
// }
// }
// }
//
// See http://blog.golang.org/pipelines for more examples of how to use
// a Done channel for cancelation.
Done() <-chan struct{}
// Err returns a non-nil error value after Done is closed. Err returns
// Canceled if the context was canceled or DeadlineExceeded if the
// context's deadline passed. No other values for Err are defined.
// After Done is closed, successive calls to Err return the same value.
Err() error
// Value returns the value associated with this context for key, or nil
// if no value is associated with key. Successive calls to Value with
// the same key returns the same result.
//
// Use context values only for request-scoped data that transits
// processes and API boundaries, not for passing optional parameters to
// functions.
//
// A key identifies a specific value in a Context. Functions that wish
// to store values in Context typically allocate a key in a global
// variable then use that key as the argument to context.WithValue and
// Context.Value. A key can be any type that supports equality;
// packages should define keys as an unexported type to avoid
// collisions.
//
// Packages that define a Context key should provide type-safe accessors
// for the values stores using that key:
//
// // Package user defines a User type that's stored in Contexts.
// package user
//
// import "golang.org/x/net/context"
//
// // User is the type of value stored in the Contexts.
// type User struct {...}
//
// // key is an unexported type for keys defined in this package.
// // This prevents collisions with keys defined in other packages.
// type key int
//
// // userKey is the key for user.User values in Contexts. It is
// // unexported; clients use user.NewContext and user.FromContext
// // instead of using this key directly.
// var userKey key = 0
//
// // NewContext returns a new Context that carries value u.
// func NewContext(ctx context.Context, u *User) context.Context {
// return context.WithValue(ctx, userKey, u)
// }
//
// // FromContext returns the User value stored in ctx, if any.
// func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (*User, bool) {
// u, ok := ctx.Value(userKey).(*User)
// return u, ok
// }
Value(key interface{}) interface{}
}
// A CancelFunc tells an operation to abandon its work.
// A CancelFunc does not wait for the work to stop.
// After the first call, subsequent calls to a CancelFunc do nothing.
type CancelFunc func()

641
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/ciphers.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,641 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package http2
// A list of the possible cipher suite ids. Taken from
// http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt
const (
cipher_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL uint16 = 0x0000
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 uint16 = 0x0001
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x0002
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0003
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 uint16 = 0x0004
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0006
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0007
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0008
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0009
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000A
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000B
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000C
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000D
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000E
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000F
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0010
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0011
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0012
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0013
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0014
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0015
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0016
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0017
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 uint16 = 0x0018
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0019
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001A
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001B
// Reserved uint16 = 0x001C-1D
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001E
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001F
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0020
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0021
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5 uint16 = 0x0022
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5 uint16 = 0x0023
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 uint16 = 0x0024
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5 uint16 = 0x0025
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA uint16 = 0x0026
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA uint16 = 0x0027
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA uint16 = 0x0028
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0029
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x002A
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x002B
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x002C
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x002D
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x002E
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002F
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0030
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0031
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0032
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0033
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0034
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0036
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0037
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0038
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0039
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x003A
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003D
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003E
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003F
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0040
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0041
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0042
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0043
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0044
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0045
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0046
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0047-4F
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0050-58
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0059-5C
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x005D-5F
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0060-66
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0067
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0068
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0069
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006A
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006B
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006C
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006D
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x006E-83
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0084
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0085
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0086
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0087
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0088
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0089
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x008A
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008B
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008C
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008D
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x008E
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008F
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0090
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0091
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0092
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0093
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0094
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0095
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0096
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0097
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0098
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0099
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x009A
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x009B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009D
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009E
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009F
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A0
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A1
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A2
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A3
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A4
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A5
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A6
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A7
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A8
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A9
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00AA
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00AB
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00AC
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00AD
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00AE
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00AF
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B0
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B1
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B2
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B3
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B4
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B5
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B6
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B7
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B8
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B9
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BA
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BB
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BC
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BD
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BE
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BF
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C0
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C1
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C2
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C3
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C4
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C5
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x00C6-FE
cipher_TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV uint16 = 0x00FF
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x01-55,*
cipher_TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x5601 - 0xC000
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC001
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC002
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC003
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC004
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC005
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC006
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC007
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC008
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC009
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00A
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC00B
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC00C
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00E
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC010
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC011
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC012
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC013
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC014
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC015
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC016
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC017
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC018
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC019
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01A
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01B
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01C
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01D
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01E
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01F
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC020
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC021
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC022
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC023
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC024
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC025
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC026
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC027
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC028
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC029
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC02A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC02B
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC02C
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC02D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC02E
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC02F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC030
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC031
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC032
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC033
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC034
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC035
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC036
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC037
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC038
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC039
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC03A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC03B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC03C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC03D
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC03E
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC03F
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC040
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC041
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC042
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC043
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC044
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC045
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC046
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC047
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC048
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC049
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC04A
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC04B
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC04C
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC04D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC04E
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC04F
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC050
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC051
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC052
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC053
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC054
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC055
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC056
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC057
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC058
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC059
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC05A
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC05B
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC05C
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC05D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC05E
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC05F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC060
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC061
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC062
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC063
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC064
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC065
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC066
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC067
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC068
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC069
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC06A
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC06B
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC06C
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC06D
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC06E
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC06F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC070
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC071
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC072
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC073
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC074
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC075
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC076
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC077
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC078
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC079
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC07A
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC07B
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC07C
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC07D
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC07E
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC07F
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC080
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC081
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC082
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC083
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC084
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC085
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC086
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC087
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC088
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC089
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC08A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC08B
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC08C
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC08D
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC08E
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC08F
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC090
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC091
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC092
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC093
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC094
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC095
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC096
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC097
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC098
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC099
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC09A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC09B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC09C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC09D
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC09E
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC09F
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A0
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A1
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A2
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A3
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A4
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A5
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A6
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A7
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A8
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A9
cipher_TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AA
cipher_TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AB
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC0AC
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC0AD
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AE
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AF
// Unassigned uint16 = 0xC0B0-FF
// Unassigned uint16 = 0xC1-CB,*
// Unassigned uint16 = 0xCC00-A7
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCA8
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCA9
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAA
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAB
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAC
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAD
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAE
)
// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
// References:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#appendix-A
// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
switch cipher {
case cipher_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8:
return true
default:
return false
}
}

View file

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func configureTransport(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
}
// registerHTTPSProtocol calls Transport.RegisterProtocol but
// convering panics into errors.
// converting panics into errors.
func registerHTTPSProtocol(t *http.Transport, rt http.RoundTripper) (err error) {
defer func() {
if e := recover(); e != nil {
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ type noDialH2RoundTripper struct{ t *Transport }
func (rt noDialH2RoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
res, err := rt.t.RoundTrip(req)
if err == ErrNoCachedConn {
if isNoCachedConnError(err) {
return nil, http.ErrSkipAltProtocol
}
return res, err

View file

@ -87,13 +87,16 @@ type goAwayFlowError struct{}
func (goAwayFlowError) Error() string { return "connection exceeded flow control window size" }
// connErrorReason wraps a ConnectionError with an informative error about why it occurs.
// connError represents an HTTP/2 ConnectionError error code, along
// with a string (for debugging) explaining why.
//
// Errors of this type are only returned by the frame parser functions
// and converted into ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol).
// and converted into ConnectionError(Code), after stashing away
// the Reason into the Framer's errDetail field, accessible via
// the (*Framer).ErrorDetail method.
type connError struct {
Code ErrCode
Reason string
Code ErrCode // the ConnectionError error code
Reason string // additional reason
}
func (e connError) Error() string {

View file

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http"
"time"
)
@ -15,29 +14,3 @@ import (
func transportExpectContinueTimeout(t1 *http.Transport) time.Duration {
return t1.ExpectContinueTimeout
}
// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
switch cipher {
case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
return true
default:
return false
}
}

View file

@ -52,3 +52,5 @@ func reqGetBody(req *http.Request) func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
func reqBodyIsNoBody(body io.ReadCloser) bool {
return body == http.NoBody
}
func go18httpNoBody() io.ReadCloser { return http.NoBody } // for tests only

16
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go19.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.9
package http2
import (
"net/http"
)
func configureServer19(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
s.RegisterOnShutdown(conf.state.startGracefulShutdown)
return nil
}

View file

@ -125,77 +125,78 @@ func (t *headerFieldTable) idToIndex(id uint64) uint64 {
return k + 1
}
func pair(name, value string) HeaderField {
return HeaderField{Name: name, Value: value}
}
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression-07#appendix-B
var staticTable = newStaticTable()
var staticTableEntries = [...]HeaderField{
{Name: ":authority"},
{Name: ":method", Value: "GET"},
{Name: ":method", Value: "POST"},
{Name: ":path", Value: "/"},
{Name: ":path", Value: "/index.html"},
{Name: ":scheme", Value: "http"},
{Name: ":scheme", Value: "https"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "200"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "204"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "206"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "304"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "400"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "404"},
{Name: ":status", Value: "500"},
{Name: "accept-charset"},
{Name: "accept-encoding", Value: "gzip, deflate"},
{Name: "accept-language"},
{Name: "accept-ranges"},
{Name: "accept"},
{Name: "access-control-allow-origin"},
{Name: "age"},
{Name: "allow"},
{Name: "authorization"},
{Name: "cache-control"},
{Name: "content-disposition"},
{Name: "content-encoding"},
{Name: "content-language"},
{Name: "content-length"},
{Name: "content-location"},
{Name: "content-range"},
{Name: "content-type"},
{Name: "cookie"},
{Name: "date"},
{Name: "etag"},
{Name: "expect"},
{Name: "expires"},
{Name: "from"},
{Name: "host"},
{Name: "if-match"},
{Name: "if-modified-since"},
{Name: "if-none-match"},
{Name: "if-range"},
{Name: "if-unmodified-since"},
{Name: "last-modified"},
{Name: "link"},
{Name: "location"},
{Name: "max-forwards"},
{Name: "proxy-authenticate"},
{Name: "proxy-authorization"},
{Name: "range"},
{Name: "referer"},
{Name: "refresh"},
{Name: "retry-after"},
{Name: "server"},
{Name: "set-cookie"},
{Name: "strict-transport-security"},
{Name: "transfer-encoding"},
{Name: "user-agent"},
{Name: "vary"},
{Name: "via"},
{Name: "www-authenticate"},
}
func newStaticTable() *headerFieldTable {
t := &headerFieldTable{}
t.init()
t.addEntry(pair(":authority", ""))
t.addEntry(pair(":method", "GET"))
t.addEntry(pair(":method", "POST"))
t.addEntry(pair(":path", "/"))
t.addEntry(pair(":path", "/index.html"))
t.addEntry(pair(":scheme", "http"))
t.addEntry(pair(":scheme", "https"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "200"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "204"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "206"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "304"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "400"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "404"))
t.addEntry(pair(":status", "500"))
t.addEntry(pair("accept-charset", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("accept-encoding", "gzip, deflate"))
t.addEntry(pair("accept-language", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("accept-ranges", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("accept", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("access-control-allow-origin", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("age", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("allow", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("authorization", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("cache-control", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-disposition", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-encoding", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-language", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-length", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-location", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-range", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("content-type", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("cookie", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("date", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("etag", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("expect", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("expires", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("from", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("host", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("if-match", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("if-modified-since", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("if-none-match", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("if-range", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("if-unmodified-since", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("last-modified", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("link", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("location", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("max-forwards", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("proxy-authenticate", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("proxy-authorization", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("range", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("referer", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("refresh", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("retry-after", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("server", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("set-cookie", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("strict-transport-security", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("transfer-encoding", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("user-agent", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("vary", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("via", ""))
t.addEntry(pair("www-authenticate", ""))
for _, e := range staticTableEntries[:] {
t.addEntry(e)
}
return t
}

View file

@ -376,12 +376,16 @@ func (s *sorter) SortStrings(ss []string) {
// validPseudoPath reports whether v is a valid :path pseudo-header
// value. It must be either:
//
// *) a non-empty string starting with '/', but not with with "//",
// *) a non-empty string starting with '/'
// *) the string '*', for OPTIONS requests.
//
// For now this is only used a quick check for deciding when to clean
// up Opaque URLs before sending requests from the Transport.
// See golang.org/issue/16847
//
// We used to enforce that the path also didn't start with "//", but
// Google's GFE accepts such paths and Chrome sends them, so ignore
// that part of the spec. See golang.org/issue/19103.
func validPseudoPath(v string) bool {
return (len(v) > 0 && v[0] == '/' && (len(v) == 1 || v[1] != '/')) || v == "*"
return (len(v) > 0 && v[0] == '/') || v == "*"
}

View file

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http"
"time"
)
@ -20,27 +19,3 @@ func transportExpectContinueTimeout(t1 *http.Transport) time.Duration {
return 0
}
// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
switch cipher {
case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
return true
default:
return false
}
}

View file

@ -25,3 +25,5 @@ func reqGetBody(req *http.Request) func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
}
func reqBodyIsNoBody(io.ReadCloser) bool { return false }
func go18httpNoBody() io.ReadCloser { return nil } // for tests only

16
vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go19.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.9
package http2
import (
"net/http"
)
func configureServer19(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
// not supported prior to go1.9
return nil
}

View file

@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
// underlying buffer is an interface. (io.Pipe is always unbuffered)
type pipe struct {
mu sync.Mutex
c sync.Cond // c.L lazily initialized to &p.mu
b pipeBuffer
c sync.Cond // c.L lazily initialized to &p.mu
b pipeBuffer // nil when done reading
err error // read error once empty. non-nil means closed.
breakErr error // immediate read error (caller doesn't see rest of b)
donec chan struct{} // closed on error
@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ type pipeBuffer interface {
func (p *pipe) Len() int {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.b == nil {
return 0
}
return p.b.Len()
}
@ -47,7 +50,7 @@ func (p *pipe) Read(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
if p.breakErr != nil {
return 0, p.breakErr
}
if p.b.Len() > 0 {
if p.b != nil && p.b.Len() > 0 {
return p.b.Read(d)
}
if p.err != nil {
@ -55,6 +58,7 @@ func (p *pipe) Read(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
p.readFn() // e.g. copy trailers
p.readFn = nil // not sticky like p.err
}
p.b = nil
return 0, p.err
}
p.c.Wait()
@ -75,6 +79,9 @@ func (p *pipe) Write(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
if p.err != nil {
return 0, errClosedPipeWrite
}
if p.breakErr != nil {
return len(d), nil // discard when there is no reader
}
return p.b.Write(d)
}
@ -109,6 +116,9 @@ func (p *pipe) closeWithError(dst *error, err error, fn func()) {
return
}
p.readFn = fn
if dst == &p.breakErr {
p.b = nil
}
*dst = err
p.closeDoneLocked()
}

View file

@ -126,6 +126,11 @@ type Server struct {
// NewWriteScheduler constructs a write scheduler for a connection.
// If nil, a default scheduler is chosen.
NewWriteScheduler func() WriteScheduler
// Internal state. This is a pointer (rather than embedded directly)
// so that we don't embed a Mutex in this struct, which will make the
// struct non-copyable, which might break some callers.
state *serverInternalState
}
func (s *Server) initialConnRecvWindowSize() int32 {
@ -156,6 +161,40 @@ func (s *Server) maxConcurrentStreams() uint32 {
return defaultMaxStreams
}
type serverInternalState struct {
mu sync.Mutex
activeConns map[*serverConn]struct{}
}
func (s *serverInternalState) registerConn(sc *serverConn) {
if s == nil {
return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.activeConns[sc] = struct{}{}
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *serverInternalState) unregisterConn(sc *serverConn) {
if s == nil {
return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
}
s.mu.Lock()
delete(s.activeConns, sc)
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *serverInternalState) startGracefulShutdown() {
if s == nil {
return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
}
s.mu.Lock()
for sc := range s.activeConns {
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
}
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// ConfigureServer adds HTTP/2 support to a net/http Server.
//
// The configuration conf may be nil.
@ -168,21 +207,28 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
if conf == nil {
conf = new(Server)
}
conf.state = &serverInternalState{activeConns: make(map[*serverConn]struct{})}
if err := configureServer18(s, conf); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := configureServer19(s, conf); err != nil {
return err
}
if s.TLSConfig == nil {
s.TLSConfig = new(tls.Config)
} else if s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites != nil {
// If they already provided a CipherSuite list, return
// an error if it has a bad order or is missing
// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
const requiredCipher = tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
haveRequired := false
sawBad := false
for i, cs := range s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites {
if cs == requiredCipher {
switch cs {
case tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
// Alternative MTI cipher to not discourage ECDSA-only servers.
// See http://golang.org/cl/30721 for further information.
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
haveRequired = true
}
if isBadCipher(cs) {
@ -192,7 +238,7 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
}
}
if !haveRequired {
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing HTTP/2-required TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256")
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing an HTTP/2-required AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher.")
}
}
@ -292,7 +338,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
streams: make(map[uint32]*stream),
readFrameCh: make(chan readFrameResult),
wantWriteFrameCh: make(chan FrameWriteRequest, 8),
wantStartPushCh: make(chan startPushRequest, 8),
serveMsgCh: make(chan interface{}, 8),
wroteFrameCh: make(chan frameWriteResult, 1), // buffered; one send in writeFrameAsync
bodyReadCh: make(chan bodyReadMsg), // buffering doesn't matter either way
doneServing: make(chan struct{}),
@ -305,6 +351,9 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
pushEnabled: true,
}
s.state.registerConn(sc)
defer s.state.unregisterConn(sc)
// The net/http package sets the write deadline from the
// http.Server.WriteTimeout during the TLS handshake, but then
// passes the connection off to us with the deadline already set.
@ -405,10 +454,9 @@ type serverConn struct {
doneServing chan struct{} // closed when serverConn.serve ends
readFrameCh chan readFrameResult // written by serverConn.readFrames
wantWriteFrameCh chan FrameWriteRequest // from handlers -> serve
wantStartPushCh chan startPushRequest // from handlers -> serve
wroteFrameCh chan frameWriteResult // from writeFrameAsync -> serve, tickles more frame writes
bodyReadCh chan bodyReadMsg // from handlers -> serve
testHookCh chan func(int) // code to run on the serve loop
serveMsgCh chan interface{} // misc messages & code to send to / run on the serve loop
flow flow // conn-wide (not stream-specific) outbound flow control
inflow flow // conn-wide inbound flow control
tlsState *tls.ConnectionState // shared by all handlers, like net/http
@ -440,14 +488,15 @@ type serverConn struct {
inFrameScheduleLoop bool // whether we're in the scheduleFrameWrite loop
needToSendGoAway bool // we need to schedule a GOAWAY frame write
goAwayCode ErrCode
shutdownTimerCh <-chan time.Time // nil until used
shutdownTimer *time.Timer // nil until used
idleTimer *time.Timer // nil if unused
idleTimerCh <-chan time.Time // nil if unused
shutdownTimer *time.Timer // nil until used
idleTimer *time.Timer // nil if unused
// Owned by the writeFrameAsync goroutine:
headerWriteBuf bytes.Buffer
hpackEncoder *hpack.Encoder
// Used by startGracefulShutdown.
shutdownOnce sync.Once
}
func (sc *serverConn) maxHeaderListSize() uint32 {
@ -603,7 +652,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) condlogf(err error, format string, args ...interface{}) {
if err == nil {
return
}
if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || isClosedConnError(err) {
if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || isClosedConnError(err) || err == errPrefaceTimeout {
// Boring, expected errors.
sc.vlogf(format, args...)
} else {
@ -748,19 +797,15 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
sc.setConnState(http.StateIdle)
if sc.srv.IdleTimeout != 0 {
sc.idleTimer = time.NewTimer(sc.srv.IdleTimeout)
sc.idleTimer = time.AfterFunc(sc.srv.IdleTimeout, sc.onIdleTimer)
defer sc.idleTimer.Stop()
sc.idleTimerCh = sc.idleTimer.C
}
var gracefulShutdownCh <-chan struct{}
if sc.hs != nil {
gracefulShutdownCh = h1ServerShutdownChan(sc.hs)
}
go sc.readFrames() // closed by defer sc.conn.Close above
settingsTimer := time.NewTimer(firstSettingsTimeout)
settingsTimer := time.AfterFunc(firstSettingsTimeout, sc.onSettingsTimer)
defer settingsTimer.Stop()
loopNum := 0
for {
loopNum++
@ -771,8 +816,6 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
break
}
sc.writeFrame(wr)
case spr := <-sc.wantStartPushCh:
sc.startPush(spr)
case res := <-sc.wroteFrameCh:
sc.wroteFrame(res)
case res := <-sc.readFrameCh:
@ -780,36 +823,85 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
return
}
res.readMore()
if settingsTimer.C != nil {
if settingsTimer != nil {
settingsTimer.Stop()
settingsTimer.C = nil
settingsTimer = nil
}
case m := <-sc.bodyReadCh:
sc.noteBodyRead(m.st, m.n)
case <-settingsTimer.C:
sc.logf("timeout waiting for SETTINGS frames from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case <-gracefulShutdownCh:
gracefulShutdownCh = nil
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
case <-sc.shutdownTimerCh:
sc.vlogf("GOAWAY close timer fired; closing conn from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case <-sc.idleTimerCh:
sc.vlogf("connection is idle")
sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
case fn := <-sc.testHookCh:
fn(loopNum)
case msg := <-sc.serveMsgCh:
switch v := msg.(type) {
case func(int):
v(loopNum) // for testing
case *serverMessage:
switch v {
case settingsTimerMsg:
sc.logf("timeout waiting for SETTINGS frames from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case idleTimerMsg:
sc.vlogf("connection is idle")
sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
case shutdownTimerMsg:
sc.vlogf("GOAWAY close timer fired; closing conn from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case gracefulShutdownMsg:
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
default:
panic("unknown timer")
}
case *startPushRequest:
sc.startPush(v)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected type %T", v))
}
}
if sc.inGoAway && sc.curOpenStreams() == 0 && !sc.needToSendGoAway && !sc.writingFrame {
return
// Start the shutdown timer after sending a GOAWAY. When sending GOAWAY
// with no error code (graceful shutdown), don't start the timer until
// all open streams have been completed.
sentGoAway := sc.inGoAway && !sc.needToSendGoAway && !sc.writingFrame
gracefulShutdownComplete := sc.goAwayCode == ErrCodeNo && sc.curOpenStreams() == 0
if sentGoAway && sc.shutdownTimer == nil && (sc.goAwayCode != ErrCodeNo || gracefulShutdownComplete) {
sc.shutDownIn(goAwayTimeout)
}
}
}
// readPreface reads the ClientPreface greeting from the peer
// or returns an error on timeout or an invalid greeting.
func (sc *serverConn) awaitGracefulShutdown(sharedCh <-chan struct{}, privateCh chan struct{}) {
select {
case <-sc.doneServing:
case <-sharedCh:
close(privateCh)
}
}
type serverMessage int
// Message values sent to serveMsgCh.
var (
settingsTimerMsg = new(serverMessage)
idleTimerMsg = new(serverMessage)
shutdownTimerMsg = new(serverMessage)
gracefulShutdownMsg = new(serverMessage)
)
func (sc *serverConn) onSettingsTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(settingsTimerMsg) }
func (sc *serverConn) onIdleTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(idleTimerMsg) }
func (sc *serverConn) onShutdownTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(shutdownTimerMsg) }
func (sc *serverConn) sendServeMsg(msg interface{}) {
sc.serveG.checkNotOn() // NOT
select {
case sc.serveMsgCh <- msg:
case <-sc.doneServing:
}
}
var errPrefaceTimeout = errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
// readPreface reads the ClientPreface greeting from the peer or
// returns errPrefaceTimeout on timeout, or an error if the greeting
// is invalid.
func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
errc := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
@ -827,7 +919,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-timer.C:
return errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
return errPrefaceTimeout
case err := <-errc:
if err == nil {
if VerboseLogs {
@ -1125,33 +1217,43 @@ func (sc *serverConn) scheduleFrameWrite() {
sc.inFrameScheduleLoop = false
}
// startGracefulShutdown sends a GOAWAY with ErrCodeNo to tell the
// client we're gracefully shutting down. The connection isn't closed
// until all current streams are done.
// startGracefulShutdown gracefully shuts down a connection. This
// sends GOAWAY with ErrCodeNo to tell the client we're gracefully
// shutting down. The connection isn't closed until all current
// streams are done.
//
// startGracefulShutdown returns immediately; it does not wait until
// the connection has shut down.
func (sc *serverConn) startGracefulShutdown() {
sc.goAwayIn(ErrCodeNo, 0)
sc.serveG.checkNotOn() // NOT
sc.shutdownOnce.Do(func() { sc.sendServeMsg(gracefulShutdownMsg) })
}
// After sending GOAWAY, the connection will close after goAwayTimeout.
// If we close the connection immediately after sending GOAWAY, there may
// be unsent data in our kernel receive buffer, which will cause the kernel
// to send a TCP RST on close() instead of a FIN. This RST will abort the
// connection immediately, whether or not the client had received the GOAWAY.
//
// Ideally we should delay for at least 1 RTT + epsilon so the client has
// a chance to read the GOAWAY and stop sending messages. Measuring RTT
// is hard, so we approximate with 1 second. See golang.org/issue/18701.
//
// This is a var so it can be shorter in tests, where all requests uses the
// loopback interface making the expected RTT very small.
//
// TODO: configurable?
var goAwayTimeout = 1 * time.Second
func (sc *serverConn) startGracefulShutdownInternal() {
sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
}
func (sc *serverConn) goAway(code ErrCode) {
sc.serveG.check()
var forceCloseIn time.Duration
if code != ErrCodeNo {
forceCloseIn = 250 * time.Millisecond
} else {
// TODO: configurable
forceCloseIn = 1 * time.Second
}
sc.goAwayIn(code, forceCloseIn)
}
func (sc *serverConn) goAwayIn(code ErrCode, forceCloseIn time.Duration) {
sc.serveG.check()
if sc.inGoAway {
return
}
if forceCloseIn != 0 {
sc.shutDownIn(forceCloseIn)
}
sc.inGoAway = true
sc.needToSendGoAway = true
sc.goAwayCode = code
@ -1160,8 +1262,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) goAwayIn(code ErrCode, forceCloseIn time.Duration) {
func (sc *serverConn) shutDownIn(d time.Duration) {
sc.serveG.check()
sc.shutdownTimer = time.NewTimer(d)
sc.shutdownTimerCh = sc.shutdownTimer.C
sc.shutdownTimer = time.AfterFunc(d, sc.onShutdownTimer)
}
func (sc *serverConn) resetStream(se StreamError) {
@ -1359,7 +1460,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) closeStream(st *stream, err error) {
sc.idleTimer.Reset(sc.srv.IdleTimeout)
}
if h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled(sc.hs) {
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
}
}
if p := st.body; p != nil {
@ -1546,7 +1647,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processGoAway(f *GoAwayFrame) error {
} else {
sc.vlogf("http2: received GOAWAY %+v, starting graceful shutdown", f)
}
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.8
// We should not create any new streams, which means we should disable push.
sc.pushEnabled = false
@ -2163,6 +2264,7 @@ type responseWriterState struct {
wroteHeader bool // WriteHeader called (explicitly or implicitly). Not necessarily sent to user yet.
sentHeader bool // have we sent the header frame?
handlerDone bool // handler has finished
dirty bool // a Write failed; don't reuse this responseWriterState
sentContentLen int64 // non-zero if handler set a Content-Length header
wroteBytes int64
@ -2220,7 +2322,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
clen = strconv.Itoa(len(p))
}
_, hasContentType := rws.snapHeader["Content-Type"]
if !hasContentType && bodyAllowedForStatus(rws.status) {
if !hasContentType && bodyAllowedForStatus(rws.status) && len(p) > 0 {
ctype = http.DetectContentType(p)
}
var date string
@ -2244,6 +2346,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
date: date,
})
if err != nil {
rws.dirty = true
return 0, err
}
if endStream {
@ -2265,6 +2368,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
if len(p) > 0 || endStream {
// only send a 0 byte DATA frame if we're ending the stream.
if err := rws.conn.writeDataFromHandler(rws.stream, p, endStream); err != nil {
rws.dirty = true
return 0, err
}
}
@ -2276,6 +2380,9 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
trailers: rws.trailers,
endStream: true,
})
if err != nil {
rws.dirty = true
}
return len(p), err
}
return len(p), nil
@ -2383,6 +2490,24 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Header() http.Header {
return rws.handlerHeader
}
// checkWriteHeaderCode is a copy of net/http's checkWriteHeaderCode.
func checkWriteHeaderCode(code int) {
// Issue 22880: require valid WriteHeader status codes.
// For now we only enforce that it's three digits.
// In the future we might block things over 599 (600 and above aren't defined
// at http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#status.codes)
// and we might block under 200 (once we have more mature 1xx support).
// But for now any three digits.
//
// We used to send "HTTP/1.1 000 0" on the wire in responses but there's
// no equivalent bogus thing we can realistically send in HTTP/2,
// so we'll consistently panic instead and help people find their bugs
// early. (We can't return an error from WriteHeader even if we wanted to.)
if code < 100 || code > 999 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid WriteHeader code %v", code))
}
}
func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
rws := w.rws
if rws == nil {
@ -2393,6 +2518,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
func (rws *responseWriterState) writeHeader(code int) {
if !rws.wroteHeader {
checkWriteHeaderCode(code)
rws.wroteHeader = true
rws.status = code
if len(rws.handlerHeader) > 0 {
@ -2415,7 +2541,7 @@ func cloneHeader(h http.Header) http.Header {
//
// * Handler calls w.Write or w.WriteString ->
// * -> rws.bw (*bufio.Writer) ->
// * (Handler migth call Flush)
// * (Handler might call Flush)
// * -> chunkWriter{rws}
// * -> responseWriterState.writeChunk(p []byte)
// * -> responseWriterState.writeChunk (most of the magic; see comment there)
@ -2454,10 +2580,19 @@ func (w *responseWriter) write(lenData int, dataB []byte, dataS string) (n int,
func (w *responseWriter) handlerDone() {
rws := w.rws
dirty := rws.dirty
rws.handlerDone = true
w.Flush()
w.rws = nil
responseWriterStatePool.Put(rws)
if !dirty {
// Only recycle the pool if all prior Write calls to
// the serverConn goroutine completed successfully. If
// they returned earlier due to resets from the peer
// there might still be write goroutines outstanding
// from the serverConn referencing the rws memory. See
// issue 20704.
responseWriterStatePool.Put(rws)
}
}
// Push errors.
@ -2539,7 +2674,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
return fmt.Errorf("method %q must be GET or HEAD", opts.Method)
}
msg := startPushRequest{
msg := &startPushRequest{
parent: st,
method: opts.Method,
url: u,
@ -2552,7 +2687,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
return errClientDisconnected
case <-st.cw:
return errStreamClosed
case sc.wantStartPushCh <- msg:
case sc.serveMsgCh <- msg:
}
select {
@ -2574,7 +2709,7 @@ type startPushRequest struct {
done chan error
}
func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg *startPushRequest) {
sc.serveG.check()
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.6.
@ -2613,7 +2748,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
// A server that is unable to establish a new stream identifier can send a GOAWAY
// frame so that the client is forced to open a new connection for new streams.
if sc.maxPushPromiseID+2 >= 1<<31 {
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
return 0, ErrPushLimitReached
}
sc.maxPushPromiseID += 2
@ -2738,31 +2873,6 @@ var badTrailer = map[string]bool{
"Www-Authenticate": true,
}
// h1ServerShutdownChan returns a channel that will be closed when the
// provided *http.Server wants to shut down.
//
// This is a somewhat hacky way to get at http1 innards. It works
// when the http2 code is bundled into the net/http package in the
// standard library. The alternatives ended up making the cmd/go tool
// depend on http Servers. This is the lightest option for now.
// This is tested via the TestServeShutdown* tests in net/http.
func h1ServerShutdownChan(hs *http.Server) <-chan struct{} {
if fn := testh1ServerShutdownChan; fn != nil {
return fn(hs)
}
var x interface{} = hs
type I interface {
getDoneChan() <-chan struct{}
}
if hs, ok := x.(I); ok {
return hs.getDoneChan()
}
return nil
}
// optional test hook for h1ServerShutdownChan.
var testh1ServerShutdownChan func(hs *http.Server) <-chan struct{}
// h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled reports whether hs has its keep-alives
// disabled. See comments on h1ServerShutdownChan above for why
// the code is written this way.

View file

@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"io/ioutil"
"log"
"math"
mathrand "math/rand"
"net"
"net/http"
"sort"
@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ type Transport struct {
// MaxHeaderListSize is the http2 SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE to
// send in the initial settings frame. It is how many bytes
// of response headers are allow. Unlike the http2 spec, zero here
// of response headers are allowed. Unlike the http2 spec, zero here
// means to use a default limit (currently 10MB). If you actually
// want to advertise an ulimited value to the peer, Transport
// interprets the highest possible value here (0xffffffff or 1<<32-1)
@ -164,15 +165,17 @@ type ClientConn struct {
goAwayDebug string // goAway frame's debug data, retained as a string
streams map[uint32]*clientStream // client-initiated
nextStreamID uint32
pendingRequests int // requests blocked and waiting to be sent because len(streams) == maxConcurrentStreams
pings map[[8]byte]chan struct{} // in flight ping data to notification channel
bw *bufio.Writer
br *bufio.Reader
fr *Framer
lastActive time.Time
// Settings from peer: (also guarded by mu)
maxFrameSize uint32
maxConcurrentStreams uint32
initialWindowSize uint32
maxFrameSize uint32
maxConcurrentStreams uint32
peerMaxHeaderListSize uint64
initialWindowSize uint32
hbuf bytes.Buffer // HPACK encoder writes into this
henc *hpack.Encoder
@ -216,35 +219,45 @@ type clientStream struct {
resTrailer *http.Header // client's Response.Trailer
}
// awaitRequestCancel runs in its own goroutine and waits for the user
// to cancel a RoundTrip request, its context to expire, or for the
// request to be done (any way it might be removed from the cc.streams
// map: peer reset, successful completion, TCP connection breakage,
// etc)
func (cs *clientStream) awaitRequestCancel(req *http.Request) {
// awaitRequestCancel waits for the user to cancel a request or for the done
// channel to be signaled. A non-nil error is returned only if the request was
// canceled.
func awaitRequestCancel(req *http.Request, done <-chan struct{}) error {
ctx := reqContext(req)
if req.Cancel == nil && ctx.Done() == nil {
return
return nil
}
select {
case <-req.Cancel:
cs.cancelStream()
cs.bufPipe.CloseWithError(errRequestCanceled)
return errRequestCanceled
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-done:
return nil
}
}
// awaitRequestCancel waits for the user to cancel a request, its context to
// expire, or for the request to be done (any way it might be removed from the
// cc.streams map: peer reset, successful completion, TCP connection breakage,
// etc). If the request is canceled, then cs will be canceled and closed.
func (cs *clientStream) awaitRequestCancel(req *http.Request) {
if err := awaitRequestCancel(req, cs.done); err != nil {
cs.cancelStream()
cs.bufPipe.CloseWithError(ctx.Err())
case <-cs.done:
cs.bufPipe.CloseWithError(err)
}
}
func (cs *clientStream) cancelStream() {
cs.cc.mu.Lock()
cc := cs.cc
cc.mu.Lock()
didReset := cs.didReset
cs.didReset = true
cs.cc.mu.Unlock()
cc.mu.Unlock()
if !didReset {
cs.cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, ErrCodeCancel, nil)
cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, ErrCodeCancel, nil)
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
}
}
@ -261,6 +274,13 @@ func (cs *clientStream) checkResetOrDone() error {
}
}
func (cs *clientStream) getStartedWrite() bool {
cc := cs.cc
cc.mu.Lock()
defer cc.mu.Unlock()
return cs.startedWrite
}
func (cs *clientStream) abortRequestBodyWrite(err error) {
if err == nil {
panic("nil error")
@ -286,7 +306,26 @@ func (sew stickyErrWriter) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
return
}
var ErrNoCachedConn = errors.New("http2: no cached connection was available")
// noCachedConnError is the concrete type of ErrNoCachedConn, which
// needs to be detected by net/http regardless of whether it's its
// bundled version (in h2_bundle.go with a rewritten type name) or
// from a user's x/net/http2. As such, as it has a unique method name
// (IsHTTP2NoCachedConnError) that net/http sniffs for via func
// isNoCachedConnError.
type noCachedConnError struct{}
func (noCachedConnError) IsHTTP2NoCachedConnError() {}
func (noCachedConnError) Error() string { return "http2: no cached connection was available" }
// isNoCachedConnError reports whether err is of type noCachedConnError
// or its equivalent renamed type in net/http2's h2_bundle.go. Both types
// may coexist in the same running program.
func isNoCachedConnError(err error) bool {
_, ok := err.(interface{ IsHTTP2NoCachedConnError() })
return ok
}
var ErrNoCachedConn error = noCachedConnError{}
// RoundTripOpt are options for the Transport.RoundTripOpt method.
type RoundTripOpt struct {
@ -329,17 +368,28 @@ func (t *Transport) RoundTripOpt(req *http.Request, opt RoundTripOpt) (*http.Res
}
addr := authorityAddr(req.URL.Scheme, req.URL.Host)
for {
for retry := 0; ; retry++ {
cc, err := t.connPool().GetClientConn(req, addr)
if err != nil {
t.vlogf("http2: Transport failed to get client conn for %s: %v", addr, err)
return nil, err
}
traceGotConn(req, cc)
res, err := cc.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
if req, err = shouldRetryRequest(req, err); err == nil {
continue
res, gotErrAfterReqBodyWrite, err := cc.roundTrip(req)
if err != nil && retry <= 6 {
if req, err = shouldRetryRequest(req, err, gotErrAfterReqBodyWrite); err == nil {
// After the first retry, do exponential backoff with 10% jitter.
if retry == 0 {
continue
}
backoff := float64(uint(1) << (uint(retry) - 1))
backoff += backoff * (0.1 * mathrand.Float64())
select {
case <-time.After(time.Second * time.Duration(backoff)):
continue
case <-reqContext(req).Done():
return nil, reqContext(req).Err()
}
}
}
if err != nil {
@ -360,43 +410,50 @@ func (t *Transport) CloseIdleConnections() {
}
var (
errClientConnClosed = errors.New("http2: client conn is closed")
errClientConnUnusable = errors.New("http2: client conn not usable")
errClientConnGotGoAway = errors.New("http2: Transport received Server's graceful shutdown GOAWAY")
errClientConnGotGoAwayAfterSomeReqBody = errors.New("http2: Transport received Server's graceful shutdown GOAWAY; some request body already written")
errClientConnClosed = errors.New("http2: client conn is closed")
errClientConnUnusable = errors.New("http2: client conn not usable")
errClientConnGotGoAway = errors.New("http2: Transport received Server's graceful shutdown GOAWAY")
)
// shouldRetryRequest is called by RoundTrip when a request fails to get
// response headers. It is always called with a non-nil error.
// It returns either a request to retry (either the same request, or a
// modified clone), or an error if the request can't be replayed.
func shouldRetryRequest(req *http.Request, err error) (*http.Request, error) {
switch err {
default:
func shouldRetryRequest(req *http.Request, err error, afterBodyWrite bool) (*http.Request, error) {
if !canRetryError(err) {
return nil, err
case errClientConnUnusable, errClientConnGotGoAway:
return req, nil
case errClientConnGotGoAwayAfterSomeReqBody:
// If the Body is nil (or http.NoBody), it's safe to reuse
// this request and its Body.
if req.Body == nil || reqBodyIsNoBody(req.Body) {
return req, nil
}
// Otherwise we depend on the Request having its GetBody
// func defined.
getBody := reqGetBody(req) // Go 1.8: getBody = req.GetBody
if getBody == nil {
return nil, errors.New("http2: Transport: peer server initiated graceful shutdown after some of Request.Body was written; define Request.GetBody to avoid this error")
}
body, err := getBody()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newReq := *req
newReq.Body = body
return &newReq, nil
}
if !afterBodyWrite {
return req, nil
}
// If the Body is nil (or http.NoBody), it's safe to reuse
// this request and its Body.
if req.Body == nil || reqBodyIsNoBody(req.Body) {
return req, nil
}
// Otherwise we depend on the Request having its GetBody
// func defined.
getBody := reqGetBody(req) // Go 1.8: getBody = req.GetBody
if getBody == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("http2: Transport: cannot retry err [%v] after Request.Body was written; define Request.GetBody to avoid this error", err)
}
body, err := getBody()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newReq := *req
newReq.Body = body
return &newReq, nil
}
func canRetryError(err error) bool {
if err == errClientConnUnusable || err == errClientConnGotGoAway {
return true
}
if se, ok := err.(StreamError); ok {
return se.Code == ErrCodeRefusedStream
}
return false
}
func (t *Transport) dialClientConn(addr string, singleUse bool) (*ClientConn, error) {
@ -474,17 +531,18 @@ func (t *Transport) NewClientConn(c net.Conn) (*ClientConn, error) {
func (t *Transport) newClientConn(c net.Conn, singleUse bool) (*ClientConn, error) {
cc := &ClientConn{
t: t,
tconn: c,
readerDone: make(chan struct{}),
nextStreamID: 1,
maxFrameSize: 16 << 10, // spec default
initialWindowSize: 65535, // spec default
maxConcurrentStreams: 1000, // "infinite", per spec. 1000 seems good enough.
streams: make(map[uint32]*clientStream),
singleUse: singleUse,
wantSettingsAck: true,
pings: make(map[[8]byte]chan struct{}),
t: t,
tconn: c,
readerDone: make(chan struct{}),
nextStreamID: 1,
maxFrameSize: 16 << 10, // spec default
initialWindowSize: 65535, // spec default
maxConcurrentStreams: 1000, // "infinite", per spec. 1000 seems good enough.
peerMaxHeaderListSize: 0xffffffffffffffff, // "infinite", per spec. Use 2^64-1 instead.
streams: make(map[uint32]*clientStream),
singleUse: singleUse,
wantSettingsAck: true,
pings: make(map[[8]byte]chan struct{}),
}
if d := t.idleConnTimeout(); d != 0 {
cc.idleTimeout = d
@ -560,6 +618,8 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) setGoAway(f *GoAwayFrame) {
}
}
// CanTakeNewRequest reports whether the connection can take a new request,
// meaning it has not been closed or received or sent a GOAWAY.
func (cc *ClientConn) CanTakeNewRequest() bool {
cc.mu.Lock()
defer cc.mu.Unlock()
@ -571,8 +631,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) canTakeNewRequestLocked() bool {
return false
}
return cc.goAway == nil && !cc.closed &&
int64(len(cc.streams)+1) < int64(cc.maxConcurrentStreams) &&
cc.nextStreamID < math.MaxInt32
int64(cc.nextStreamID)+int64(cc.pendingRequests) < math.MaxInt32
}
// onIdleTimeout is called from a time.AfterFunc goroutine. It will
@ -694,7 +753,7 @@ func checkConnHeaders(req *http.Request) error {
// req.ContentLength, where 0 actually means zero (not unknown) and -1
// means unknown.
func actualContentLength(req *http.Request) int64 {
if req.Body == nil {
if req.Body == nil || reqBodyIsNoBody(req.Body) {
return 0
}
if req.ContentLength != 0 {
@ -704,8 +763,13 @@ func actualContentLength(req *http.Request) int64 {
}
func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
resp, _, err := cc.roundTrip(req)
return resp, err
}
func (cc *ClientConn) roundTrip(req *http.Request) (res *http.Response, gotErrAfterReqBodyWrite bool, err error) {
if err := checkConnHeaders(req); err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, false, err
}
if cc.idleTimer != nil {
cc.idleTimer.Stop()
@ -713,20 +777,19 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
trailers, err := commaSeparatedTrailers(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, false, err
}
hasTrailers := trailers != ""
cc.mu.Lock()
cc.lastActive = time.Now()
if cc.closed || !cc.canTakeNewRequestLocked() {
if err := cc.awaitOpenSlotForRequest(req); err != nil {
cc.mu.Unlock()
return nil, errClientConnUnusable
return nil, false, err
}
body := req.Body
hasBody := body != nil
contentLen := actualContentLength(req)
hasBody := contentLen != 0
// TODO(bradfitz): this is a copy of the logic in net/http. Unify somewhere?
var requestedGzip bool
@ -755,7 +818,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
hdrs, err := cc.encodeHeaders(req, requestedGzip, trailers, contentLen)
if err != nil {
cc.mu.Unlock()
return nil, err
return nil, false, err
}
cs := cc.newStream()
@ -767,7 +830,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
cc.wmu.Lock()
endStream := !hasBody && !hasTrailers
werr := cc.writeHeaders(cs.ID, endStream, hdrs)
werr := cc.writeHeaders(cs.ID, endStream, int(cc.maxFrameSize), hdrs)
cc.wmu.Unlock()
traceWroteHeaders(cs.trace)
cc.mu.Unlock()
@ -781,7 +844,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
// Don't bother sending a RST_STREAM (our write already failed;
// no need to keep writing)
traceWroteRequest(cs.trace, werr)
return nil, werr
return nil, false, werr
}
var respHeaderTimer <-chan time.Time
@ -800,7 +863,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
bodyWritten := false
ctx := reqContext(req)
handleReadLoopResponse := func(re resAndError) (*http.Response, error) {
handleReadLoopResponse := func(re resAndError) (*http.Response, bool, error) {
res := re.res
if re.err != nil || res.StatusCode > 299 {
// On error or status code 3xx, 4xx, 5xx, etc abort any
@ -816,19 +879,12 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
cs.abortRequestBodyWrite(errStopReqBodyWrite)
}
if re.err != nil {
if re.err == errClientConnGotGoAway {
cc.mu.Lock()
if cs.startedWrite {
re.err = errClientConnGotGoAwayAfterSomeReqBody
}
cc.mu.Unlock()
}
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
return nil, re.err
return nil, cs.getStartedWrite(), re.err
}
res.Request = req
res.TLS = cc.tlsState
return res, nil
return res, false, nil
}
for {
@ -836,37 +892,37 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
case re := <-readLoopResCh:
return handleReadLoopResponse(re)
case <-respHeaderTimer:
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
if !hasBody || bodyWritten {
cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, ErrCodeCancel, nil)
} else {
bodyWriter.cancel()
cs.abortRequestBodyWrite(errStopReqBodyWriteAndCancel)
}
return nil, errTimeout
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
return nil, cs.getStartedWrite(), errTimeout
case <-ctx.Done():
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
if !hasBody || bodyWritten {
cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, ErrCodeCancel, nil)
} else {
bodyWriter.cancel()
cs.abortRequestBodyWrite(errStopReqBodyWriteAndCancel)
}
return nil, ctx.Err()
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
return nil, cs.getStartedWrite(), ctx.Err()
case <-req.Cancel:
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
if !hasBody || bodyWritten {
cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, ErrCodeCancel, nil)
} else {
bodyWriter.cancel()
cs.abortRequestBodyWrite(errStopReqBodyWriteAndCancel)
}
return nil, errRequestCanceled
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
return nil, cs.getStartedWrite(), errRequestCanceled
case <-cs.peerReset:
// processResetStream already removed the
// stream from the streams map; no need for
// forgetStreamID.
return nil, cs.resetErr
return nil, cs.getStartedWrite(), cs.resetErr
case err := <-bodyWriter.resc:
// Prefer the read loop's response, if available. Issue 16102.
select {
@ -875,7 +931,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
default:
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, cs.getStartedWrite(), err
}
bodyWritten = true
if d := cc.responseHeaderTimeout(); d != 0 {
@ -887,14 +943,52 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
}
}
// awaitOpenSlotForRequest waits until len(streams) < maxConcurrentStreams.
// Must hold cc.mu.
func (cc *ClientConn) awaitOpenSlotForRequest(req *http.Request) error {
var waitingForConn chan struct{}
var waitingForConnErr error // guarded by cc.mu
for {
cc.lastActive = time.Now()
if cc.closed || !cc.canTakeNewRequestLocked() {
return errClientConnUnusable
}
if int64(len(cc.streams))+1 <= int64(cc.maxConcurrentStreams) {
if waitingForConn != nil {
close(waitingForConn)
}
return nil
}
// Unfortunately, we cannot wait on a condition variable and channel at
// the same time, so instead, we spin up a goroutine to check if the
// request is canceled while we wait for a slot to open in the connection.
if waitingForConn == nil {
waitingForConn = make(chan struct{})
go func() {
if err := awaitRequestCancel(req, waitingForConn); err != nil {
cc.mu.Lock()
waitingForConnErr = err
cc.cond.Broadcast()
cc.mu.Unlock()
}
}()
}
cc.pendingRequests++
cc.cond.Wait()
cc.pendingRequests--
if waitingForConnErr != nil {
return waitingForConnErr
}
}
}
// requires cc.wmu be held
func (cc *ClientConn) writeHeaders(streamID uint32, endStream bool, hdrs []byte) error {
func (cc *ClientConn) writeHeaders(streamID uint32, endStream bool, maxFrameSize int, hdrs []byte) error {
first := true // first frame written (HEADERS is first, then CONTINUATION)
frameSize := int(cc.maxFrameSize)
for len(hdrs) > 0 && cc.werr == nil {
chunk := hdrs
if len(chunk) > frameSize {
chunk = chunk[:frameSize]
if len(chunk) > maxFrameSize {
chunk = chunk[:maxFrameSize]
}
hdrs = hdrs[len(chunk):]
endHeaders := len(hdrs) == 0
@ -1002,17 +1096,26 @@ func (cs *clientStream) writeRequestBody(body io.Reader, bodyCloser io.Closer) (
var trls []byte
if hasTrailers {
cc.mu.Lock()
defer cc.mu.Unlock()
trls = cc.encodeTrailers(req)
trls, err = cc.encodeTrailers(req)
cc.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil {
cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, ErrCodeInternal, err)
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
return err
}
}
cc.mu.Lock()
maxFrameSize := int(cc.maxFrameSize)
cc.mu.Unlock()
cc.wmu.Lock()
defer cc.wmu.Unlock()
// Two ways to send END_STREAM: either with trailers, or
// with an empty DATA frame.
if len(trls) > 0 {
err = cc.writeHeaders(cs.ID, true, trls)
err = cc.writeHeaders(cs.ID, true, maxFrameSize, trls)
} else {
err = cc.fr.WriteData(cs.ID, true, nil)
}
@ -1106,62 +1209,86 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) encodeHeaders(req *http.Request, addGzipHeader bool, trail
}
}
// 8.1.2.3 Request Pseudo-Header Fields
// The :path pseudo-header field includes the path and query parts of the
// target URI (the path-absolute production and optionally a '?' character
// followed by the query production (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of
// [RFC3986]).
cc.writeHeader(":authority", host)
cc.writeHeader(":method", req.Method)
if req.Method != "CONNECT" {
cc.writeHeader(":path", path)
cc.writeHeader(":scheme", req.URL.Scheme)
}
if trailers != "" {
cc.writeHeader("trailer", trailers)
enumerateHeaders := func(f func(name, value string)) {
// 8.1.2.3 Request Pseudo-Header Fields
// The :path pseudo-header field includes the path and query parts of the
// target URI (the path-absolute production and optionally a '?' character
// followed by the query production (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of
// [RFC3986]).
f(":authority", host)
f(":method", req.Method)
if req.Method != "CONNECT" {
f(":path", path)
f(":scheme", req.URL.Scheme)
}
if trailers != "" {
f("trailer", trailers)
}
var didUA bool
for k, vv := range req.Header {
if strings.EqualFold(k, "host") || strings.EqualFold(k, "content-length") {
// Host is :authority, already sent.
// Content-Length is automatic, set below.
continue
} else if strings.EqualFold(k, "connection") || strings.EqualFold(k, "proxy-connection") ||
strings.EqualFold(k, "transfer-encoding") || strings.EqualFold(k, "upgrade") ||
strings.EqualFold(k, "keep-alive") {
// Per 8.1.2.2 Connection-Specific Header
// Fields, don't send connection-specific
// fields. We have already checked if any
// are error-worthy so just ignore the rest.
continue
} else if strings.EqualFold(k, "user-agent") {
// Match Go's http1 behavior: at most one
// User-Agent. If set to nil or empty string,
// then omit it. Otherwise if not mentioned,
// include the default (below).
didUA = true
if len(vv) < 1 {
continue
}
vv = vv[:1]
if vv[0] == "" {
continue
}
}
for _, v := range vv {
f(k, v)
}
}
if shouldSendReqContentLength(req.Method, contentLength) {
f("content-length", strconv.FormatInt(contentLength, 10))
}
if addGzipHeader {
f("accept-encoding", "gzip")
}
if !didUA {
f("user-agent", defaultUserAgent)
}
}
var didUA bool
for k, vv := range req.Header {
lowKey := strings.ToLower(k)
switch lowKey {
case "host", "content-length":
// Host is :authority, already sent.
// Content-Length is automatic, set below.
continue
case "connection", "proxy-connection", "transfer-encoding", "upgrade", "keep-alive":
// Per 8.1.2.2 Connection-Specific Header
// Fields, don't send connection-specific
// fields. We have already checked if any
// are error-worthy so just ignore the rest.
continue
case "user-agent":
// Match Go's http1 behavior: at most one
// User-Agent. If set to nil or empty string,
// then omit it. Otherwise if not mentioned,
// include the default (below).
didUA = true
if len(vv) < 1 {
continue
}
vv = vv[:1]
if vv[0] == "" {
continue
}
}
for _, v := range vv {
cc.writeHeader(lowKey, v)
}
}
if shouldSendReqContentLength(req.Method, contentLength) {
cc.writeHeader("content-length", strconv.FormatInt(contentLength, 10))
}
if addGzipHeader {
cc.writeHeader("accept-encoding", "gzip")
}
if !didUA {
cc.writeHeader("user-agent", defaultUserAgent)
// Do a first pass over the headers counting bytes to ensure
// we don't exceed cc.peerMaxHeaderListSize. This is done as a
// separate pass before encoding the headers to prevent
// modifying the hpack state.
hlSize := uint64(0)
enumerateHeaders(func(name, value string) {
hf := hpack.HeaderField{Name: name, Value: value}
hlSize += uint64(hf.Size())
})
if hlSize > cc.peerMaxHeaderListSize {
return nil, errRequestHeaderListSize
}
// Header list size is ok. Write the headers.
enumerateHeaders(func(name, value string) {
cc.writeHeader(strings.ToLower(name), value)
})
return cc.hbuf.Bytes(), nil
}
@ -1188,17 +1315,29 @@ func shouldSendReqContentLength(method string, contentLength int64) bool {
}
// requires cc.mu be held.
func (cc *ClientConn) encodeTrailers(req *http.Request) []byte {
func (cc *ClientConn) encodeTrailers(req *http.Request) ([]byte, error) {
cc.hbuf.Reset()
hlSize := uint64(0)
for k, vv := range req.Trailer {
// Transfer-Encoding, etc.. have already been filter at the
for _, v := range vv {
hf := hpack.HeaderField{Name: k, Value: v}
hlSize += uint64(hf.Size())
}
}
if hlSize > cc.peerMaxHeaderListSize {
return nil, errRequestHeaderListSize
}
for k, vv := range req.Trailer {
// Transfer-Encoding, etc.. have already been filtered at the
// start of RoundTrip
lowKey := strings.ToLower(k)
for _, v := range vv {
cc.writeHeader(lowKey, v)
}
}
return cc.hbuf.Bytes()
return cc.hbuf.Bytes(), nil
}
func (cc *ClientConn) writeHeader(name, value string) {
@ -1246,7 +1385,9 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) streamByID(id uint32, andRemove bool) *clientStream {
cc.idleTimer.Reset(cc.idleTimeout)
}
close(cs.done)
cc.cond.Broadcast() // wake up checkResetOrDone via clientStream.awaitFlowControl
// Wake up checkResetOrDone via clientStream.awaitFlowControl and
// wake up RoundTrip if there is a pending request.
cc.cond.Broadcast()
}
return cs
}
@ -1254,17 +1395,12 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) streamByID(id uint32, andRemove bool) *clientStream {
// clientConnReadLoop is the state owned by the clientConn's frame-reading readLoop.
type clientConnReadLoop struct {
cc *ClientConn
activeRes map[uint32]*clientStream // keyed by streamID
closeWhenIdle bool
}
// readLoop runs in its own goroutine and reads and dispatches frames.
func (cc *ClientConn) readLoop() {
rl := &clientConnReadLoop{
cc: cc,
activeRes: make(map[uint32]*clientStream),
}
rl := &clientConnReadLoop{cc: cc}
defer rl.cleanup()
cc.readerErr = rl.run()
if ce, ok := cc.readerErr.(ConnectionError); ok {
@ -1319,10 +1455,8 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) cleanup() {
} else if err == io.EOF {
err = io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
}
for _, cs := range rl.activeRes {
cs.bufPipe.CloseWithError(err)
}
for _, cs := range cc.streams {
cs.bufPipe.CloseWithError(err) // no-op if already closed
select {
case cs.resc <- resAndError{err: err}:
default:
@ -1345,8 +1479,9 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) run() error {
cc.vlogf("http2: Transport readFrame error on conn %p: (%T) %v", cc, err, err)
}
if se, ok := err.(StreamError); ok {
if cs := cc.streamByID(se.StreamID, true /*ended; remove it*/); cs != nil {
if cs := cc.streamByID(se.StreamID, false); cs != nil {
cs.cc.writeStreamReset(cs.ID, se.Code, err)
cs.cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
if se.Cause == nil {
se.Cause = cc.fr.errDetail
}
@ -1399,7 +1534,7 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) run() error {
}
return err
}
if rl.closeWhenIdle && gotReply && maybeIdle && len(rl.activeRes) == 0 {
if rl.closeWhenIdle && gotReply && maybeIdle {
cc.closeIfIdle()
}
}
@ -1407,13 +1542,31 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) run() error {
func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
cc := rl.cc
cs := cc.streamByID(f.StreamID, f.StreamEnded())
cs := cc.streamByID(f.StreamID, false)
if cs == nil {
// We'd get here if we canceled a request while the
// server had its response still in flight. So if this
// was just something we canceled, ignore it.
return nil
}
if f.StreamEnded() {
// Issue 20521: If the stream has ended, streamByID() causes
// clientStream.done to be closed, which causes the request's bodyWriter
// to be closed with an errStreamClosed, which may be received by
// clientConn.RoundTrip before the result of processing these headers.
// Deferring stream closure allows the header processing to occur first.
// clientConn.RoundTrip may still receive the bodyWriter error first, but
// the fix for issue 16102 prioritises any response.
//
// Issue 22413: If there is no request body, we should close the
// stream before writing to cs.resc so that the stream is closed
// immediately once RoundTrip returns.
if cs.req.Body != nil {
defer cc.forgetStreamID(f.StreamID)
} else {
cc.forgetStreamID(f.StreamID)
}
}
if !cs.firstByte {
if cs.trace != nil {
// TODO(bradfitz): move first response byte earlier,
@ -1437,6 +1590,7 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
}
// Any other error type is a stream error.
cs.cc.writeStreamReset(f.StreamID, ErrCodeProtocol, err)
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
cs.resc <- resAndError{err: err}
return nil // return nil from process* funcs to keep conn alive
}
@ -1444,9 +1598,6 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
// (nil, nil) special case. See handleResponse docs.
return nil
}
if res.Body != noBody {
rl.activeRes[cs.ID] = cs
}
cs.resTrailer = &res.Trailer
cs.resc <- resAndError{res: res}
return nil
@ -1466,11 +1617,11 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) handleResponse(cs *clientStream, f *MetaHeadersFra
status := f.PseudoValue("status")
if status == "" {
return nil, errors.New("missing status pseudo header")
return nil, errors.New("malformed response from server: missing status pseudo header")
}
statusCode, err := strconv.Atoi(status)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("malformed non-numeric status pseudo header")
return nil, errors.New("malformed response from server: malformed non-numeric status pseudo header")
}
if statusCode == 100 {
@ -1655,6 +1806,7 @@ func (b transportResponseBody) Close() error {
cc.wmu.Lock()
if !serverSentStreamEnd {
cc.fr.WriteRSTStream(cs.ID, ErrCodeCancel)
cs.didReset = true
}
// Return connection-level flow control.
if unread > 0 {
@ -1667,6 +1819,7 @@ func (b transportResponseBody) Close() error {
}
cs.bufPipe.BreakWithError(errClosedResponseBody)
cc.forgetStreamID(cs.ID)
return nil
}
@ -1701,13 +1854,23 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
}
return nil
}
if !cs.firstByte {
cc.logf("protocol error: received DATA before a HEADERS frame")
rl.endStreamError(cs, StreamError{
StreamID: f.StreamID,
Code: ErrCodeProtocol,
})
return nil
}
if f.Length > 0 {
if len(data) > 0 && cs.bufPipe.b == nil {
// Data frame after it's already closed?
cc.logf("http2: Transport received DATA frame for closed stream; closing connection")
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
if cs.req.Method == "HEAD" && len(data) > 0 {
cc.logf("protocol error: received DATA on a HEAD request")
rl.endStreamError(cs, StreamError{
StreamID: f.StreamID,
Code: ErrCodeProtocol,
})
return nil
}
// Check connection-level flow control.
cc.mu.Lock()
if cs.inflow.available() >= int32(f.Length) {
@ -1718,16 +1881,27 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
}
// Return any padded flow control now, since we won't
// refund it later on body reads.
if pad := int32(f.Length) - int32(len(data)); pad > 0 {
cs.inflow.add(pad)
cc.inflow.add(pad)
var refund int
if pad := int(f.Length) - len(data); pad > 0 {
refund += pad
}
// Return len(data) now if the stream is already closed,
// since data will never be read.
didReset := cs.didReset
if didReset {
refund += len(data)
}
if refund > 0 {
cc.inflow.add(int32(refund))
cc.wmu.Lock()
cc.fr.WriteWindowUpdate(0, uint32(pad))
cc.fr.WriteWindowUpdate(cs.ID, uint32(pad))
cc.fr.WriteWindowUpdate(0, uint32(refund))
if !didReset {
cs.inflow.add(int32(refund))
cc.fr.WriteWindowUpdate(cs.ID, uint32(refund))
}
cc.bw.Flush()
cc.wmu.Unlock()
}
didReset := cs.didReset
cc.mu.Unlock()
if len(data) > 0 && !didReset {
@ -1758,11 +1932,10 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) endStreamError(cs *clientStream, err error) {
err = io.EOF
code = cs.copyTrailers
}
cs.bufPipe.closeWithErrorAndCode(err, code)
delete(rl.activeRes, cs.ID)
if isConnectionCloseRequest(cs.req) {
rl.closeWhenIdle = true
}
cs.bufPipe.closeWithErrorAndCode(err, code)
select {
case cs.resc <- resAndError{err: err}:
@ -1810,6 +1983,8 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processSettings(f *SettingsFrame) error {
cc.maxFrameSize = s.Val
case SettingMaxConcurrentStreams:
cc.maxConcurrentStreams = s.Val
case SettingMaxHeaderListSize:
cc.peerMaxHeaderListSize = uint64(s.Val)
case SettingInitialWindowSize:
// Values above the maximum flow-control
// window size of 2^31-1 MUST be treated as a
@ -1887,7 +2062,6 @@ func (rl *clientConnReadLoop) processResetStream(f *RSTStreamFrame) error {
cs.bufPipe.CloseWithError(err)
cs.cc.cond.Broadcast() // wake up checkResetOrDone via clientStream.awaitFlowControl
}
delete(rl.activeRes, cs.ID)
return nil
}
@ -1976,6 +2150,7 @@ func (cc *ClientConn) writeStreamReset(streamID uint32, code ErrCode, err error)
var (
errResponseHeaderListSize = errors.New("http2: response header list larger than advertised limit")
errRequestHeaderListSize = errors.New("http2: request header list larger than peer's advertised limit")
errPseudoTrailers = errors.New("http2: invalid pseudo header in trailers")
)

View file

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"log"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
@ -90,11 +89,7 @@ type writeGoAway struct {
func (p *writeGoAway) writeFrame(ctx writeContext) error {
err := ctx.Framer().WriteGoAway(p.maxStreamID, p.code, nil)
if p.code != 0 {
ctx.Flush() // ignore error: we're hanging up on them anyway
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
ctx.CloseConn()
}
ctx.Flush() // ignore error: we're hanging up on them anyway
return err
}

View file

@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ type PriorityWriteSchedulerConfig struct {
}
// NewPriorityWriteScheduler constructs a WriteScheduler that schedules
// frames by following HTTP/2 priorities as described in RFC 7340 Section 5.3.
// frames by following HTTP/2 priorities as described in RFC 7540 Section 5.3.
// If cfg is nil, default options are used.
func NewPriorityWriteScheduler(cfg *PriorityWriteSchedulerConfig) WriteScheduler {
if cfg == nil {

126
vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/idna.go generated vendored
View file

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"unicode/utf8"
"golang.org/x/text/secure/bidirule"
"golang.org/x/text/unicode/bidi"
"golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm"
)
@ -67,6 +68,15 @@ func VerifyDNSLength(verify bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.verifyDNSLength = verify }
}
// RemoveLeadingDots removes leading label separators. Leading runes that map to
// dots, such as U+3002 IDEOGRAPHIC FULL STOP, are removed as well.
//
// This is the behavior suggested by the UTS #46 and is adopted by some
// browsers.
func RemoveLeadingDots(remove bool) Option {
return func(o *options) { o.removeLeadingDots = remove }
}
// ValidateLabels sets whether to check the mandatory label validation criteria
// as defined in Section 5.4 of RFC 5891. This includes testing for correct use
// of hyphens ('-'), normalization, validity of runes, and the context rules.
@ -83,7 +93,7 @@ func ValidateLabels(enable bool) Option {
}
}
// StrictDomainName limits the set of permissable ASCII characters to those
// StrictDomainName limits the set of permissible ASCII characters to those
// allowed in domain names as defined in RFC 1034 (A-Z, a-z, 0-9 and the
// hyphen). This is set by default for MapForLookup and ValidateForRegistration.
//
@ -137,10 +147,11 @@ func MapForLookup() Option {
}
type options struct {
transitional bool
useSTD3Rules bool
validateLabels bool
verifyDNSLength bool
transitional bool
useSTD3Rules bool
validateLabels bool
verifyDNSLength bool
removeLeadingDots bool
trie *idnaTrie
@ -149,14 +160,14 @@ type options struct {
// mapping implements a validation and mapping step as defined in RFC 5895
// or UTS 46, tailored to, for example, domain registration or lookup.
mapping func(p *Profile, s string) (string, error)
mapping func(p *Profile, s string) (mapped string, isBidi bool, err error)
// bidirule, if specified, checks whether s conforms to the Bidi Rule
// defined in RFC 5893.
bidirule func(s string) bool
}
// A Profile defines the configuration of a IDNA mapper.
// A Profile defines the configuration of an IDNA mapper.
type Profile struct {
options
}
@ -289,12 +300,16 @@ func (e runeError) Error() string {
// see http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46.
func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
var err error
var isBidi bool
if p.mapping != nil {
s, err = p.mapping(p, s)
s, isBidi, err = p.mapping(p, s)
}
// Remove leading empty labels.
for ; len(s) > 0 && s[0] == '.'; s = s[1:] {
if p.removeLeadingDots {
for ; len(s) > 0 && s[0] == '.'; s = s[1:] {
}
}
// TODO: allow for a quick check of the tables data.
// It seems like we should only create this error on ToASCII, but the
// UTS 46 conformance tests suggests we should always check this.
if err == nil && p.verifyDNSLength && s == "" {
@ -320,6 +335,7 @@ func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
// Spec says keep the old label.
continue
}
isBidi = isBidi || bidirule.DirectionString(u) != bidi.LeftToRight
labels.set(u)
if err == nil && p.validateLabels {
err = p.fromPuny(p, u)
@ -334,6 +350,14 @@ func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
err = p.validateLabel(label)
}
}
if isBidi && p.bidirule != nil && err == nil {
for labels.reset(); !labels.done(); labels.next() {
if !p.bidirule(labels.label()) {
err = &labelError{s, "B"}
break
}
}
}
if toASCII {
for labels.reset(); !labels.done(); labels.next() {
label := labels.label()
@ -365,41 +389,77 @@ func (p *Profile) process(s string, toASCII bool) (string, error) {
return s, err
}
func normalize(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
return norm.NFC.String(s), nil
func normalize(p *Profile, s string) (mapped string, isBidi bool, err error) {
// TODO: consider first doing a quick check to see if any of these checks
// need to be done. This will make it slower in the general case, but
// faster in the common case.
mapped = norm.NFC.String(s)
isBidi = bidirule.DirectionString(mapped) == bidi.RightToLeft
return mapped, isBidi, nil
}
func validateRegistration(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
func validateRegistration(p *Profile, s string) (idem string, bidi bool, err error) {
// TODO: filter need for normalization in loop below.
if !norm.NFC.IsNormalString(s) {
return s, &labelError{s, "V1"}
return s, false, &labelError{s, "V1"}
}
var err error
for i := 0; i < len(s); {
v, sz := trie.lookupString(s[i:])
i += sz
if sz == 0 {
return s, bidi, runeError(utf8.RuneError)
}
bidi = bidi || info(v).isBidi(s[i:])
// Copy bytes not copied so far.
switch p.simplify(info(v).category()) {
// TODO: handle the NV8 defined in the Unicode idna data set to allow
// for strict conformance to IDNA2008.
case valid, deviation:
case disallowed, mapped, unknown, ignored:
if err == nil {
r, _ := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s[i:])
err = runeError(r)
}
r, _ := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s[i:])
return s, bidi, runeError(r)
}
i += sz
}
return s, err
return s, bidi, nil
}
func validateAndMap(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
func (c info) isBidi(s string) bool {
if !c.isMapped() {
return c&attributesMask == rtl
}
// TODO: also store bidi info for mapped data. This is possible, but a bit
// cumbersome and not for the common case.
p, _ := bidi.LookupString(s)
switch p.Class() {
case bidi.R, bidi.AL, bidi.AN:
return true
}
return false
}
func validateAndMap(p *Profile, s string) (vm string, bidi bool, err error) {
var (
err error
b []byte
k int
b []byte
k int
)
// combinedInfoBits contains the or-ed bits of all runes. We use this
// to derive the mayNeedNorm bit later. This may trigger normalization
// overeagerly, but it will not do so in the common case. The end result
// is another 10% saving on BenchmarkProfile for the common case.
var combinedInfoBits info
for i := 0; i < len(s); {
v, sz := trie.lookupString(s[i:])
if sz == 0 {
b = append(b, s[k:i]...)
b = append(b, "\ufffd"...)
k = len(s)
if err == nil {
err = runeError(utf8.RuneError)
}
break
}
combinedInfoBits |= info(v)
bidi = bidi || info(v).isBidi(s[i:])
start := i
i += sz
// Copy bytes not copied so far.
@ -408,7 +468,7 @@ func validateAndMap(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
continue
case disallowed:
if err == nil {
r, _ := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s[i:])
r, _ := utf8.DecodeRuneInString(s[start:])
err = runeError(r)
}
continue
@ -426,7 +486,9 @@ func validateAndMap(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
}
if k == 0 {
// No changes so far.
s = norm.NFC.String(s)
if combinedInfoBits&mayNeedNorm != 0 {
s = norm.NFC.String(s)
}
} else {
b = append(b, s[k:]...)
if norm.NFC.QuickSpan(b) != len(b) {
@ -435,7 +497,7 @@ func validateAndMap(p *Profile, s string) (string, error) {
// TODO: the punycode converters require strings as input.
s = string(b)
}
return s, err
return s, bidi, err
}
// A labelIter allows iterating over domain name labels.
@ -530,8 +592,13 @@ func validateFromPunycode(p *Profile, s string) error {
if !norm.NFC.IsNormalString(s) {
return &labelError{s, "V1"}
}
// TODO: detect whether string may have to be normalized in the following
// loop.
for i := 0; i < len(s); {
v, sz := trie.lookupString(s[i:])
if sz == 0 {
return runeError(utf8.RuneError)
}
if c := p.simplify(info(v).category()); c != valid && c != deviation {
return &labelError{s, "V6"}
}
@ -604,16 +671,13 @@ var joinStates = [][numJoinTypes]joinState{
// validateLabel validates the criteria from Section 4.1. Item 1, 4, and 6 are
// already implicitly satisfied by the overall implementation.
func (p *Profile) validateLabel(s string) error {
func (p *Profile) validateLabel(s string) (err error) {
if s == "" {
if p.verifyDNSLength {
return &labelError{s, "A4"}
}
return nil
}
if p.bidirule != nil && !p.bidirule(s) {
return &labelError{s, "B"}
}
if !p.validateLabels {
return nil
}

4396
vendor/golang.org/x/net/idna/tables.go generated vendored

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ package idna
// 15..3 index into xor or mapping table
// }
// } else {
// 15..13 unused
// 12 modifier (including virama)
// 11 virama modifier
// 15..14 unused
// 13 mayNeedNorm
// 12..11 attributes
// 10..8 joining type
// 7..3 category type
// }
@ -49,15 +49,20 @@ const (
joinShift = 8
joinMask = 0x07
viramaModifier = 0x0800
// Attributes
attributesMask = 0x1800
viramaModifier = 0x1800
modifier = 0x1000
rtl = 0x0800
mayNeedNorm = 0x2000
)
// A category corresponds to a category defined in the IDNA mapping table.
type category uint16
const (
unknown category = 0 // not defined currently in unicode.
unknown category = 0 // not currently defined in unicode.
mapped category = 1
disallowedSTD3Mapped category = 2
deviation category = 3
@ -110,5 +115,5 @@ func (c info) isModifier() bool {
}
func (c info) isViramaModifier() bool {
return c&(viramaModifier|catSmallMask) == viramaModifier
return c&(attributesMask|catSmallMask) == viramaModifier
}

View file

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
"strings"
)
// A PerHost directs connections to a default Dialer unless the hostname
// A PerHost directs connections to a default Dialer unless the host name
// requested matches one of a number of exceptions.
type PerHost struct {
def, bypass Dialer
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func (p *PerHost) dialerForRequest(host string) Dialer {
return p.bypass
}
if host == zone[1:] {
// For a zone "example.com", we match "example.com"
// For a zone ".example.com", we match "example.com"
// too.
return p.bypass
}
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func (p *PerHost) dialerForRequest(host string) Dialer {
// AddFromString parses a string that contains comma-separated values
// specifying hosts that should use the bypass proxy. Each value is either an
// IP address, a CIDR range, a zone (*.example.com) or a hostname
// IP address, a CIDR range, a zone (*.example.com) or a host name
// (localhost). A best effort is made to parse the string and errors are
// ignored.
func (p *PerHost) AddFromString(s string) {
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ func (p *PerHost) AddZone(zone string) {
p.bypassZones = append(p.bypassZones, zone)
}
// AddHost specifies a hostname that will use the bypass proxy.
// AddHost specifies a host name that will use the bypass proxy.
func (p *PerHost) AddHost(host string) {
if strings.HasSuffix(host, ".") {
host = host[:len(host)-1]

View file

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/url"
"os"
"sync"
)
// A Dialer is a means to establish a connection.
@ -27,7 +28,7 @@ type Auth struct {
// FromEnvironment returns the dialer specified by the proxy related variables in
// the environment.
func FromEnvironment() Dialer {
allProxy := os.Getenv("all_proxy")
allProxy := allProxyEnv.Get()
if len(allProxy) == 0 {
return Direct
}
@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ func FromEnvironment() Dialer {
return Direct
}
noProxy := os.Getenv("no_proxy")
noProxy := noProxyEnv.Get()
if len(noProxy) == 0 {
return proxy
}
@ -92,3 +93,42 @@ func FromURL(u *url.URL, forward Dialer) (Dialer, error) {
return nil, errors.New("proxy: unknown scheme: " + u.Scheme)
}
var (
allProxyEnv = &envOnce{
names: []string{"ALL_PROXY", "all_proxy"},
}
noProxyEnv = &envOnce{
names: []string{"NO_PROXY", "no_proxy"},
}
)
// envOnce looks up an environment variable (optionally by multiple
// names) once. It mitigates expensive lookups on some platforms
// (e.g. Windows).
// (Borrowed from net/http/transport.go)
type envOnce struct {
names []string
once sync.Once
val string
}
func (e *envOnce) Get() string {
e.once.Do(e.init)
return e.val
}
func (e *envOnce) init() {
for _, n := range e.names {
e.val = os.Getenv(n)
if e.val != "" {
return
}
}
}
// reset is used by tests
func (e *envOnce) reset() {
e.once = sync.Once{}
e.val = ""
}

View file

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
)
// SOCKS5 returns a Dialer that makes SOCKSv5 connections to the given address
// with an optional username and password. See RFC 1928.
// with an optional username and password. See RFC 1928 and RFC 1929.
func SOCKS5(network, addr string, auth *Auth, forward Dialer) (Dialer, error) {
s := &socks5{
network: network,
@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ var socks5Errors = []string{
"address type not supported",
}
// Dial connects to the address addr on the network net via the SOCKS5 proxy.
// Dial connects to the address addr on the given network via the SOCKS5 proxy.
func (s *socks5) Dial(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
switch network {
case "tcp", "tcp6", "tcp4":
@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ func (s *socks5) connect(conn net.Conn, target string) error {
return errors.New("proxy: SOCKS5 proxy at " + s.addr + " requires authentication")
}
// See RFC 1929
if buf[1] == socks5AuthPassword {
buf = buf[:0]
buf = append(buf, 1 /* password protocol version */)
@ -154,7 +155,7 @@ func (s *socks5) connect(conn net.Conn, target string) error {
buf = append(buf, ip...)
} else {
if len(host) > 255 {
return errors.New("proxy: destination hostname too long: " + host)
return errors.New("proxy: destination host name too long: " + host)
}
buf = append(buf, socks5Domain)
buf = append(buf, byte(len(host)))

View file

@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ var buckets = []bucket{
}
// RenderEvents renders the HTML page typically served at /debug/events.
// It does not do any auth checking; see AuthRequest for the default auth check
// used by the handler registered on http.DefaultServeMux.
// req may be nil.
// It does not do any auth checking. The request may be nil.
//
// Most users will use the Events handler.
func RenderEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, sensitive bool) {
now := time.Now()
data := &struct {

View file

@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ package trace // import "golang.org/x/net/trace"
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"html/template"
"io"
@ -111,30 +110,46 @@ var AuthRequest = func(req *http.Request) (any, sensitive bool) {
}
func init() {
http.HandleFunc("/debug/requests", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
any, sensitive := AuthRequest(req)
if !any {
http.Error(w, "not allowed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
Render(w, req, sensitive)
})
http.HandleFunc("/debug/events", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
any, sensitive := AuthRequest(req)
if !any {
http.Error(w, "not allowed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
RenderEvents(w, req, sensitive)
})
// TODO(jbd): Serve Traces from /debug/traces in the future?
// There is no requirement for a request to be present to have traces.
http.HandleFunc("/debug/requests", Traces)
http.HandleFunc("/debug/events", Events)
}
// Traces responds with traces from the program.
// The package initialization registers it in http.DefaultServeMux
// at /debug/requests.
//
// It performs authorization by running AuthRequest.
func Traces(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
any, sensitive := AuthRequest(req)
if !any {
http.Error(w, "not allowed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
Render(w, req, sensitive)
}
// Events responds with a page of events collected by EventLogs.
// The package initialization registers it in http.DefaultServeMux
// at /debug/events.
//
// It performs authorization by running AuthRequest.
func Events(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
any, sensitive := AuthRequest(req)
if !any {
http.Error(w, "not allowed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
RenderEvents(w, req, sensitive)
}
// Render renders the HTML page typically served at /debug/requests.
// It does not do any auth checking; see AuthRequest for the default auth check
// used by the handler registered on http.DefaultServeMux.
// req may be nil.
// It does not do any auth checking. The request may be nil.
//
// Most users will use the Traces handler.
func Render(w io.Writer, req *http.Request, sensitive bool) {
data := &struct {
Families []string
@ -271,18 +286,6 @@ type contextKeyT string
var contextKey = contextKeyT("golang.org/x/net/trace.Trace")
// NewContext returns a copy of the parent context
// and associates it with a Trace.
func NewContext(ctx context.Context, tr Trace) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKey, tr)
}
// FromContext returns the Trace bound to the context, if any.
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (tr Trace, ok bool) {
tr, ok = ctx.Value(contextKey).(Trace)
return
}
// Trace represents an active request.
type Trace interface {
// LazyLog adds x to the event log. It will be evaluated each time the

21
vendor/golang.org/x/net/trace/trace_go16.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.7
package trace
import "golang.org/x/net/context"
// NewContext returns a copy of the parent context
// and associates it with a Trace.
func NewContext(ctx context.Context, tr Trace) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKey, tr)
}
// FromContext returns the Trace bound to the context, if any.
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (tr Trace, ok bool) {
tr, ok = ctx.Value(contextKey).(Trace)
return
}

21
vendor/golang.org/x/net/trace/trace_go17.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.7
package trace
import "context"
// NewContext returns a copy of the parent context
// and associates it with a Trace.
func NewContext(ctx context.Context, tr Trace) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, contextKey, tr)
}
// FromContext returns the Trace bound to the context, if any.
func FromContext(ctx context.Context) (tr Trace, ok bool) {
tr, ok = ctx.Value(contextKey).(Trace)
return
}

124
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/affinity_linux.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// CPU affinity functions
package unix
import (
"unsafe"
)
const cpuSetSize = _CPU_SETSIZE / _NCPUBITS
// CPUSet represents a CPU affinity mask.
type CPUSet [cpuSetSize]cpuMask
func schedAffinity(trap uintptr, pid int, set *CPUSet) error {
_, _, e := RawSyscall(trap, uintptr(pid), uintptr(unsafe.Sizeof(set)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(set)))
if e != 0 {
return errnoErr(e)
}
return nil
}
// SchedGetaffinity gets the CPU affinity mask of the thread specified by pid.
// If pid is 0 the calling thread is used.
func SchedGetaffinity(pid int, set *CPUSet) error {
return schedAffinity(SYS_SCHED_GETAFFINITY, pid, set)
}
// SchedSetaffinity sets the CPU affinity mask of the thread specified by pid.
// If pid is 0 the calling thread is used.
func SchedSetaffinity(pid int, set *CPUSet) error {
return schedAffinity(SYS_SCHED_SETAFFINITY, pid, set)
}
// Zero clears the set s, so that it contains no CPUs.
func (s *CPUSet) Zero() {
for i := range s {
s[i] = 0
}
}
func cpuBitsIndex(cpu int) int {
return cpu / _NCPUBITS
}
func cpuBitsMask(cpu int) cpuMask {
return cpuMask(1 << (uint(cpu) % _NCPUBITS))
}
// Set adds cpu to the set s.
func (s *CPUSet) Set(cpu int) {
i := cpuBitsIndex(cpu)
if i < len(s) {
s[i] |= cpuBitsMask(cpu)
}
}
// Clear removes cpu from the set s.
func (s *CPUSet) Clear(cpu int) {
i := cpuBitsIndex(cpu)
if i < len(s) {
s[i] &^= cpuBitsMask(cpu)
}
}
// IsSet reports whether cpu is in the set s.
func (s *CPUSet) IsSet(cpu int) bool {
i := cpuBitsIndex(cpu)
if i < len(s) {
return s[i]&cpuBitsMask(cpu) != 0
}
return false
}
// Count returns the number of CPUs in the set s.
func (s *CPUSet) Count() int {
c := 0
for _, b := range s {
c += onesCount64(uint64(b))
}
return c
}
// onesCount64 is a copy of Go 1.9's math/bits.OnesCount64.
// Once this package can require Go 1.9, we can delete this
// and update the caller to use bits.OnesCount64.
func onesCount64(x uint64) int {
const m0 = 0x5555555555555555 // 01010101 ...
const m1 = 0x3333333333333333 // 00110011 ...
const m2 = 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f // 00001111 ...
const m3 = 0x00ff00ff00ff00ff // etc.
const m4 = 0x0000ffff0000ffff
// Implementation: Parallel summing of adjacent bits.
// See "Hacker's Delight", Chap. 5: Counting Bits.
// The following pattern shows the general approach:
//
// x = x>>1&(m0&m) + x&(m0&m)
// x = x>>2&(m1&m) + x&(m1&m)
// x = x>>4&(m2&m) + x&(m2&m)
// x = x>>8&(m3&m) + x&(m3&m)
// x = x>>16&(m4&m) + x&(m4&m)
// x = x>>32&(m5&m) + x&(m5&m)
// return int(x)
//
// Masking (& operations) can be left away when there's no
// danger that a field's sum will carry over into the next
// field: Since the result cannot be > 64, 8 bits is enough
// and we can ignore the masks for the shifts by 8 and up.
// Per "Hacker's Delight", the first line can be simplified
// more, but it saves at best one instruction, so we leave
// it alone for clarity.
const m = 1<<64 - 1
x = x>>1&(m0&m) + x&(m0&m)
x = x>>2&(m1&m) + x&(m1&m)
x = (x>>4 + x) & (m2 & m)
x += x >> 8
x += x >> 16
x += x >> 32
return int(x) & (1<<7 - 1)
}

10
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/asm.s generated vendored
View file

@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !gccgo
#include "textflag.h"
TEXT ·use(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
RET

View file

@ -10,21 +10,51 @@
// System calls for 386, Linux
//
// See ../runtime/sys_linux_386.s for the reason why we always use int 0x80
// instead of the glibc-specific "CALL 0x10(GS)".
#define INVOKE_SYSCALL INT $0x80
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
JMP syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
JMP syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-24
CALL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVL trap+0(FP), AX // syscall entry
MOVL a1+4(FP), BX
MOVL a2+8(FP), CX
MOVL a3+12(FP), DX
MOVL $0, SI
MOVL $0, DI
INVOKE_SYSCALL
MOVL AX, r1+16(FP)
MOVL DX, r2+20(FP)
CALL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
JMP syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
JMP syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-24
MOVL trap+0(FP), AX // syscall entry
MOVL a1+4(FP), BX
MOVL a2+8(FP), CX
MOVL a3+12(FP), DX
MOVL $0, SI
MOVL $0, DI
INVOKE_SYSCALL
MOVL AX, r1+16(FP)
MOVL DX, r2+20(FP)
RET
TEXT ·socketcall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-36
JMP syscall·socketcall(SB)

View file

@ -13,17 +13,45 @@
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
JMP syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
JMP syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
CALL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVQ a1+8(FP), DI
MOVQ a2+16(FP), SI
MOVQ a3+24(FP), DX
MOVQ $0, R10
MOVQ $0, R8
MOVQ $0, R9
MOVQ trap+0(FP), AX // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVQ AX, r1+32(FP)
MOVQ DX, r2+40(FP)
CALL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
JMP syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
JMP syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
MOVQ a1+8(FP), DI
MOVQ a2+16(FP), SI
MOVQ a3+24(FP), DX
MOVQ $0, R10
MOVQ $0, R8
MOVQ $0, R9
MOVQ trap+0(FP), AX // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVQ AX, r1+32(FP)
MOVQ DX, r2+40(FP)
RET
TEXT ·gettimeofday(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-16
JMP syscall·gettimeofday(SB)

View file

@ -13,17 +13,44 @@
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
B syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
B syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-24
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVW trap+0(FP), R7
MOVW a1+4(FP), R0
MOVW a2+8(FP), R1
MOVW a3+12(FP), R2
MOVW $0, R3
MOVW $0, R4
MOVW $0, R5
SWI $0
MOVW R0, r1+16(FP)
MOVW $0, R0
MOVW R0, r2+20(FP)
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
B syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
B syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·seek(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-32
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-24
MOVW trap+0(FP), R7 // syscall entry
MOVW a1+4(FP), R0
MOVW a2+8(FP), R1
MOVW a3+12(FP), R2
SWI $0
MOVW R0, r1+16(FP)
MOVW $0, R0
MOVW R0, r2+20(FP)
RET
TEXT ·seek(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
B syscall·seek(SB)

View file

@ -11,14 +11,42 @@
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
B syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
B syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVD a1+8(FP), R0
MOVD a2+16(FP), R1
MOVD a3+24(FP), R2
MOVD $0, R3
MOVD $0, R4
MOVD $0, R5
MOVD trap+0(FP), R8 // syscall entry
SVC
MOVD R0, r1+32(FP) // r1
MOVD R1, r2+40(FP) // r2
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
B syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
B syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
MOVD a1+8(FP), R0
MOVD a2+16(FP), R1
MOVD a3+24(FP), R2
MOVD $0, R3
MOVD $0, R4
MOVD $0, R5
MOVD trap+0(FP), R8 // syscall entry
SVC
MOVD R0, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R1, r2+40(FP)
RET

View file

@ -15,14 +15,42 @@
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
JMP syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
JMP syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
JAL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVV a1+8(FP), R4
MOVV a2+16(FP), R5
MOVV a3+24(FP), R6
MOVV R0, R7
MOVV R0, R8
MOVV R0, R9
MOVV trap+0(FP), R2 // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVV R2, r1+32(FP)
MOVV R3, r2+40(FP)
JAL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
JMP syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
JMP syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
MOVV a1+8(FP), R4
MOVV a2+16(FP), R5
MOVV a3+24(FP), R6
MOVV R0, R7
MOVV R0, R8
MOVV R0, R9
MOVV trap+0(FP), R2 // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVV R2, r1+32(FP)
MOVV R3, r2+40(FP)
RET

54
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/asm_linux_mipsx.s generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build linux
// +build mips mipsle
// +build !gccgo
#include "textflag.h"
//
// System calls for mips, Linux
//
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
JMP syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
JMP syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall9(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-52
JMP syscall·Syscall9(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-24
JAL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVW a1+4(FP), R4
MOVW a2+8(FP), R5
MOVW a3+12(FP), R6
MOVW R0, R7
MOVW trap+0(FP), R2 // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVW R2, r1+16(FP) // r1
MOVW R3, r2+20(FP) // r2
JAL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
JMP syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
JMP syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-24
MOVW a1+4(FP), R4
MOVW a2+8(FP), R5
MOVW a3+12(FP), R6
MOVW trap+0(FP), R2 // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVW R2, r1+16(FP)
MOVW R3, r2+20(FP)
RET

View file

@ -15,14 +15,42 @@
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
BR syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
BR syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVD a1+8(FP), R3
MOVD a2+16(FP), R4
MOVD a3+24(FP), R5
MOVD R0, R6
MOVD R0, R7
MOVD R0, R8
MOVD trap+0(FP), R9 // syscall entry
SYSCALL R9
MOVD R3, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R4, r2+40(FP)
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
BR syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
BR syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
MOVD a1+8(FP), R3
MOVD a2+16(FP), R4
MOVD a3+24(FP), R5
MOVD R0, R6
MOVD R0, R7
MOVD R0, R8
MOVD trap+0(FP), R9 // syscall entry
SYSCALL R9
MOVD R3, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R4, r2+40(FP)
RET

View file

@ -21,8 +21,36 @@ TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
BR syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·SyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
BL runtime·entersyscall(SB)
MOVD a1+8(FP), R2
MOVD a2+16(FP), R3
MOVD a3+24(FP), R4
MOVD $0, R5
MOVD $0, R6
MOVD $0, R7
MOVD trap+0(FP), R1 // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVD R2, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R3, r2+40(FP)
BL runtime·exitsyscall(SB)
RET
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-56
BR syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-80
BR syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscallNoError(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-48
MOVD a1+8(FP), R2
MOVD a2+16(FP), R3
MOVD a3+24(FP), R4
MOVD $0, R5
MOVD $0, R6
MOVD $0, R7
MOVD trap+0(FP), R1 // syscall entry
SYSCALL
MOVD R2, r1+32(FP)
MOVD R3, r2+40(FP)
RET

29
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/asm_openbsd_arm.s generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !gccgo
#include "textflag.h"
//
// System call support for ARM, OpenBSD
//
// Just jump to package syscall's implementation for all these functions.
// The runtime may know about them.
TEXT ·Syscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
B syscall·Syscall(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
B syscall·Syscall6(SB)
TEXT ·Syscall9(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-52
B syscall·Syscall9(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-28
B syscall·RawSyscall(SB)
TEXT ·RawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-40
B syscall·RawSyscall6(SB)

View file

@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
// System calls for amd64, Solaris are implemented in runtime/syscall_solaris.go
//
TEXT ·sysvicall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-64
TEXT ·sysvicall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88
JMP syscall·sysvicall6(SB)
TEXT ·rawSysvicall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-64
TEXT ·rawSysvicall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88
JMP syscall·rawSysvicall6(SB)

195
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/cap_freebsd.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build freebsd
package unix
import (
errorspkg "errors"
"fmt"
)
// Go implementation of C mostly found in /usr/src/sys/kern/subr_capability.c
const (
// This is the version of CapRights this package understands. See C implementation for parallels.
capRightsGoVersion = CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00
capArSizeMin = CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 + 2
capArSizeMax = capRightsGoVersion + 2
)
var (
bit2idx = []int{
-1, 0, 1, -1, 2, -1, -1, -1, 3, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
4, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
}
)
func capidxbit(right uint64) int {
return int((right >> 57) & 0x1f)
}
func rightToIndex(right uint64) (int, error) {
idx := capidxbit(right)
if idx < 0 || idx >= len(bit2idx) {
return -2, fmt.Errorf("index for right 0x%x out of range", right)
}
return bit2idx[idx], nil
}
func caprver(right uint64) int {
return int(right >> 62)
}
func capver(rights *CapRights) int {
return caprver(rights.Rights[0])
}
func caparsize(rights *CapRights) int {
return capver(rights) + 2
}
// CapRightsSet sets the permissions in setrights in rights.
func CapRightsSet(rights *CapRights, setrights []uint64) error {
// This is essentially a copy of cap_rights_vset()
if capver(rights) != CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 {
return fmt.Errorf("bad rights version %d", capver(rights))
}
n := caparsize(rights)
if n < capArSizeMin || n > capArSizeMax {
return errorspkg.New("bad rights size")
}
for _, right := range setrights {
if caprver(right) != CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 {
return errorspkg.New("bad right version")
}
i, err := rightToIndex(right)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if i >= n {
return errorspkg.New("index overflow")
}
if capidxbit(rights.Rights[i]) != capidxbit(right) {
return errorspkg.New("index mismatch")
}
rights.Rights[i] |= right
if capidxbit(rights.Rights[i]) != capidxbit(right) {
return errorspkg.New("index mismatch (after assign)")
}
}
return nil
}
// CapRightsClear clears the permissions in clearrights from rights.
func CapRightsClear(rights *CapRights, clearrights []uint64) error {
// This is essentially a copy of cap_rights_vclear()
if capver(rights) != CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 {
return fmt.Errorf("bad rights version %d", capver(rights))
}
n := caparsize(rights)
if n < capArSizeMin || n > capArSizeMax {
return errorspkg.New("bad rights size")
}
for _, right := range clearrights {
if caprver(right) != CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 {
return errorspkg.New("bad right version")
}
i, err := rightToIndex(right)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if i >= n {
return errorspkg.New("index overflow")
}
if capidxbit(rights.Rights[i]) != capidxbit(right) {
return errorspkg.New("index mismatch")
}
rights.Rights[i] &= ^(right & 0x01FFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
if capidxbit(rights.Rights[i]) != capidxbit(right) {
return errorspkg.New("index mismatch (after assign)")
}
}
return nil
}
// CapRightsIsSet checks whether all the permissions in setrights are present in rights.
func CapRightsIsSet(rights *CapRights, setrights []uint64) (bool, error) {
// This is essentially a copy of cap_rights_is_vset()
if capver(rights) != CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 {
return false, fmt.Errorf("bad rights version %d", capver(rights))
}
n := caparsize(rights)
if n < capArSizeMin || n > capArSizeMax {
return false, errorspkg.New("bad rights size")
}
for _, right := range setrights {
if caprver(right) != CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION_00 {
return false, errorspkg.New("bad right version")
}
i, err := rightToIndex(right)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
if i >= n {
return false, errorspkg.New("index overflow")
}
if capidxbit(rights.Rights[i]) != capidxbit(right) {
return false, errorspkg.New("index mismatch")
}
if (rights.Rights[i] & right) != right {
return false, nil
}
}
return true, nil
}
func capright(idx uint64, bit uint64) uint64 {
return ((1 << (57 + idx)) | bit)
}
// CapRightsInit returns a pointer to an initialised CapRights structure filled with rights.
// See man cap_rights_init(3) and rights(4).
func CapRightsInit(rights []uint64) (*CapRights, error) {
var r CapRights
r.Rights[0] = (capRightsGoVersion << 62) | capright(0, 0)
r.Rights[1] = capright(1, 0)
err := CapRightsSet(&r, rights)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &r, nil
}
// CapRightsLimit reduces the operations permitted on fd to at most those contained in rights.
// The capability rights on fd can never be increased by CapRightsLimit.
// See man cap_rights_limit(2) and rights(4).
func CapRightsLimit(fd uintptr, rights *CapRights) error {
return capRightsLimit(int(fd), rights)
}
// CapRightsGet returns a CapRights structure containing the operations permitted on fd.
// See man cap_rights_get(3) and rights(4).
func CapRightsGet(fd uintptr) (*CapRights, error) {
r, err := CapRightsInit(nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = capRightsGet(capRightsGoVersion, int(fd), r)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return r, nil
}

24
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dev_darwin.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Functions to access/create device major and minor numbers matching the
// encoding used in Darwin's sys/types.h header.
package unix
// Major returns the major component of a Darwin device number.
func Major(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32((dev >> 24) & 0xff)
}
// Minor returns the minor component of a Darwin device number.
func Minor(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32(dev & 0xffffff)
}
// Mkdev returns a Darwin device number generated from the given major and minor
// components.
func Mkdev(major, minor uint32) uint64 {
return (uint64(major) << 24) | uint64(minor)
}

30
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dev_dragonfly.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Functions to access/create device major and minor numbers matching the
// encoding used in Dragonfly's sys/types.h header.
//
// The information below is extracted and adapted from sys/types.h:
//
// Minor gives a cookie instead of an index since in order to avoid changing the
// meanings of bits 0-15 or wasting time and space shifting bits 16-31 for
// devices that don't use them.
package unix
// Major returns the major component of a DragonFlyBSD device number.
func Major(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32((dev >> 8) & 0xff)
}
// Minor returns the minor component of a DragonFlyBSD device number.
func Minor(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32(dev & 0xffff00ff)
}
// Mkdev returns a DragonFlyBSD device number generated from the given major and
// minor components.
func Mkdev(major, minor uint32) uint64 {
return (uint64(major) << 8) | uint64(minor)
}

30
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dev_freebsd.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Functions to access/create device major and minor numbers matching the
// encoding used in FreeBSD's sys/types.h header.
//
// The information below is extracted and adapted from sys/types.h:
//
// Minor gives a cookie instead of an index since in order to avoid changing the
// meanings of bits 0-15 or wasting time and space shifting bits 16-31 for
// devices that don't use them.
package unix
// Major returns the major component of a FreeBSD device number.
func Major(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32((dev >> 8) & 0xff)
}
// Minor returns the minor component of a FreeBSD device number.
func Minor(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32(dev & 0xffff00ff)
}
// Mkdev returns a FreeBSD device number generated from the given major and
// minor components.
func Mkdev(major, minor uint32) uint64 {
return (uint64(major) << 8) | uint64(minor)
}

42
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dev_linux.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Functions to access/create device major and minor numbers matching the
// encoding used by the Linux kernel and glibc.
//
// The information below is extracted and adapted from bits/sysmacros.h in the
// glibc sources:
//
// dev_t in glibc is 64-bit, with 32-bit major and minor numbers. glibc's
// default encoding is MMMM Mmmm mmmM MMmm, where M is a hex digit of the major
// number and m is a hex digit of the minor number. This is backward compatible
// with legacy systems where dev_t is 16 bits wide, encoded as MMmm. It is also
// backward compatible with the Linux kernel, which for some architectures uses
// 32-bit dev_t, encoded as mmmM MMmm.
package unix
// Major returns the major component of a Linux device number.
func Major(dev uint64) uint32 {
major := uint32((dev & 0x00000000000fff00) >> 8)
major |= uint32((dev & 0xfffff00000000000) >> 32)
return major
}
// Minor returns the minor component of a Linux device number.
func Minor(dev uint64) uint32 {
minor := uint32((dev & 0x00000000000000ff) >> 0)
minor |= uint32((dev & 0x00000ffffff00000) >> 12)
return minor
}
// Mkdev returns a Linux device number generated from the given major and minor
// components.
func Mkdev(major, minor uint32) uint64 {
dev := (uint64(major) & 0x00000fff) << 8
dev |= (uint64(major) & 0xfffff000) << 32
dev |= (uint64(minor) & 0x000000ff) << 0
dev |= (uint64(minor) & 0xffffff00) << 12
return dev
}

29
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dev_netbsd.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Functions to access/create device major and minor numbers matching the
// encoding used in NetBSD's sys/types.h header.
package unix
// Major returns the major component of a NetBSD device number.
func Major(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32((dev & 0x000fff00) >> 8)
}
// Minor returns the minor component of a NetBSD device number.
func Minor(dev uint64) uint32 {
minor := uint32((dev & 0x000000ff) >> 0)
minor |= uint32((dev & 0xfff00000) >> 12)
return minor
}
// Mkdev returns a NetBSD device number generated from the given major and minor
// components.
func Mkdev(major, minor uint32) uint64 {
dev := (uint64(major) << 8) & 0x000fff00
dev |= (uint64(minor) << 12) & 0xfff00000
dev |= (uint64(minor) << 0) & 0x000000ff
return dev
}

29
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dev_openbsd.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Functions to access/create device major and minor numbers matching the
// encoding used in OpenBSD's sys/types.h header.
package unix
// Major returns the major component of an OpenBSD device number.
func Major(dev uint64) uint32 {
return uint32((dev & 0x0000ff00) >> 8)
}
// Minor returns the minor component of an OpenBSD device number.
func Minor(dev uint64) uint32 {
minor := uint32((dev & 0x000000ff) >> 0)
minor |= uint32((dev & 0xffff0000) >> 8)
return minor
}
// Mkdev returns an OpenBSD device number generated from the given major and minor
// components.
func Mkdev(major, minor uint32) uint64 {
dev := (uint64(major) << 8) & 0x0000ff00
dev |= (uint64(minor) << 8) & 0xffff0000
dev |= (uint64(minor) << 0) & 0x000000ff
return dev
}

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vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/dirent.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build darwin dragonfly freebsd linux nacl netbsd openbsd solaris
package unix
import "unsafe"
// readInt returns the size-bytes unsigned integer in native byte order at offset off.
func readInt(b []byte, off, size uintptr) (u uint64, ok bool) {
if len(b) < int(off+size) {
return 0, false
}
if isBigEndian {
return readIntBE(b[off:], size), true
}
return readIntLE(b[off:], size), true
}
func readIntBE(b []byte, size uintptr) uint64 {
switch size {
case 1:
return uint64(b[0])
case 2:
_ = b[1] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808
return uint64(b[1]) | uint64(b[0])<<8
case 4:
_ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808
return uint64(b[3]) | uint64(b[2])<<8 | uint64(b[1])<<16 | uint64(b[0])<<24
case 8:
_ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808
return uint64(b[7]) | uint64(b[6])<<8 | uint64(b[5])<<16 | uint64(b[4])<<24 |
uint64(b[3])<<32 | uint64(b[2])<<40 | uint64(b[1])<<48 | uint64(b[0])<<56
default:
panic("syscall: readInt with unsupported size")
}
}
func readIntLE(b []byte, size uintptr) uint64 {
switch size {
case 1:
return uint64(b[0])
case 2:
_ = b[1] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808
return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8
case 4:
_ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808
return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8 | uint64(b[2])<<16 | uint64(b[3])<<24
case 8:
_ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808
return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8 | uint64(b[2])<<16 | uint64(b[3])<<24 |
uint64(b[4])<<32 | uint64(b[5])<<40 | uint64(b[6])<<48 | uint64(b[7])<<56
default:
panic("syscall: readInt with unsupported size")
}
}
// ParseDirent parses up to max directory entries in buf,
// appending the names to names. It returns the number of
// bytes consumed from buf, the number of entries added
// to names, and the new names slice.
func ParseDirent(buf []byte, max int, names []string) (consumed int, count int, newnames []string) {
origlen := len(buf)
count = 0
for max != 0 && len(buf) > 0 {
reclen, ok := direntReclen(buf)
if !ok || reclen > uint64(len(buf)) {
return origlen, count, names
}
rec := buf[:reclen]
buf = buf[reclen:]
ino, ok := direntIno(rec)
if !ok {
break
}
if ino == 0 { // File absent in directory.
continue
}
const namoff = uint64(unsafe.Offsetof(Dirent{}.Name))
namlen, ok := direntNamlen(rec)
if !ok || namoff+namlen > uint64(len(rec)) {
break
}
name := rec[namoff : namoff+namlen]
for i, c := range name {
if c == 0 {
name = name[:i]
break
}
}
// Check for useless names before allocating a string.
if string(name) == "." || string(name) == ".." {
continue
}
max--
count++
names = append(names, string(name))
}
return origlen - len(buf), count, names
}

9
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/endian_big.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//
// +build ppc64 s390x mips mips64
package unix
const isBigEndian = true

9
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/endian_little.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
//
// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 arm arm64 ppc64le mipsle mips64le
package unix
const isBigEndian = false

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
@ -25,3 +25,7 @@ func Clearenv() {
func Environ() []string {
return syscall.Environ()
}
func Unsetenv(key string) error {
return syscall.Unsetenv(key)
}

View file

@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.4
package unix
import "syscall"
func Unsetenv(key string) error {
// This was added in Go 1.4.
return syscall.Unsetenv(key)
}

227
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/errors_freebsd_386.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Constants that were deprecated or moved to enums in the FreeBSD headers. Keep
// them here for backwards compatibility.
package unix
const (
IFF_SMART = 0x20
IFT_1822 = 0x2
IFT_A12MPPSWITCH = 0x82
IFT_AAL2 = 0xbb
IFT_AAL5 = 0x31
IFT_ADSL = 0x5e
IFT_AFLANE8023 = 0x3b
IFT_AFLANE8025 = 0x3c
IFT_ARAP = 0x58
IFT_ARCNET = 0x23
IFT_ARCNETPLUS = 0x24
IFT_ASYNC = 0x54
IFT_ATM = 0x25
IFT_ATMDXI = 0x69
IFT_ATMFUNI = 0x6a
IFT_ATMIMA = 0x6b
IFT_ATMLOGICAL = 0x50
IFT_ATMRADIO = 0xbd
IFT_ATMSUBINTERFACE = 0x86
IFT_ATMVCIENDPT = 0xc2
IFT_ATMVIRTUAL = 0x95
IFT_BGPPOLICYACCOUNTING = 0xa2
IFT_BSC = 0x53
IFT_CCTEMUL = 0x3d
IFT_CEPT = 0x13
IFT_CES = 0x85
IFT_CHANNEL = 0x46
IFT_CNR = 0x55
IFT_COFFEE = 0x84
IFT_COMPOSITELINK = 0x9b
IFT_DCN = 0x8d
IFT_DIGITALPOWERLINE = 0x8a
IFT_DIGITALWRAPPEROVERHEADCHANNEL = 0xba
IFT_DLSW = 0x4a
IFT_DOCSCABLEDOWNSTREAM = 0x80
IFT_DOCSCABLEMACLAYER = 0x7f
IFT_DOCSCABLEUPSTREAM = 0x81
IFT_DS0 = 0x51
IFT_DS0BUNDLE = 0x52
IFT_DS1FDL = 0xaa
IFT_DS3 = 0x1e
IFT_DTM = 0x8c
IFT_DVBASILN = 0xac
IFT_DVBASIOUT = 0xad
IFT_DVBRCCDOWNSTREAM = 0x93
IFT_DVBRCCMACLAYER = 0x92
IFT_DVBRCCUPSTREAM = 0x94
IFT_ENC = 0xf4
IFT_EON = 0x19
IFT_EPLRS = 0x57
IFT_ESCON = 0x49
IFT_ETHER = 0x6
IFT_FAITH = 0xf2
IFT_FAST = 0x7d
IFT_FASTETHER = 0x3e
IFT_FASTETHERFX = 0x45
IFT_FDDI = 0xf
IFT_FIBRECHANNEL = 0x38
IFT_FRAMERELAYINTERCONNECT = 0x3a
IFT_FRAMERELAYMPI = 0x5c
IFT_FRDLCIENDPT = 0xc1
IFT_FRELAY = 0x20
IFT_FRELAYDCE = 0x2c
IFT_FRF16MFRBUNDLE = 0xa3
IFT_FRFORWARD = 0x9e
IFT_G703AT2MB = 0x43
IFT_G703AT64K = 0x42
IFT_GIF = 0xf0
IFT_GIGABITETHERNET = 0x75
IFT_GR303IDT = 0xb2
IFT_GR303RDT = 0xb1
IFT_H323GATEKEEPER = 0xa4
IFT_H323PROXY = 0xa5
IFT_HDH1822 = 0x3
IFT_HDLC = 0x76
IFT_HDSL2 = 0xa8
IFT_HIPERLAN2 = 0xb7
IFT_HIPPI = 0x2f
IFT_HIPPIINTERFACE = 0x39
IFT_HOSTPAD = 0x5a
IFT_HSSI = 0x2e
IFT_HY = 0xe
IFT_IBM370PARCHAN = 0x48
IFT_IDSL = 0x9a
IFT_IEEE80211 = 0x47
IFT_IEEE80212 = 0x37
IFT_IEEE8023ADLAG = 0xa1
IFT_IFGSN = 0x91
IFT_IMT = 0xbe
IFT_INTERLEAVE = 0x7c
IFT_IP = 0x7e
IFT_IPFORWARD = 0x8e
IFT_IPOVERATM = 0x72
IFT_IPOVERCDLC = 0x6d
IFT_IPOVERCLAW = 0x6e
IFT_IPSWITCH = 0x4e
IFT_IPXIP = 0xf9
IFT_ISDN = 0x3f
IFT_ISDNBASIC = 0x14
IFT_ISDNPRIMARY = 0x15
IFT_ISDNS = 0x4b
IFT_ISDNU = 0x4c
IFT_ISO88022LLC = 0x29
IFT_ISO88023 = 0x7
IFT_ISO88024 = 0x8
IFT_ISO88025 = 0x9
IFT_ISO88025CRFPINT = 0x62
IFT_ISO88025DTR = 0x56
IFT_ISO88025FIBER = 0x73
IFT_ISO88026 = 0xa
IFT_ISUP = 0xb3
IFT_L3IPXVLAN = 0x89
IFT_LAPB = 0x10
IFT_LAPD = 0x4d
IFT_LAPF = 0x77
IFT_LOCALTALK = 0x2a
IFT_LOOP = 0x18
IFT_MEDIAMAILOVERIP = 0x8b
IFT_MFSIGLINK = 0xa7
IFT_MIOX25 = 0x26
IFT_MODEM = 0x30
IFT_MPC = 0x71
IFT_MPLS = 0xa6
IFT_MPLSTUNNEL = 0x96
IFT_MSDSL = 0x8f
IFT_MVL = 0xbf
IFT_MYRINET = 0x63
IFT_NFAS = 0xaf
IFT_NSIP = 0x1b
IFT_OPTICALCHANNEL = 0xc3
IFT_OPTICALTRANSPORT = 0xc4
IFT_OTHER = 0x1
IFT_P10 = 0xc
IFT_P80 = 0xd
IFT_PARA = 0x22
IFT_PFLOG = 0xf6
IFT_PFSYNC = 0xf7
IFT_PLC = 0xae
IFT_POS = 0xab
IFT_PPPMULTILINKBUNDLE = 0x6c
IFT_PROPBWAP2MP = 0xb8
IFT_PROPCNLS = 0x59
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSDOWNSTREAM = 0xb5
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSMACLAYER = 0xb4
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSUPSTREAM = 0xb6
IFT_PROPMUX = 0x36
IFT_PROPWIRELESSP2P = 0x9d
IFT_PTPSERIAL = 0x16
IFT_PVC = 0xf1
IFT_QLLC = 0x44
IFT_RADIOMAC = 0xbc
IFT_RADSL = 0x5f
IFT_REACHDSL = 0xc0
IFT_RFC1483 = 0x9f
IFT_RS232 = 0x21
IFT_RSRB = 0x4f
IFT_SDLC = 0x11
IFT_SDSL = 0x60
IFT_SHDSL = 0xa9
IFT_SIP = 0x1f
IFT_SLIP = 0x1c
IFT_SMDSDXI = 0x2b
IFT_SMDSICIP = 0x34
IFT_SONET = 0x27
IFT_SONETOVERHEADCHANNEL = 0xb9
IFT_SONETPATH = 0x32
IFT_SONETVT = 0x33
IFT_SRP = 0x97
IFT_SS7SIGLINK = 0x9c
IFT_STACKTOSTACK = 0x6f
IFT_STARLAN = 0xb
IFT_STF = 0xd7
IFT_T1 = 0x12
IFT_TDLC = 0x74
IFT_TERMPAD = 0x5b
IFT_TR008 = 0xb0
IFT_TRANSPHDLC = 0x7b
IFT_TUNNEL = 0x83
IFT_ULTRA = 0x1d
IFT_USB = 0xa0
IFT_V11 = 0x40
IFT_V35 = 0x2d
IFT_V36 = 0x41
IFT_V37 = 0x78
IFT_VDSL = 0x61
IFT_VIRTUALIPADDRESS = 0x70
IFT_VOICEEM = 0x64
IFT_VOICEENCAP = 0x67
IFT_VOICEFXO = 0x65
IFT_VOICEFXS = 0x66
IFT_VOICEOVERATM = 0x98
IFT_VOICEOVERFRAMERELAY = 0x99
IFT_VOICEOVERIP = 0x68
IFT_X213 = 0x5d
IFT_X25 = 0x5
IFT_X25DDN = 0x4
IFT_X25HUNTGROUP = 0x7a
IFT_X25MLP = 0x79
IFT_X25PLE = 0x28
IFT_XETHER = 0x1a
IPPROTO_MAXID = 0x34
IPV6_FAITH = 0x1d
IP_FAITH = 0x16
MAP_NORESERVE = 0x40
MAP_RENAME = 0x20
NET_RT_MAXID = 0x6
RTF_PRCLONING = 0x10000
RTM_OLDADD = 0x9
RTM_OLDDEL = 0xa
SIOCADDRT = 0x8030720a
SIOCALIFADDR = 0x8118691b
SIOCDELRT = 0x8030720b
SIOCDLIFADDR = 0x8118691d
SIOCGLIFADDR = 0xc118691c
SIOCGLIFPHYADDR = 0xc118694b
SIOCSLIFPHYADDR = 0x8118694a
)

227
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/errors_freebsd_amd64.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Constants that were deprecated or moved to enums in the FreeBSD headers. Keep
// them here for backwards compatibility.
package unix
const (
IFF_SMART = 0x20
IFT_1822 = 0x2
IFT_A12MPPSWITCH = 0x82
IFT_AAL2 = 0xbb
IFT_AAL5 = 0x31
IFT_ADSL = 0x5e
IFT_AFLANE8023 = 0x3b
IFT_AFLANE8025 = 0x3c
IFT_ARAP = 0x58
IFT_ARCNET = 0x23
IFT_ARCNETPLUS = 0x24
IFT_ASYNC = 0x54
IFT_ATM = 0x25
IFT_ATMDXI = 0x69
IFT_ATMFUNI = 0x6a
IFT_ATMIMA = 0x6b
IFT_ATMLOGICAL = 0x50
IFT_ATMRADIO = 0xbd
IFT_ATMSUBINTERFACE = 0x86
IFT_ATMVCIENDPT = 0xc2
IFT_ATMVIRTUAL = 0x95
IFT_BGPPOLICYACCOUNTING = 0xa2
IFT_BSC = 0x53
IFT_CCTEMUL = 0x3d
IFT_CEPT = 0x13
IFT_CES = 0x85
IFT_CHANNEL = 0x46
IFT_CNR = 0x55
IFT_COFFEE = 0x84
IFT_COMPOSITELINK = 0x9b
IFT_DCN = 0x8d
IFT_DIGITALPOWERLINE = 0x8a
IFT_DIGITALWRAPPEROVERHEADCHANNEL = 0xba
IFT_DLSW = 0x4a
IFT_DOCSCABLEDOWNSTREAM = 0x80
IFT_DOCSCABLEMACLAYER = 0x7f
IFT_DOCSCABLEUPSTREAM = 0x81
IFT_DS0 = 0x51
IFT_DS0BUNDLE = 0x52
IFT_DS1FDL = 0xaa
IFT_DS3 = 0x1e
IFT_DTM = 0x8c
IFT_DVBASILN = 0xac
IFT_DVBASIOUT = 0xad
IFT_DVBRCCDOWNSTREAM = 0x93
IFT_DVBRCCMACLAYER = 0x92
IFT_DVBRCCUPSTREAM = 0x94
IFT_ENC = 0xf4
IFT_EON = 0x19
IFT_EPLRS = 0x57
IFT_ESCON = 0x49
IFT_ETHER = 0x6
IFT_FAITH = 0xf2
IFT_FAST = 0x7d
IFT_FASTETHER = 0x3e
IFT_FASTETHERFX = 0x45
IFT_FDDI = 0xf
IFT_FIBRECHANNEL = 0x38
IFT_FRAMERELAYINTERCONNECT = 0x3a
IFT_FRAMERELAYMPI = 0x5c
IFT_FRDLCIENDPT = 0xc1
IFT_FRELAY = 0x20
IFT_FRELAYDCE = 0x2c
IFT_FRF16MFRBUNDLE = 0xa3
IFT_FRFORWARD = 0x9e
IFT_G703AT2MB = 0x43
IFT_G703AT64K = 0x42
IFT_GIF = 0xf0
IFT_GIGABITETHERNET = 0x75
IFT_GR303IDT = 0xb2
IFT_GR303RDT = 0xb1
IFT_H323GATEKEEPER = 0xa4
IFT_H323PROXY = 0xa5
IFT_HDH1822 = 0x3
IFT_HDLC = 0x76
IFT_HDSL2 = 0xa8
IFT_HIPERLAN2 = 0xb7
IFT_HIPPI = 0x2f
IFT_HIPPIINTERFACE = 0x39
IFT_HOSTPAD = 0x5a
IFT_HSSI = 0x2e
IFT_HY = 0xe
IFT_IBM370PARCHAN = 0x48
IFT_IDSL = 0x9a
IFT_IEEE80211 = 0x47
IFT_IEEE80212 = 0x37
IFT_IEEE8023ADLAG = 0xa1
IFT_IFGSN = 0x91
IFT_IMT = 0xbe
IFT_INTERLEAVE = 0x7c
IFT_IP = 0x7e
IFT_IPFORWARD = 0x8e
IFT_IPOVERATM = 0x72
IFT_IPOVERCDLC = 0x6d
IFT_IPOVERCLAW = 0x6e
IFT_IPSWITCH = 0x4e
IFT_IPXIP = 0xf9
IFT_ISDN = 0x3f
IFT_ISDNBASIC = 0x14
IFT_ISDNPRIMARY = 0x15
IFT_ISDNS = 0x4b
IFT_ISDNU = 0x4c
IFT_ISO88022LLC = 0x29
IFT_ISO88023 = 0x7
IFT_ISO88024 = 0x8
IFT_ISO88025 = 0x9
IFT_ISO88025CRFPINT = 0x62
IFT_ISO88025DTR = 0x56
IFT_ISO88025FIBER = 0x73
IFT_ISO88026 = 0xa
IFT_ISUP = 0xb3
IFT_L3IPXVLAN = 0x89
IFT_LAPB = 0x10
IFT_LAPD = 0x4d
IFT_LAPF = 0x77
IFT_LOCALTALK = 0x2a
IFT_LOOP = 0x18
IFT_MEDIAMAILOVERIP = 0x8b
IFT_MFSIGLINK = 0xa7
IFT_MIOX25 = 0x26
IFT_MODEM = 0x30
IFT_MPC = 0x71
IFT_MPLS = 0xa6
IFT_MPLSTUNNEL = 0x96
IFT_MSDSL = 0x8f
IFT_MVL = 0xbf
IFT_MYRINET = 0x63
IFT_NFAS = 0xaf
IFT_NSIP = 0x1b
IFT_OPTICALCHANNEL = 0xc3
IFT_OPTICALTRANSPORT = 0xc4
IFT_OTHER = 0x1
IFT_P10 = 0xc
IFT_P80 = 0xd
IFT_PARA = 0x22
IFT_PFLOG = 0xf6
IFT_PFSYNC = 0xf7
IFT_PLC = 0xae
IFT_POS = 0xab
IFT_PPPMULTILINKBUNDLE = 0x6c
IFT_PROPBWAP2MP = 0xb8
IFT_PROPCNLS = 0x59
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSDOWNSTREAM = 0xb5
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSMACLAYER = 0xb4
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSUPSTREAM = 0xb6
IFT_PROPMUX = 0x36
IFT_PROPWIRELESSP2P = 0x9d
IFT_PTPSERIAL = 0x16
IFT_PVC = 0xf1
IFT_QLLC = 0x44
IFT_RADIOMAC = 0xbc
IFT_RADSL = 0x5f
IFT_REACHDSL = 0xc0
IFT_RFC1483 = 0x9f
IFT_RS232 = 0x21
IFT_RSRB = 0x4f
IFT_SDLC = 0x11
IFT_SDSL = 0x60
IFT_SHDSL = 0xa9
IFT_SIP = 0x1f
IFT_SLIP = 0x1c
IFT_SMDSDXI = 0x2b
IFT_SMDSICIP = 0x34
IFT_SONET = 0x27
IFT_SONETOVERHEADCHANNEL = 0xb9
IFT_SONETPATH = 0x32
IFT_SONETVT = 0x33
IFT_SRP = 0x97
IFT_SS7SIGLINK = 0x9c
IFT_STACKTOSTACK = 0x6f
IFT_STARLAN = 0xb
IFT_STF = 0xd7
IFT_T1 = 0x12
IFT_TDLC = 0x74
IFT_TERMPAD = 0x5b
IFT_TR008 = 0xb0
IFT_TRANSPHDLC = 0x7b
IFT_TUNNEL = 0x83
IFT_ULTRA = 0x1d
IFT_USB = 0xa0
IFT_V11 = 0x40
IFT_V35 = 0x2d
IFT_V36 = 0x41
IFT_V37 = 0x78
IFT_VDSL = 0x61
IFT_VIRTUALIPADDRESS = 0x70
IFT_VOICEEM = 0x64
IFT_VOICEENCAP = 0x67
IFT_VOICEFXO = 0x65
IFT_VOICEFXS = 0x66
IFT_VOICEOVERATM = 0x98
IFT_VOICEOVERFRAMERELAY = 0x99
IFT_VOICEOVERIP = 0x68
IFT_X213 = 0x5d
IFT_X25 = 0x5
IFT_X25DDN = 0x4
IFT_X25HUNTGROUP = 0x7a
IFT_X25MLP = 0x79
IFT_X25PLE = 0x28
IFT_XETHER = 0x1a
IPPROTO_MAXID = 0x34
IPV6_FAITH = 0x1d
IP_FAITH = 0x16
MAP_NORESERVE = 0x40
MAP_RENAME = 0x20
NET_RT_MAXID = 0x6
RTF_PRCLONING = 0x10000
RTM_OLDADD = 0x9
RTM_OLDDEL = 0xa
SIOCADDRT = 0x8040720a
SIOCALIFADDR = 0x8118691b
SIOCDELRT = 0x8040720b
SIOCDLIFADDR = 0x8118691d
SIOCGLIFADDR = 0xc118691c
SIOCGLIFPHYADDR = 0xc118694b
SIOCSLIFPHYADDR = 0x8118694a
)

226
vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/errors_freebsd_arm.go generated vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package unix
const (
IFT_1822 = 0x2
IFT_A12MPPSWITCH = 0x82
IFT_AAL2 = 0xbb
IFT_AAL5 = 0x31
IFT_ADSL = 0x5e
IFT_AFLANE8023 = 0x3b
IFT_AFLANE8025 = 0x3c
IFT_ARAP = 0x58
IFT_ARCNET = 0x23
IFT_ARCNETPLUS = 0x24
IFT_ASYNC = 0x54
IFT_ATM = 0x25
IFT_ATMDXI = 0x69
IFT_ATMFUNI = 0x6a
IFT_ATMIMA = 0x6b
IFT_ATMLOGICAL = 0x50
IFT_ATMRADIO = 0xbd
IFT_ATMSUBINTERFACE = 0x86
IFT_ATMVCIENDPT = 0xc2
IFT_ATMVIRTUAL = 0x95
IFT_BGPPOLICYACCOUNTING = 0xa2
IFT_BSC = 0x53
IFT_CCTEMUL = 0x3d
IFT_CEPT = 0x13
IFT_CES = 0x85
IFT_CHANNEL = 0x46
IFT_CNR = 0x55
IFT_COFFEE = 0x84
IFT_COMPOSITELINK = 0x9b
IFT_DCN = 0x8d
IFT_DIGITALPOWERLINE = 0x8a
IFT_DIGITALWRAPPEROVERHEADCHANNEL = 0xba
IFT_DLSW = 0x4a
IFT_DOCSCABLEDOWNSTREAM = 0x80
IFT_DOCSCABLEMACLAYER = 0x7f
IFT_DOCSCABLEUPSTREAM = 0x81
IFT_DS0 = 0x51
IFT_DS0BUNDLE = 0x52
IFT_DS1FDL = 0xaa
IFT_DS3 = 0x1e
IFT_DTM = 0x8c
IFT_DVBASILN = 0xac
IFT_DVBASIOUT = 0xad
IFT_DVBRCCDOWNSTREAM = 0x93
IFT_DVBRCCMACLAYER = 0x92
IFT_DVBRCCUPSTREAM = 0x94
IFT_ENC = 0xf4
IFT_EON = 0x19
IFT_EPLRS = 0x57
IFT_ESCON = 0x49
IFT_ETHER = 0x6
IFT_FAST = 0x7d
IFT_FASTETHER = 0x3e
IFT_FASTETHERFX = 0x45
IFT_FDDI = 0xf
IFT_FIBRECHANNEL = 0x38
IFT_FRAMERELAYINTERCONNECT = 0x3a
IFT_FRAMERELAYMPI = 0x5c
IFT_FRDLCIENDPT = 0xc1
IFT_FRELAY = 0x20
IFT_FRELAYDCE = 0x2c
IFT_FRF16MFRBUNDLE = 0xa3
IFT_FRFORWARD = 0x9e
IFT_G703AT2MB = 0x43
IFT_G703AT64K = 0x42
IFT_GIF = 0xf0
IFT_GIGABITETHERNET = 0x75
IFT_GR303IDT = 0xb2
IFT_GR303RDT = 0xb1
IFT_H323GATEKEEPER = 0xa4
IFT_H323PROXY = 0xa5
IFT_HDH1822 = 0x3
IFT_HDLC = 0x76
IFT_HDSL2 = 0xa8
IFT_HIPERLAN2 = 0xb7
IFT_HIPPI = 0x2f
IFT_HIPPIINTERFACE = 0x39
IFT_HOSTPAD = 0x5a
IFT_HSSI = 0x2e
IFT_HY = 0xe
IFT_IBM370PARCHAN = 0x48
IFT_IDSL = 0x9a
IFT_IEEE80211 = 0x47
IFT_IEEE80212 = 0x37
IFT_IEEE8023ADLAG = 0xa1
IFT_IFGSN = 0x91
IFT_IMT = 0xbe
IFT_INTERLEAVE = 0x7c
IFT_IP = 0x7e
IFT_IPFORWARD = 0x8e
IFT_IPOVERATM = 0x72
IFT_IPOVERCDLC = 0x6d
IFT_IPOVERCLAW = 0x6e
IFT_IPSWITCH = 0x4e
IFT_ISDN = 0x3f
IFT_ISDNBASIC = 0x14
IFT_ISDNPRIMARY = 0x15
IFT_ISDNS = 0x4b
IFT_ISDNU = 0x4c
IFT_ISO88022LLC = 0x29
IFT_ISO88023 = 0x7
IFT_ISO88024 = 0x8
IFT_ISO88025 = 0x9
IFT_ISO88025CRFPINT = 0x62
IFT_ISO88025DTR = 0x56
IFT_ISO88025FIBER = 0x73
IFT_ISO88026 = 0xa
IFT_ISUP = 0xb3
IFT_L3IPXVLAN = 0x89
IFT_LAPB = 0x10
IFT_LAPD = 0x4d
IFT_LAPF = 0x77
IFT_LOCALTALK = 0x2a
IFT_LOOP = 0x18
IFT_MEDIAMAILOVERIP = 0x8b
IFT_MFSIGLINK = 0xa7
IFT_MIOX25 = 0x26
IFT_MODEM = 0x30
IFT_MPC = 0x71
IFT_MPLS = 0xa6
IFT_MPLSTUNNEL = 0x96
IFT_MSDSL = 0x8f
IFT_MVL = 0xbf
IFT_MYRINET = 0x63
IFT_NFAS = 0xaf
IFT_NSIP = 0x1b
IFT_OPTICALCHANNEL = 0xc3
IFT_OPTICALTRANSPORT = 0xc4
IFT_OTHER = 0x1
IFT_P10 = 0xc
IFT_P80 = 0xd
IFT_PARA = 0x22
IFT_PFLOG = 0xf6
IFT_PFSYNC = 0xf7
IFT_PLC = 0xae
IFT_POS = 0xab
IFT_PPPMULTILINKBUNDLE = 0x6c
IFT_PROPBWAP2MP = 0xb8
IFT_PROPCNLS = 0x59
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSDOWNSTREAM = 0xb5
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSMACLAYER = 0xb4
IFT_PROPDOCSWIRELESSUPSTREAM = 0xb6
IFT_PROPMUX = 0x36
IFT_PROPWIRELESSP2P = 0x9d
IFT_PTPSERIAL = 0x16
IFT_PVC = 0xf1
IFT_QLLC = 0x44
IFT_RADIOMAC = 0xbc
IFT_RADSL = 0x5f
IFT_REACHDSL = 0xc0
IFT_RFC1483 = 0x9f
IFT_RS232 = 0x21
IFT_RSRB = 0x4f
IFT_SDLC = 0x11
IFT_SDSL = 0x60
IFT_SHDSL = 0xa9
IFT_SIP = 0x1f
IFT_SLIP = 0x1c
IFT_SMDSDXI = 0x2b
IFT_SMDSICIP = 0x34
IFT_SONET = 0x27
IFT_SONETOVERHEADCHANNEL = 0xb9
IFT_SONETPATH = 0x32
IFT_SONETVT = 0x33
IFT_SRP = 0x97
IFT_SS7SIGLINK = 0x9c
IFT_STACKTOSTACK = 0x6f
IFT_STARLAN = 0xb
IFT_STF = 0xd7
IFT_T1 = 0x12
IFT_TDLC = 0x74
IFT_TERMPAD = 0x5b
IFT_TR008 = 0xb0
IFT_TRANSPHDLC = 0x7b
IFT_TUNNEL = 0x83
IFT_ULTRA = 0x1d
IFT_USB = 0xa0
IFT_V11 = 0x40
IFT_V35 = 0x2d
IFT_V36 = 0x41
IFT_V37 = 0x78
IFT_VDSL = 0x61
IFT_VIRTUALIPADDRESS = 0x70
IFT_VOICEEM = 0x64
IFT_VOICEENCAP = 0x67
IFT_VOICEFXO = 0x65
IFT_VOICEFXS = 0x66
IFT_VOICEOVERATM = 0x98
IFT_VOICEOVERFRAMERELAY = 0x99
IFT_VOICEOVERIP = 0x68
IFT_X213 = 0x5d
IFT_X25 = 0x5
IFT_X25DDN = 0x4
IFT_X25HUNTGROUP = 0x7a
IFT_X25MLP = 0x79
IFT_X25PLE = 0x28
IFT_XETHER = 0x1a
// missing constants on FreeBSD-11.1-RELEASE, copied from old values in ztypes_freebsd_arm.go
IFF_SMART = 0x20
IFT_FAITH = 0xf2
IFT_IPXIP = 0xf9
IPPROTO_MAXID = 0x34
IPV6_FAITH = 0x1d
IP_FAITH = 0x16
MAP_NORESERVE = 0x40
MAP_RENAME = 0x20
NET_RT_MAXID = 0x6
RTF_PRCLONING = 0x10000
RTM_OLDADD = 0x9
RTM_OLDDEL = 0xa
SIOCADDRT = 0x8030720a
SIOCALIFADDR = 0x8118691b
SIOCDELRT = 0x8030720b
SIOCDLIFADDR = 0x8118691d
SIOCGLIFADDR = 0xc118691c
SIOCGLIFPHYADDR = 0xc118694b
SIOCSLIFPHYADDR = 0x8118694a
)

View file

@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
// +build linux darwin freebsd openbsd netbsd dragonfly
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// +build linux,386 linux,arm
// +build linux,386 linux,arm linux,mips linux,mipsle
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
@ -8,12 +8,22 @@ package unix
import "syscall"
// We can't use the gc-syntax .s files for gccgo. On the plus side
// We can't use the gc-syntax .s files for gccgo. On the plus side
// much of the functionality can be written directly in Go.
//extern gccgoRealSyscallNoError
func realSyscallNoError(trap, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9 uintptr) (r uintptr)
//extern gccgoRealSyscall
func realSyscall(trap, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9 uintptr) (r, errno uintptr)
func SyscallNoError(trap, a1, a2, a3 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr) {
syscall.Entersyscall()
r := realSyscallNoError(trap, a1, a2, a3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
syscall.Exitsyscall()
return r, 0
}
func Syscall(trap, a1, a2, a3 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err syscall.Errno) {
syscall.Entersyscall()
r, errno := realSyscall(trap, a1, a2, a3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
@ -35,6 +45,11 @@ func Syscall9(trap, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr,
return r, 0, syscall.Errno(errno)
}
func RawSyscallNoError(trap, a1, a2, a3 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr) {
r := realSyscallNoError(trap, a1, a2, a3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
return r, 0
}
func RawSyscall(trap, a1, a2, a3 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err syscall.Errno) {
r, errno := realSyscall(trap, a1, a2, a3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
return r, 0, syscall.Errno(errno)

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ gccgoRealSyscall(uintptr_t trap, uintptr_t a1, uintptr_t a2, uintptr_t a3, uintp
return r;
}
uintptr_t
gccgoRealSyscallNoError(uintptr_t trap, uintptr_t a1, uintptr_t a2, uintptr_t a3, uintptr_t a4, uintptr_t a5, uintptr_t a6, uintptr_t a7, uintptr_t a8, uintptr_t a9)
{
return syscall(trap, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9);
}
// Define the use function in C so that it is not inlined.
extern void use(void *) __asm__ (GOSYM_PREFIX GOPKGPATH ".use") __attribute__((noinline));

View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

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